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I. INTRODUCTION 
The Supreme Court has decided that certain types of law, when 
challenged, are presumptively unconstitutional, while others are 
presumptively permissible. Laws containing racial classifications, for 
example, have been deemed to be presumptively unconstitutional, 
and to violate the Equal Protection Clause unless the government 
shows those classifications to be "necessary" to achieve a "compelling'' 
state interest.1 The Court has applied a presumption of 
unconstitutionality, and a similar formulation of "strict scrutiny," not 
only to laws containing racial classifications, but also to laws that 
classify according to the content of speech;2 laws that burden the free 
exercise of religion;a laws that burden the right to choose abortion;4 
laws that burden the right to travel;5 indeed, laws that burden the 
full range of rights deemed to be "fundamental."6 
1. See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 331 (2003) (Racial "classifications are 
constitutional only if they are narrowly tailored to further compelling governmental 
interests."); Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429, 432-33 (1984) (Racial "classifications are 
subject to the most exacting scrutiny; to pass constitutional muster, they must be 
justified by a compelling governmental interest and must be 'necessary . . . to the 
accomplishment' of their legitimate purpose." (citations omitted)). 
2. See Simon & Schuster v. Members of the New York State Crime Victims Bd., 
502 U.S. 105, 118 (1991) (To validate a law targeting speech based on content, "the 
State must show that its regulation is necessary to serve a compelling state interest 
and is narrowly drawn to achieve that end."). 
3. See Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 406-07 (1963) (requiring burdens on 
religious exercise to be justified by a "compelling" governmental interest); Bob Jones 
Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 603 ("The state may justify a limitation on 
religious liberty by showing that it is essential to accomplish an overriding 
governmental interest."). 
4. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 155 (1973) ("Where certain 'fundamental rights' 
are involved, the Court has held that regulation limiting these rights may be justified 
only by a 'compelling state interest,' and that legislative enactments must be narrowly 
drawn to express only the legitimate state interests at stake.") (citations omitted). 
5. See Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 634 (1969) (A classification penalizing 
the right to travel is unconstitutional "unless shown to be necessary to promote a 
compelling governmental interest."). 
6. Why does the government bear this burden under these disparate 
circumstances? Does "strict scrutiny" mean the same thing for enforcing the Equal 
Protection Clause, the speech clause, the free exercise clause, and the Due Process 
Clause? Should it mean the same thing? How can variations on one vague verbal 
formula serve to vindicate the range of disparate values that must underlie 
constitutional protections against racial discrimination, censorship of speech, and 
restrictions on the right to choose, to travel, or to worship? What, if anything, does 
"strict scrutiny" have to do with the particular constitutional values underlying the 
proscriptions in these disparate areas? Do particular constitutional values matter in 
those doctrinal contexts in which the Court has established "strict scrutiny'' as the test 
of constitutionality? Should they? What, precisely, does the government have to prove 
under "strict scrutiny'' when defending a racial classification, a content-based 
regulation of speech, an intrusion on the exercise of religion, an intrusion on a right of 
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In contrast, the Court presumes that facially neutral laws 
challenged as inflicting unconstitutional racial discrimination do not 
violate the Equal Protection Clause.7 Such a law will be upheld 
unless the challenger proves that "a racially discriminatory purpose 
has been a motivating factor" in the law's enactment.s In another 
constitutional context, the Court at one time treated as 
presumptively unconstitutional federal statutes enacted under the 
Commerce Clause that regulated subjects other than interstate 
commerce.9 Today, the Court treats such statutes as presumptively 
permissible-at least if Congress has regulated economic activityIO-
and treats as presumptively impermissible Commerce Clause 
legislation that regulates non-economic activity.11 
How has the Court determined which types of law should be 
presumed permissible, and which types presumed impermissible? 
How should the Court make these determinations? Beyond 
presumptions, in particular constitutional challenges under 
particular constitutional provisions, has the Court clearly identified 
what the challenger must prove to overcome a presumption of 
permissibility, or what the government must show to overcome a 
presumption of impermissibility? How should the Court determine, 
and articulate, what must be shown to overcome these presumptions? 
The foregoing questions reflect two functionally discrete issues 
that courts must confront in deciding particular constitutional 
controversies. First, what is the substantive definition of 
governmental action that violates particular provisions of the 
Constitution? In other words, what substantive constitutional 
principles define restrictions on governmental discretion? Second, 
what party should bear the burden of persuasion with respect to a 
privacy, or an intrusion on the right to travel? In determining whether a state interest 
is "compelling," does a court decide an issue of law, fact, or mixed law and fact? See 
infra note 30. 
7. See Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 265-266 
(1977). 
8. Id. At times, the Court characterizes the task of establishing 
unconstitutionality as a matter of making a "showing;" at other times, as a matter of 
establishing "proof." Compare Justice Powell's opinion for the Court in Arlington 
Heights, 429 U.S. at 265 ("Proof of racially discriminatory intent or purpose is required 
to show a violation of the Equal Protection Clause."), with Justice Powell's opinion in 
California Board of Regents v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 305 (1978) ("[I]n order to justify 
the use of a suspect classification, a State must show that its purpose or interest is 
both constitutionally permissible and substantial, and that its use of the classification 
is 'necessary . . . to the accomplishment' of its purpose or the safeguarding of its 
interest.") (citations omitted). 
9. See generally Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238 (1936). 
10. See generally United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941); Wickard v. Filburn, 
317 U.S. 111 (1942). 
11. See generally United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995). 
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court's determination of whether that substantive definition of 
unconstitutionality has been violated; and how should that burden be 
discharged? In other words, through what adjudicative rules should 
courts determine whether a particular governmental act violates a 
substantive definition of unconstitutionality? 
This Article will suggest that each of these two issues ought to be 
addressed explicitly in formulating doctrine for the adjudication of 
constitutional controversies. In doing so, my argument rests on a 
fundamental distinction that parallels that raised in Mitchell 
Berman's work on "constitutional decision rules."12 Berman argues 
that scholars and judges should "concentrate on developing a 
functional taxonomy" of constitutional doctrine,13 suggesting a 
distinction between "doctrines that represent the judiciary's 
understanding of the proper meaning of a constitutional power, right, 
duty, or other sort of provision" (which he terms "constitutional 
operative provisions") and "doctrines that direct courts how to decide 
whether a constitutional operative provision is satisfied" (which he 
terms "constitution decision rules").14 
In my view, Berman's work is on a track that could-and 
should-lead to a new paradigm for thinking about constitutional 
law. I have been working a similar track in my teaching for over 
twenty years, and for the past five years have been formalizing my 
analyses in writing this Article. Toward developing this conceptual 
distinction between rules that define constitutional meaning 
(substantive constitutional principles) and rules for determining 
whether a particular challenged governmental act violates a 
substantive constitutional principle (adjudicative rules), my route is 
different from Berman's.15 Berman develops the distinction as 
12. See Mitchell N. Berman, Constitutional Decision Rules, 90 VA. L. REV. 1 (2004) 
[hereinafter Berman, Constitutional Decision Rules]; see also Mitchell N. Berman, 
Guillen and Gullibility: Piercing the Surface of Commerce Clause Doctrine, 89 IOWA L. 
REV. 1487, 1519-23 (2004) [hereinafter Berman, Guillen and Gullibility]; Mitchell N. 
Berman, Managing Gerrymandering, 83 TEXAS L. REV. 781 (2005) [hereinafter 
Berman, Managing Gerrymandering]. 
13. Berman, Constitutional Decision Rules, supra note 12, at 8. 
14. Id. at 9. 
15. Imagine my mix of reactions when I happened upon Professor Berman's article 
in late June of 2005, (as I was clumsily searching in Westlaw for the cite to Robert 
Nagel's Formulaic Constitution), just as this piece was nearing completion, after so 
many years of classroom percolation and four years of deliberate-speed paced writing. 
The proposition that constitutional doctrine should be explicitly structured in terms of 
substantive and adjudicative rules seemed so foundational to me, and almost obvious, 
but since no one had sharply made the point in the two centuries during which the 
Court has been crafting constitutional doctrine, I did not expect that anyone else soon 
would. I was wrong. But this makes all the more interesting the independent-and 
different-routes that we take to reach a similar conclusion. The notion first occurred 
to me the first time I taught McCulloch v. Maryland, in the fall of 1983. For a 
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"taxonomy," a framework for categorizing doctrinal rules. He teases 
the distinction through providing his own refining responses to 
positions taken by two Justices dissenting in recent cases,16 and to 
positions asserted by contemporary scholars engaged in their own 
meta-critiques of constitutional doctrine.11 I derive the distinction as 
intrinsic to the nature of adjudication-whether tort, contract, 
criminal, or constitutional adjudication-and, beyond this, as 
essential to achieving the special functions that constitutionalism 
and judicial review exist to serve.is 
Viewing the distinction between substantive constitutional 
principles and adjudicative rules as intrinsic and foundational,19 I go 
prescriptive steps beyond Berman in suggesting what ought to be 
done with it. Berman urges that "judges, scholars, and litigators 
should make greater efforts to distinguish whether a constitutional 
rule is an announcement of constitutional meaning (i.e., a 
constitutional operative proposition) or, instead, is a constitutional 
decision rule, and should pay attention, in the making of 
constitutional decision rules, to the particular considerations that 
discussion of McCulloch, see infra text accompanying notes 327-49. The insight's 
significance seemed enhanced the first time I taught Justice Powell's opinion in Bakke, 
the following spring. For a discussion of Powell's opinion in Bakke, see infra Parts 
111.C, 111.D.l.a-b. It took all these years for me to fully develop the proposition that 
constitutional doctrine ought to be framed explicitly in terms of substantive 
constitutional principles and adjudicative rules (which I called "judicial proof rules" in 
those early years). 
16. In particular, Berman focuses on Justice Scalia's dissent in United States v. 
Dickerson, 530 U.S. 428 (2000), and Justice Breyer's dissent in Board of Trustees of the 
University of Alabama v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356 (2001). See Berman, Constitutional 
Decision Rules, supra note 12, at 24-29, 54-60. 
17. See, e.g., Akhil Reed Amar, The Supreme Court, 1999 Term-Foreword: The 
Document and the Doctrine, 114 HARV. L. REV. 26 (2000-2001); Richard H. Fallon, Jr., 
The Supreme Court, 1996 Term-Foreword: Implementing the Constitution, 111 HARV. 
L. REV. 54 (1997-1998); Henry P. Monahan, The Supreme Court, 1974 Term-
Foreword: Constitutional Common Law, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1975); Lawrence Gene 
Sager, Fair Measure: The Legal Status of Underenforced Constitutional Norms, 91 
HARV. L. REV. 1212 (1977-1978); David A. Strauss, The Ubiquity of Prophylactic Rules, 
55 U. CHI. L. REV. 190 (1988); Cass R. Sunstein, The Supreme Court, 1995 Term-
Foreword: Leaving Things Undecided, 110 HARV. L. REV. 4 (1996-1997). 
18. See infra Part II (discussing adjudicative and political functions of judicial 
review). 
19. Berman also posits an intrinsic necessity for categorizing his operative 
propositions and decision rules. "A decision rule of some sort is unavoidable because 
application of the operative propositions confronts epistemic uncertainty." Berman, 
Constitutional Decision Rules, supra note 12, at 93. Thus, some of the differences in 
our rationales for suggesting that constitutional doctrine is (Berman), or ought to be 
(Chang), comprised at least implicitly (Berman), or preferably explicitly (Chang), of 
operative propositions (or substantive constitutional principles) and decision rules (or 
adjudicative rules), are differences of emphasis. 
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might justify its construction."20 Although he discusses benefits that 
could result from categorizing extant doctrinal rules as "operative 
propositions" or "decision rules,"21 Berman suggests that "[s]ome 
benefits of treating the distinction seriously (as well, admittedly, as 
some costs) are likely to be hard to envision before a judicial and 
scholarly practice of doing so emerges."22 He eschews recommending 
that "when announcing doctrine, a court should always make clear 
which aspects of that doctrine are operative propositions and which, 
if any, are decision rules,"23 urging, instead, that "courts, scholars, 
and litigators ... should think and speak in terms of [this 'doctrinal 
taxonomy'] when doing so would be productive."24 
I do recommend that Justices always should derive and define 
constitutional doctrine explicitly in terms of substantive 
constitutional principles and adjudicative rules-or should explain 
why they choose to leave the matter ambiguous. Toward reaching 
that conclusion, I closely examine judicial opinions in a range of 
contexts-from Justice Marshall's early nineteenth century 
federalism in McCulloch u. Maryland,25 to Justice Powell's late 
twentieth century equal protection in California Board of Regents u. 
Bakke,26 and beyond. I identify the substantive constitutional 
principles and adjudicative rules implicit in those opinions, discuss 
the significant benefits that could have been achieved had the 
implicit been made explicit (and significant costs from failing to have 
done so), and sketch how the Justices could have framed their 
opinions explicitly in such terms. Furthermore, while Berman 
emphasizes the taxonomy of existing doctrine, I emphasize the 
reformulation of existing doctrine and the creation of new doctrine. 
Berman largely eschews "staking ourselves to any claims about the 
sorts of considerations upon which courts might rely in the derivation 
and formulation of either" kind of rule;21 I explore the discrete 
20. Berman, Constitutional Decision Rules, supra note 12, at 13. In endorsing 
Berman's suggestion that constitutional doctrine ought to be categorized in terms of 
operative propositions and decision rules, Professor Kermit Roosevelt has suggested 
particular considerations relevant for framing decision rules. See Kermit Roosevelt III, 
Constitutional Calcification: How the Law Becomes What the Court Does, 91 VA. L. 
REV. 1649 (2005). For my views on considerations relevant for framing adjudicative 
rules, see infra text at notes 142-57, 478-81. For discussion of Roosevelt's views on 
decision rules, see infra note 142. 
21. Berman, Constitutional Decision Rules, supra note 12, at 83-107. 
22. Id. at 83. 
23. Id. at 108. 
24. Id. 
25. 17 U.S. 316 (1819). 
26. 438 U.S. 265 (1978). 
27. See Berman, Constitutional Decision Rules, supra note 12, at 60. 
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considerations that are essential to the derivation, definition, and 
legitimacy of each kind of rule.2s 
Because positing the fundamental distinction between 
substantive constitutional principles and adjudicative rules can 
reorient the way that people think about constitutional law, the 
concept bears generative efforts that pursue alternative routes-not 
redundant, but mutually reinforcing-toward its explicit recognition 
and development. Thus, I construct a track parallel to that laid by 
Berman, the destination of which is the explicit distinction between 
substantive constitutional principles and adjudicative rules. I 
suggest a payoff from traveling this track that goes beyond taxonomy 
of extant constitutional doctrines.29 The payoff includes, first, a 
prescription as to how Justices ought to structure constitutional 
28. Berman suggests that "the more difficult it is to reach agreement on the proper 
characterization of extant doctrines, the greater is the worry that the basic conceptual 
distinction between operative and decision rules would thereby be rendered, if not 
illusory, then of precious little value." Id. at 79. In my view, difficulty in classifying 
existing doctrine is to be expected, because courts have failed to derive and define 
existing constitutional doctrine explicitly in terms of the substantive rule function and 
the adjudicative rule function. It is important to identify those separate functions and 
to identify the factors relevant to the derivation and definition of each kind of rule. 
Berman recognizes this to an extent, in noting that: 
Whether a given piece of doctrine is an operative proposition depends on ... 
one's theory of constitutional interpretation. Because there exist different 
plausible theories of proper constitutional interpretation, there exist 
different plausible conceptions of constitutional meaning. What one views as 
an operative proposition thus depends upon how one proposes to derive 
constitutional meaning, a matter that cannot be resolved (though it can be 
informed) by taxonomic explorations. 
Id. at 80. This point, it seems to me, conflates two questions: First, what are the 
essential functions of operative propositions (or substantive constitutional principles) 
on the one hand, versus decision rules (or adjudicative rules) on the other? Second, 
what considerations are relevant for the derivation and definition of each kind of rule? 
Functionally, substantive constitutional principles (or decision rules) exist to identify 
issues of legally relevant fact, and adjudicative rules (or decision rules) exist to resolve 
issues of relevant fact. Methods for deriving and defining substantive constitutional 
principles (or operative propositions) might include originalism, conventional morality, 
Dworkinian principle, and so on. Considerations relevant for deriving and defining 
adjudicative (or decision) rules might include reducing the costs of erroneous decisions. 
Against these benchmarks, extant doctrine might be categorized-and more 
significantly, might be critiqued and reformulated-toward better serving each 
respective rule-function, and thereby better serving the essential functions of judicial 
review. 
29. Indeed, struggling too much to identify what the substantive constitutional 
principle (or operative proposition) is, and what the adjudicative (or decision) rule is, 
seems a bit awkward, when the Court has not thought and written in those terms in a 
given doctrinal context, and has not sought explicitly to derive and define such a 
doctrinal structure. See infra note 308 (discussing Berman's analysis of the operative 
proposition and decision rule established by the "strict scrutiny" of racial 
classifications in contemporary cases). 
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doctrine; second, an analysis of the considerations relevant for the 
explicit derivation and definition of substantive constitutional 
principles and adjudicative rules (both in the reformulation of 
existing doctrine and the creation of new doctrine); and third, at least 
potentially, a resulting body of doctrine consistently better able to 
serve the essential functions of constitutionalism and judicial review. 
My point of departure for this parallel track suggests that the 
ultimate issue in constitutional adjudication is structurally like the 
ultimate issues in other adjudicative contexts. In a criminal 
prosecution, that ultimate question concerns whether a particular 
defendant has violated some criminal statute. In a negligence action, 
an ultimate question concerns whether a particular defendant 
violated a duty of reasonable care. In constitutional adjudication, the 
ultimate question concerns whether a particular challenged 
governmental action violates some constitutional prov1s10n.3o 
Answering these ultimate questions requires a doctrinal structure 
comprised of substantive rules for defining the crime, or the tort, or 
the constitutional infraction at issue; and adjudicative rules for 
resolving issues of relevant fact and for applying such substantive 
rules to the facts found.31 
30. A step removed from these bottom-line adjudicative questions that apply law to 
facts are more "purely legal" questions: What were the legally relevant facts of some 
precedent which, under stare decisis, might govern a finding of negligence in a present 
controversy? What is the meaning of "dwelling'' in a statute defining burglary in the 
second degree? Constitutional adjudication, or more precisely, adjudication in which 
constitutional issues are raised, presents legal issues concerning the permissibility of 
government action. Is constitutional adjudication more like civil litigation, or a 
criminal prosecution, in presenting a "bottom-line" question applying law to facts, or is 
it more like the task of statutory interpretation, presenting "pure(r)" questions of law? 
If it is more like the former, then, one would think, there should be a clear distinction 
between substantive constitutional principles and adjudicative rules. If it is more like 
the latter, then the absence of a clear distinction between substantive rules and 
adjudicative rules might be no less appropriate, but would at least be consistent with 
prevailing approaches to statutory interpretation and other legal decisions allocated to 
judges without jury (or factfinder) participation. 
It would seem that constitutional adjudication is like other kinds of litigation in 
presenting questions of pure law, questions of pure fact, and mixed questions of law 
and fact. Pure questions of law are presented in deriving and defining the meaning of 
constitutional text. Resolving these questions of pure law generates rules-substantive 
constitutional principles-that identify those facts which have legal significance. 
Where parties contest relevant facts, they generate issues of pure fact that must be 
resolved. Finally, in resolving the bottom line question of constitutionality, the court 
must address a mixed question of law and fact, in applying the legal rule to the facts 
found. 
31. Determining whether a criminal defendant is guilty of a crime, for example, 
requires substantive rules defining the crime in question, and adjudicative rules for 
resolving issues of fact relevant under those substantive rules, and for applying those 
substantive rules to the facts of the defendant's case. Determining whether a 
defendant has committed a tort requires substantive rules defining the tort in 
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Continuing the journey on this parallel track, beyond further 
exploring the structural similarities between the ultimate issue in 
constitutional adjudication and those in other adjudicative contexts, 
Part II explores the special functions that constitutionalism and 
judicial review exist to serve. As conceived by politicians, scholars, 
and judges through the generations, these special functions include: 
first, adjudicating constitutional cases (an adjudicative function); and 
second, shaping political debate toward inhibiting the enactment of 
unconstitutional laws (a political function).32 Part II considers 
whether these special functions also imply the importance of 
explicitly differentiating substantive constitutional principles and 
adjudicative rules. Part III carefully explores a range of particular 
contexts in which the Court has failed explicitly to differentiate the 
derivation and definition of substantive constitutional principles and 
adjudicative rules. It seeks to demonstrate how and why these 
failures seriously undermined both the adjudicative and political 
functions of judicial review. Finally, Part IV sketches a template that 
courts might consider toward explicitly deriving and defining 
substantive constitutional principles and adjudicative rules. 
This Article's focus transcends critiques of particular cases as 
having been decided "correctly" or "incorrectly," and transcends 
debates about the merits of originalism versus other interpretive 
methodologies. It is concerned with the structure of constitutional 
doctrine in a generic sense. It is concerned with revealing two 
functionally discrete kinds of legal rule that ought to be recognized in 
the constitutional context, and the considerations relevant for the 
derivation and definition of each. The Article suggests that by 
explicitly differentiating the derivation and definition of substantive 
constitutional principles and adjudicative rules, the Court could 
create a far more productive body of constitutional law. The Court 
could create a constitutional law with a normative clarity that 
enhances the Justices' accountability for the values they would 
enforce, or refrain from enforcing; a constitutional law that could 
provide judges with a clearer. basis for adjudicating particular 
constitutional cases effectively; a constitutional law that could 
provide the public and its representatives with a clearer sense of the 
question, and adjudicative rules for resolving issues of fact relevant under those 
substantive rules, and for applying those substantive rules to the facts of the case. 
Similarly, as this Article will argue, determining whether a governmental act is 
unconstitutional requires a substantive rule defining the constitutional infraction at 
issue, and adjudicative rules for resolving issues of relevant fact, and for applying that 
definition to the facts of the case. For a definition of "rule," see infra text 
accompanying note 34. 
32. Of course, the political function applies to inhibiting unconstitutional executive 
action, and to inhibiting other forms of state action as well. 
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constitutional boundaries of political discretion; and, perhaps most 
importantly, a constitutional law that could enable political actors 
better to refrain from violating, while acting freely within, the 
Constitution's mandates.33 
II. THE ADJUDICATIVE AND POLITICAL FUNCTIONS OF JUDICIAL 
REVIEW AND THEIR IMPLICATIONS FOR STRUCTURING 
CONSTITUTIONAL DOCTRINE 
A. Substantive Constitutional Principles and Adjudicative 
Rules Defined 
The ultimate issue in a criminal prosecution (or tort action) 
concerns whether a defendant has committed a crime (or a tort). 
Adjudicating this ultimate question in these and other 
nonconstitutional contexts requires two kinds of rule, serving 
fundamentally different functions. Substantive rules-whether in 
tort law, criminal. law, or labor law-identify legally relevant facts 
and determine the range of factual issues that the parties will 
contest. Adjudicative rules-such as rules of evidence or those 
allocating the burden of persuasion-are designed to resolve issues of 
legally relevant fact. 
The ultimate issue in constitutional adjudication concerns 
whether the government has committed a constitutional violation. 
This issue is structurally analogous to the ultimate issue in other 
adjudicative contexts, and must be resolved by the application of two 
functionally discrete kinds of constitutional rule. Thus, determining 
whether a law is unconstitutional requires substantive principles for 
identifying issues of relevant fact, and adjudicative rules for 
resolving those issues of fact, and for applying the substantive 
principles to those facts. To determine whether the government has 
abridged the freedom of speech, for example, requires a substantive 
definition of unconstitutional abridgement (provided by the First 
Amendment's speech clause and substantive judicial interpretations 
of that clause) for identifying issues of material fact, and adjudicative 
rules for resolving those factual issues and determining whether the 
facts found satisfy the substantive definition of such abridgement. 
Developing this proposition further requires some definitions. By 
rule, I mean a conditional proposition, the elements of which must be 
satisfied as a prerequisite for triggering identified legal 
33. Professor Berman touched upon this benefit as well, suggesting that "we might 
find our political culture enriched by being able to contemplate constitutional 
operative propositions alone, divorced from the constitutional decision rules which are 
designed solely to govern litigation. Berman, Constitutional Decision Rules, supra note 
12, at 16; see also Berman, Guillen and Gullibility, supra note 12, at 1531-32. 
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consequences-i.e., if certain conditions are satisfied, then certain 
legal consequences follow.34 By principle, I mean a rule that is 
developed with particular attention to normative roots and 
implications, and that is evocative of those underlying norms. By 
substantive constitutional principle, I mean a principle that defines 
restrictions on governmental discretion derived from and evoking 
values deemed to underlie constitutional text. By adjudicative rule, I 
mean a rule employed by a court in the context of constitutional 
adjudication toward determining whether a substantive 
constitutional principle has been violated in relation to the facts and 
circumstances as developed at trial. 
In nonconstitutional contexts, substantive principles and 
adjudicative rules serve different functions and have been framed to 
serve different sets of values. Substantive principles are (or should 
34. The suggestion that constitutional doctrine ought to be framed explicitly 
through the separate derivation and definition of substantive constitutional principles 
and adjudicative rules does not depend on favoring "rules" over "standards" for 
substantive constitutional principles, or vice versa. For discussion of "rules" versus 
"standards," see generally, for example, Kathleen M. Sullivan, Forward: The Justices 
of Rules and Standards, 106 HARV. L. REV. 22 (1992). For my purposes, a standard 
such as, "if a regulation places an undue burden on a woman's interest in terminating 
her pregnancy, then that regulation violates the Due Process Clause," is just as much 
a rule as is the more "rule"-like, "if a regulation requires a woman to wait more than 
twenty-four hours to terminate her pregnancy, then that regulation violates the Due 
Process Clause." 
Indeed, in critiquing Justice Powell's justification of "strict scrutiny" for affirmative 
action racial classifications in Bakke, I suggest that he ought to have separately and 
explicitly derived and defined three substantive constitutional principles that were 
implicit in his analysis: first, that a racial classification may not be adopted because of 
purposes rooted in racist values or stereotypes; second, that a racial classification may 
not excessively promote racial prejudice; and third, that a racial classification may not 
have excessively unfair effects on "innocents." See infra text accompanying notes 234-
41. The first putative substantive constitutional principle is more at the "rule" end of 
the continuum between "rules" and "standards;" the second and third putative 
substantive constitutional principles are more at the "standard" end. But all three, I 
suggest, are better framed as explicit, rather than implicit, substantive constitutional 
principles, rather than as parts of an undifferentiated hodgepodge of reasons for the 
"strict scrutiny" of racial classifications. See infra text accompanying notes 242-326. 
Similarly, adjudicative rules might be framed either as standards or as rules. To 
require proof of constitutionally significant facts by a preponderance of the evidence, 
beyond a reasonable dc:mbt, or to a moral certainty, frames the foundational 
adjudicative rule-the burden of persuasion-in terms of "standards" rather than 
"rules." To require a legislature to make findings of fact identifying the past racial 
discrimination, the effects of which it seeks to redress as part of its burden to rebut the 
presumption that its racial classification was adopted because of purposes rooted in 
racism, see infra text accompanying notes 258-62, or to require Congress to make 
findings of fact identifying the effect on interstate commerce from regulated non-
economic activity, as part of rebutting a presumption that such regulation was not 
adopted for purposes of promoting interstate commerce, see infra text accompanying 
notes 439-54, frames adjudicative rules as "rules" rather than "standards." 
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be) derived from and express public values concerning the proper 
public response to choices, conduct, and circumstances relevant to 
the area of law in question. In the criminal context, for example, 
legislatures create statutes reflecting norms that distinguish socially 
acceptable conduct from that which is unacceptable, and strategic 
considerations as to why particular unacceptable conduct should be 
criminalized-e.g., for retribution, deterrence, or incapacitation. 
When interpreting a criminal statute, courts resolve ambiguity by 
referring to and reasoning from these substantive concerns. Indeed, 
in many criminal codes, legislatures direct the courts to resolve 
statutory ambiguity by referring to the substantive concerns 
underlying the definition of the particular criminal act, and the 
strategic reasons for criminalizing that bad act.35 
Adjudicative rules in nonconstitutional contexts are derived from 
values relevant to the imperfect judicial capacity to resolve issues of 
legally significant fact and to apply governing substantive rules to 
the facts and circumstances of particular cases. Because courts must 
make findings of fact in particular cases founded on incomplete 
evidence, or evidence tainted by the interest litigants have to hide 
and mislead, they must anticipate making an erroneous decision. In 
the criminal context, such errors include convicting the innocent, or 
acquitting the guilty. In tort, a court might wrongly find a defendant 
responsible, or wrongly fail to do so. Adjudicative rules must be 
designed to promote accuracy and minimize the social harm resulting 
from error in deciding the facts and determining the winner m a 
particular dispute between particular parties. 
In the constitutional context, substantive principles and 
adjudicative rules also must be derived from differently rooted sets of 
values. It cannot be controversial that the First Amendment's 
freedom of speech, no less than any criminal statute, was adopted to 
achieve a particular range of substantive objectives reflecting a 
particular range of substantive values-though people might well 
have different interpretations as to what those values are. The 
definition of Congress' powers as limited to those enumerated also 
was rooted· in particular substantive objectives and values, as was 
the Due Process Clause, the unreasonable search and seizure clause, 
and, indeed, every provision in the Constitution. 
35. See, e.g., N.Y. PENAL LAW § 5.00 (McKinney 2004) ("The general rule that a 
penal statute is to be strictly construed does not apply to this chapter, but the 
provisions herein must be construed according to the fair import of their terms to 
promote justice and effect the objects of the law."); MODEL PENAL CODE § 1.02(3) 
(1985) ("The provisions of the Code shall be construed according to the fair import of 
their terms but when the language is susceptible of differing constructions it shall be 
interpreted to further the general purposes stated in this Section and the special 
purposes of the particular provision involved."). 
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In adjudicating whether a substantive constitutional principle 
has been violated under the facts and circumstances of a particular 
case, a court is no more omniscient, and no less error-prone, than are 
courts adjudicating other kinds of claim. Courts must anticipate the 
possible errors of either striking down a governmental act that "in 
fact" is not unconstitutional or upholding a governmental act that "in 
fact" is unconstitutional. Thus, adjudicative rules in the 
constitutional context, as for other kinds of law, must be framed to 
serve the values of accuracy in resolving issues of material fact, and 
of minimizing the systemic 'costs of adjudicative errors.36 
This analysis has been rooted in the structural similarities 
between the ultimate issues presented in adjudicating constitutional 
cases and those presented in other areas of adjudication. Yet, 
constitutional provisions are unique-at least in their supremacy and 
their immunity from change by ordinary political processes. Judicial 
interpretation and enforcement of constitutional provisions also are 
unique-themselves to be treated as the supreme law of the land.37 
Do these special attributes of constitutional la~ undermine or 
reinforce the proposition that l have thus far sought to establish: i.e., 
that like doctrine applicable in other adjudicative contexts, 
constitutional doctrine must be structured in a way that includes 
explicitly differentiated substantive principles (rooted in identified 
substantive values and objectives) and adjudicative rules (designed 
to promote adjudicative accuracy and to minimize the social harm 
resulting from factfinding error)? 
The following will examine several classic perspectives about 
special attributes of constitutional law and judicial review that 
distinguish the constitutional context from other adjudicative 
contexts. I will suggest that each perspective contemplates the 
special adjudicative and political functions of judicial review, and 
thereby reinforces the proposition that the structure of constitutional 
doctrine must explicitly differentiate the derivation and definition of 
substantive constitutional principles and adjudicative rules.38 
36. Berman suggests there might be adjudicative values such as reducing the costs 
of litigation, but acknowledges that error-cost minimization is the most clearly 
legitimate rationale for creating adjudicative or decisionmaking rules. See Berman, 
Constitutional Decision Rules, supra note 12, at 93 ("A decision rule of some sort is 
unavoidable because application of the operative propositions confronts epistemic 
uncertainty. The most obvious factor that a decision-rule-maker should consider, then, 
is how best to minimize adjudicatory errors-i.e., the sum of false positives and false 
negatives."). 
37. See Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. l, 18 (1958); infra text accompanying notes 99-
115; see generally David Chang, A Critique of Judicial Supremacy, 36 VILL. L. REV. 
281 (1991) [hereinafter Chang, Critique]. 
38. Of course, adjudicative error also can result from erroneously declared 
substantive constitutional principles-as adjudicative error in a criminal case can 
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B. James Madison and Alexander Hamilton: The Origins of 
Constitutionalism and Judicial Review 
791 
In The Federalist No. 10 and The Federalist No. 78, James 
Madison and Alexander Hamilton (respectively) develop a rationale 
for a self-governing people to create a Constitution and to create 
judicial review as a means for enforcing that Constitution's 
mandates. In creating a Constitution, the People declare its 
provisions to be the supreme law of the land. They choose the policies 
underlying these supreme constitutional proVIs1ons with 
extraordinary deliberation and with special concern for "the 
permanent and aggregate interests of the community."a9 By making 
the Constitution's provisions far more difficult to change than is 
ordinary legislation, the People protect that supreme law from their 
own anticipated fallibility-factional short-sightedness and 
selfishness-in the context of ordinary, everyday political disputes. 
"Until the people have, by some solemn and authoritative act, 
annulled or changed the established form, it is binding upon 
themselves collectively, as well as individually."40 
This is a notion of political self-constraint.41 It is a notion that 
constitutional text (and the foundational yet politically vulnerable 
national policy that this text signifies) should be much more difficult 
to create and to change than is the text of congressionally-enacted 
legislation (and the national policy that this text signifies). It 
suggests that the essential device of our constitutionalism is the 
distinction between the Article I political processes for creating or 
amending national legislation, and the Article V political processes 
for creating or amending the nation's supreme constitutional text. 
Through the principle of constitutional supremacy and the 
distinction between Article I for making ordinary national policy and 
Article V for making supreme national policy, the People's own 
result not only from factfinding errors, but also from errors in instructing jurors on the 
law they should apply to their findings of fact. The point here is that different 
considerations are relevant for avoiding adjudicative error from each of these two 
sources, and for framing explicitly differentiated substantive constitutional principles 
and adjudicative rules-the two kinds of rule with respect to which the two sources of 
adjudicative error might be committed. 
39. THE FEDERALIST No. 10, at 83 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961). 
40. THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 470 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 
1961). Hamilton further suggested that the People who created their supreme law in 
the Constitution, and who provided for federal courts to interpret and enforce that 
supreme law, anticipated their own political failings resulting from "the effects of 
those ill humors which the arts of designing men or the influence of particular 
conjunctures sometimes disseminate among the people themselves .... " Id. at 469. 
41. See Chang, Critique, supra note 37, at 293-95; David Chang, Conflict, 
Coherence, and Constitutional Intent, 72 IOWA L. REV. 753, 767-82 (1987) [hereinafter 
Chang, Constitutional Intent]. 
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choices concerning foundational yet politically vulnerable values can 
be protected from their own anticipated short-sighted fallibility. 
Along with insulating their supreme legal text from amendment 
by ordinary political processes in which this fallibility might more 
readily be manifested, the People chose to entrust judges with the 
tasks of interpreting and enforcing the meaning of that supreme 
law-judges appointed "during good behavior,'' rather than politically 
accountable to voters. 
This independence of the judges is equally requisite to guard 
the Constitution and the rights of individuals from the effects of 
those ill humors which the arts of designing men, or the 
influence of particular conjunctures, sometimes disseminate 
among the people themselves ... 42 
Because federal judges are not accountable to the political pressures 
that influence the behavior of the President and members of 
Congress, the federal courts can remain free to exercise "judgment,'' 
and thereby enforce the People's own foundational constitutional 
choices.43 
Most significant for present purposes, Hamilton suggests that in 
exercising the power of judicial review, courts might address two 
kinds of harm. First, courts might redress the rights of individual 
litigants when such rights have been infringed by unconstitutional 
laws. Second, through judicial review, courts also might inhibit 
legislatures from enacting unconstitutional laws. 44 
But it is not with a view to infractions of the Constitution only 
that the independence of the judges may be an essential 
safeguard against the effects of occasional ill humors in the 
society. These sometimes extend no farther than to the injury of 
the private rights of particular classes of citizens, by unjust and 
partial laws. Here also the firmness of the judicial magistracy is 
of vast importance in mitigating the severity and confining the 
operation of such laws. It not only serves to moderate the 
immediate mischiefs of those which may have been passed but 
it operates as a check upon the legislative body in passing them; 
who, perceiving that obstacles to the success of an iniquitous 
intention are to be expected from the scruples of the courts, are in 
42. THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 469. 
43. Of course, Hamilton's justification for vesting the power to interpret and 
enforce the Constitution's mandates with judges appointed "during good behavior" 
fails to explain the mechanism by which such judges will be held accountable to the 
task they ought to be doing. If the lack of political accountability frees judges to 
exercise "judgment," does it not also free them to exercise politically unaccountable 
will? 
44. THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 470. 
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a manner compelled, by the very motives of the injustice they 
mediate, to qualify their attempts.45 
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By striking down unconstitutional laws when adjudicating particular 
cases, the Court "moderate[s] the immediate mischiefs" otherwise 
inflicted on those subject to the reach of such laws. Beyond this, the 
prospect of such invalidation "operates as a check upon the legislative 
body," inducing legislators to "qualify" their laws according to the 
"obstacles . . . [that] are to be expected from the scruples of the 
courts." 
Thus, Hamilton recognizes that judicial review should serve two 
functions-one is adjudicative and the second is political. The 
adjudicative function decides particular cases and protects the rights 
of individual litigants from intrusion by unconstitutional laws. The 
political function influences legislative decisionmaking and can 
inhibit legislatures from enacting unconstitutional laws-thereby 
averting the occasion for adjudication to enforce constitutional 
norms.46 Elaborating on this political function, Hamilton posits that 
legislators would so qualify their laws because of iniquitous 
intentions; but this is not inconsistent with a more optimistic 
expectation that when "enlightened statesmen" are, in fact, at the 
helm-which, as Madison suggested, was neither inevitable nor 
impossible47-they might, because of a sense of public duty, seek to 
keep whatever policies they pursue within the boundaries of 
anticipated judicial acquiescence.48 
How politicians, and the electorate, understand the "obstacles" 
erected against legislative discretion by courts in the name of the 
45. Id. (emphasis added). 
46. Differentiating substantive constitutional principles from adjudicative rules in 
service of the adjudicative and political functions is unrelated to H.L.A. Hart's 
distinction between primary rules and secondary rules. See generally H.L.A. HART, 
THE CONCEPT OF LAW (1961). Hart's primary rules are directed against government 
officials; secondary rules are directed against private actors. Substantive 
constitutional principles and adjudicative rules are both primary rules, from Hart's 
perspective. See id. at 77 -96. 
47. THE FEDERALIST No. 10, at 80. 
48. In Marbury v. Madison, Justice Marshall suggested a political function for a 
written constitution. "The powers of the legislature are defined, and limited; and that 
those limits may not be mistaken, or forgotten, the constitution is written." 5 U.S. 137, 
176 (1803). Recognizing that a written constitution can itself influence legislative 
debates and decisions contradicts one of his main bases for concluding that the people 
who created the Constitution must have intended to establish the power of judicial 
review. It is not true, as Marshall suggested, that a written constitution would be 
"reduce[d] to nothing'' unless its provisions were judicially enforced. See id. at 178. Yet, 
just as a written constitution itself can affect legislative debate and decision in a way 
that unwritten fundamental law could not, so it would seem that judicial 
interpretations of the Constitution could affect legislative debate and decision, and do 
so differently depending on the manner in which those judicial opinions are written. 
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Constitution can shape political decisions.49 Political debate and 
decision might vary according to how the Court articulates the 
principles with respect to which the constitutionality of legislation is 
to be measured. If constitutional doctrine fails to articulate clearly 
the substantive principles derived from and evoking values deemed 
to underlie constitutional text-if, instead, doctrine is a confused 
amalgam of substantive and adjudicative considerations-the 
normative content of constitutional law must be obscured.5o Thus, 
creating doctrine that clearly distinguishes between substantive 
constitutional principles and adjudicative rules is essential if judicial 
review is effectively to serve not only the adjudicative function, but 
also the political function envisioned by Madison and Hamilton at 
the origins of constitutionalism and judicial review.51 
C. James Bradley Thayer and Legislative Responsibility 
In The Origin and Scope of the American Doctrine of 
Constitutional Law, James Bradley Thayer suggests that judicial 
interpretations of constitutional text "were supplemented by a very 
significant rule of administration ... 'that an Act of [Congress] is not 
to be declared void unless the violation of the [C]onstitution is so 
manifest as to leave no room for reasonable doubt."' 52 
If [a court's] duty were in truth merely and nakedly to ascertain 
the meaning of the text of the constitution and of the impeached 
Act of the legislature, and to determine, as an academic 
question, whether in the court's judgment the two were in 
conflict, it would, to be sure, be an elevated and important 
office, one dealing with great matters, involving large public 
considerations, but yet a function far simpler than it really is. 
Having ascertained all this, yet there remains a question-the 
49. Congressional consideration of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 provides a vivid 
example. See infra text accompanying notes 454-65. 
50. See infra text accompanying notes 159-91, 310-12, 323-26, 348-49, 382-83, 454-
65, 475-76. Professor Roosevelt makes similar point. "When the Court treats its 
decision rules as operative propositions, it announces as constitutional truths rules 
that should neither be followed by non-judicial actors nor internalized by the general 
public." See Roosevelt, supra note 20, at 1713. 
51. One might imagine the consequences of an analogous (hypothetical) conflation 
of substantive and adjudicative rules in criminal law. Consider the following 
(hypothetical) definition of murder: 
A person has not committed murder unless the state can present admissible 
evidence that proves beyond a reasonable doubt that he engaged in conduct 
that was not necessary to achieve a compelling objective, and that caused the 
death of another human being. 
52. James B. Thayer, The Origin and Scope of the American Doctrine of 
Constitutional Law, 7 HARV. L. REV. 129, 139-40 (1893) (quoting Commonwealth ex rel. 
O'Hara v. Smith, 4 Bin. 117, 123 (Pa. 1811)) (emphasis added) [hereinafter Thayer, 
Origin and Scope]. 
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really momentous question-whether, after all, the court can 
disregard the Act. It cannot do this as a mere matter of course-
merely because it is concluded that upon a just and true 
construction that the law is unconstitutional. That is precisely 
the significance of the rule of administration .... 53 
795 
In Alexander Bickel's view, Thayer's deferential "rule of 
administration" required upholding any act of Congress that was 
permissible under any plausible or rational interpretation of the 
Constitution.54 Bickel characterized Thayer's position as follows: 
[T]he Constitution is ... a complex charter of government .... 
Most frequently, reasonable men will differ about its proper 
construction. The Constitution leaves open "a range of choice 
and judgment," so that "whatever choice is rational is 
constitutional." The Court, exercising the power of judicial 
review, is to be "the ultimate arbiter of what is rational and 
permissible," but is to have no further concern with policy 
choices.55 
Thus, according to Bickel, Thayer had a single substantive definition 
of boundaries on Congress' discretion: Congress must act rationally 
in pursuit of its purposes.56 
In my view, Bickel misconceived Thayer's position. Thayer was 
not proposing deference to Congress in defining the Constitution's 
meaning-i.e., in deriving and defining the substantive principles 
with respect to which the Constitution should be deemed to 
circumscribe national legislative discretion. Rather, Thayer was 
proposing judicial deference in determining whether a particular act 
of Congress violates a particular judicial interpretation of the 
Constitution's substantive meaning.57 
53. Id. at 143· 44 (emphasis added). 
54. See ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 37 (1986) 
(suggesting Thayer's view "that the Court might nullify a statute only if it could not 
rationally be said to proceed from a plausible construction of the Constitution") 
[hereinafter BICKEL, LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH]. 
55. Id. at 35-36. 
56. See id. This rationality requirement is the essential concern of "rationality 
review," which is comprised of a substantive requirement (all things that are similarly 
situated with respect to a statute's purpose must be similarly treated by that statute) 
and an adjudicative rule (legislatures are accorded extreme deference in determining 
whether the rationality requirement has been violated). For a discussion of the 
substantive constitutional principle, see, for example, Joseph Tussman & Jacobus 
tenBroek, The Equal Protection of the Laws, 37 CAL. L. REV. 341 (1949); Hans Linde, 
The Due Process of Lawmaking, 55 NEB. L. REV. 197 (1976). 
57. Professor Berman reads Thayer as did Bickel, saying that Thayer "resisted the 
effort to tease the states of interpretation and application apart, seeming to suggest 
instead that courts could and should just announce whether the challenged legislation 
could stand without specifying what they took to be the constitutional premise 
supporting such a conclusion." See Berman, Constitutional Decision Rules, supra note 
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Indeed, Thayer distinguished between a substantive 
interpretation of the Constitution's text and an adjudicative 
determination as to whether a particular act of Congress should be 
deemed to violate that substantive interpretation. On the former 
point, Thayer referred to the task of "ascertain[ing] the meaning" of 
constitutional text.5s In interpreting Congress' discretion under its 
enumerated powers, for example, Thayer articulated substantive 
constitutional principles much as did Justice Marshall in McCulloch: 
Congress could pursue any means of regulation so long as it did so for 
purposes-"ends" or "objects"-authorized by the Constitution.59 
Thayer urged his deferential "rule of administration" for 
determining whether Congress enacted a particular challenged 
statute for constitutionally authorized ends, or did so pretextually. 
The question of rationality was not whether Congress' challenged 
legislation comports with any rational or plausible substantive 
interpretation of the Constitution but, rather, whether Congress 
might rationally have believed that its legislation would serve the 
constitutionally authorized purposes to which it is limited under 
judicially derived and defined substantive interpretations of its 
enumerated powers. 
Consider Thayer's application of these concepts. Thayer 
analyzed, for example, whether Congress acted unconstitutionally in 
issuing paper bills. 60 He suggested that the power to issue paper 
currency and to make such legal tender might be ancillary (under the 
Necessary and Proper Clause) to the power to regulate commerce, the 
power to coin and regulate the value of money, or the power to 
borrow money.61 In particular, he said: 
[I]f Congress give to its currency the quality of legal tender, 
wholly or mainly because it will thus be a better instrument for 
borrowing purposes, it will not be in the power of a court to 
declare the legislation for that reason unconstitutional.62 
12, at 103. Berman urges, nevertheless, that "Thayerians ... [should] shift their focus 
from arguing for judicial deference to Congress' constitutional interpretations-i.e., to 
Congress' judgments about the constitutional operative propositions-to arguing for 
more deferential decision rules." Id. at 104. As argued in what follows, I interpret 
Thayer differently-as having himself made the distinction between deference to 
Congress' substantive interpretations (which he did not advocate) and deference to 
Congress on the question of whether its enactments violate judicially-declared 
substantive constitutional mandates (which he did advocate). 
58. Thayer, Origin and Scope, supra note 52, at 144. 
59. See generally McCulloch, 17 U.S. 316. For an extended discussion of 
McCulloch, see infra notes 327-49 and accompanying text. 
60. See James B. Thayer, Legal Tender, 1 HARV. L. REV. 73, 89 (1887-1888). 
61. Id. at 92-95. 
62. Id. at 95 (emphasis added). 
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For Thayer, as for Marshall in McCulloch, whether a particular 
legislative end is constitutionally authorized is a judicial question. 
Whether an act of Congress is fit to achieve its constitutionally 
permissible ends is a political question. Whether Congress has in fact 
acted for a constitutionally authorized end or purpose is a judicial 
question, but one which should be answered with due deference to 
Congress. "[T]he fitness of the legal tender acts to accomplish their 
ends [is] a purely legislative question, in the absence of an obvious 
fraud on the Constitution."63 
In justifying such a deferential "rule of administration," Thayer 
contemplates both the adjudicative and political functions of judicial 
review, and strongly suggests a need to distinguish between 
substantive constitutional principles and adjudicative rules toward 
serving each function effectively. First, Thayer suggests that in 
performing the adjudicative function, the court's task is not simply to 
determine whether and how the challenged statute is "in conflict" 
with the Constitution's judicially-declared meaning. To do so would 
risk invalidating a permissible statute-an error which, in Thayer's 
view, is more to be avoided than is upholding an unconstitutional 
law.64 Thayer views invalidating permissible statutes as undesirable 
because such errors deprive the legislature of its "proper range of 
discretion." In his view, therefore, the rule of administration should 
provide "an allowance . . . for the vast and not definable range of 
legislative power and choice."65 
Thus, in relation to the adjudicative function, Thayer's rationale 
for a deferential "rule of administration" is normative-erroneously 
invalidating an act of Congress is worse than erroneously upholding 
such an act, because the former error deprives the legislature of its 
"proper range of discretion."66 I will argue below that this normative 
notion is vulnerable-as would be the converse normative 
proposition-and will suggest an alternative analysis for establishing 
presumptions in constitutional adjudication.67 For present purposes, 
however, it is enough simply to recognize that Thayer's treatment of 
the adjudicative function of judicial review does recognize a 
distinction between substantive principles expressing the meaning of 
63. Id. at 89 (emphasis added). 
64. Thayer views the erroneous invalidation as more to be avoided, despite 
recognizing that "it is as probable that the judiciary will declare laws unconstitutional 
that are not so, as it is that the legislature will exceed their constitutional authority." 
Thayer, Origin and Scope, supra note 52, at 134 (quoting Swift's "System of the Laws 
of Connecticut"). 
65. Id. at 135. 
66. Id. 
67. See infra text accompanying notes 142-51 (normative approach); 152-57 
(probabilistic approach). 
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constitutional prov1s10ns, and adjudicative rules-"rules of 
administration"-for determining whether challenged· legislation 
violates those substantive interpretations. 
. Thayer's further justifications for the deferential "rule of 
administration" also imply a political function for judicial review, and 
the need to distinguish between substantive constitutional principles 
and adjudicative rules to serve this function effectively. The relevant 
reasoning begins with the proposition that under the Constitution, 
Congress has initial responsibility and authority to determine 
whether its contemplated enactments are constitutionally 
permissible. Indeed, Thayer suggests that the legislature often has 
final authority to answer such questions, because judicial review can 
be exercised only in the context of a case or controversy: "It was, 
then, all along true ... that much which is harmful and 
unconstitutional may take effect without any capacity in the courts 
to prevent it, since their whole power is a judicial one. Their 
interference was but one of many safeguards, and its scope was 
narrow."6s Thus, because the Constitution contemplated that 
Congress should make initial determinations of constitutionality, and 
because such determinations would prevail but for the exceptional 
occasions of constitutional adjudication, "the actual determinations" 
by the legislature that its enactments are constitutionally 
permissible "are entitled to a corresponding respect."69 
Significantly, toward implying the political function of judicial 
review, Thayer predicates the legislature's entitlement to respect and 
a deferential "rule of administration" on the interesting proposition 
that legislators have made an "actual determination" as to the 
constitutionality of their enactment, and that they have done so with 
"virtue, sense, and competent knowledge."10 
The judicial function is merely that of fixing the outside border 
of reasonable legislative action. . . . It must be studiously 
remembered, in judicially applying such a test as this of what a 
legislature may reasonably think, that virtue, sense, and 
competent knowledge are always to be attributed to that 
body .... And so in a court's revision of legislative acts, as in its 
revision of a jury's acts, it will always assume a duly instructed 
body .. .. If, for example, what is presented to the court be a 
question as to the constitutionality of an Act alleged to be ex 
post facto, there can be no assumption of ignorance, however 
probable, as to anything involved in a learned or competent 
discussion of that subject. And so of the provisions of double 
jeopardy, or giving evidence against one's self, or attainder, or 
68. Thayer, Origin and Scope, supra note 52, at 137. 
69. Id. at 136 (emphasis added). 
70. Id. at 149 (emphasis added). 
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jury trial. The reasonable doubt, then, about which our judges 
speak is that reasonable doubt which lingers in the mind of a 
competent and duly instructed person who has carefully applied 
his faculties to the question. n 
799 
In presupposing legislators who are "duly instructed" about the 
Constitution's principles and prohibitions so that they can make 
competent (and, perhaps, public-spirited) decisions to remain within 
constitutional boundaries, Thayer's analysis implies a political 
function for judicial review.72 Just as a jury cannot be "duly 
instructed" on the law it should apply to its factfinding unless the 
judge provides instructions, so Congress would not be "duly 
instructed" on the constitutional boundaries of its discretion unless 
informed by the reasoning of the courts' decided cases. One cannot 
expect that a jury will correctly determine the legal significance of 
the facts of a case unless it has been soundly instructed on the law 
that it should apply. By analogy and by reason, one might suggest 
that the more soundly a legislature is instructed on the meaning of 
the constitutional provisions against which its enactments are to be 
evaluated, the better able will legislators themselves be to make 
choices that remain within constitutional bounds. Judicial review 
thus can serve this political function of instructing legislators as to 
the constitutional principles within which they should view 
themselves constrained-the saµie political function suggested by 
Hamilton in The Federalist No. 78. 73 
71. Id. at 148-49 (emphasis added). 
72. As Thayer said, "in a court's revision of legislative acts, as in its revision of a 
jury's acts, it will always assume a duly instructed body" of persons who are 
"competent, well-instructed, sagacious, attentive, intent only on public ends, [and] fit 
to represent a self-governing people." Id. at 149. To understand the implications of this 
"assumption," one must consider its genesis. If the assumption is merely considered to 
be a fictional rationalization of judicial deference in exercising the adjudicative 
function, then it must be justified entirely with reference to the normative notion that 
it would be worse to invalidate a law that is not unconstitutional, than to uphold a law 
that is unconstitutional. This normative judgment is at least contestable and, surely, 
is not self-evident. See infra text accompanying notes 73, 142-51. If the assumption of 
a competent, well-instructed, and public-spirited legislature is predicated on a 
proposition of fact, however, another rationale for a deferential "rule of 
administration" emerges-a rationale predicated on the probabilities of 
unconstitutional government action. See infra text accompanying notes 152-57. 
73. See supra text accompanying notes 44-51. Thayer suggests that legislative acts 
should be presumed permissible, "however probable" it might be that legislators were 
ignorant as to those constitutional boundaries. See Thayer, Origin and Scope, supra 
note 52, at 139. This position seems clearly rooted in a normative judgment that it 
would be worse to invalidate a permissible act than to uphold an impermissible act-a 
judgment that Thayer does not adequately justify. In my view, such a normative 
judgment is difficult to justify, as is the converse normative judgment. See infra text 
accompanying notes 142-51. 
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In suggesting a political function for judicial review, Thayer's 
reasons for deferential "rules of administration" also imply the need 
to distinguish clearly between substantive constitutional principles 
and adjudicative rules. A public-spirited legislature that is duly 
instructed on the substantive principles within which it should feel 
constitutionally constrained is less likely to enact unconstitutional 
laws than is one that is ill-instructed. Indeed, to the extent that 
legislators are duly instructed on the substantive boundaries of their 
discretion, one has a rationale for judicial deference to legislative 
decisions that does not depend on the normative proposition that 
erroneously invalidating a statute is worse than erroneously 
upholding a statute. Rather, one has a rationale for a deferential 
"rule of administration" based on a probabilistic proposition that the 
duly instructed legislature is less likely to have acted 
unconstitutionally than the ill-instructed legislature. The less likely 
that a legislature has acted unconstitutionally, the more judicial 
deference is warranted when performing the adjudicative function. 74 
The proposition that legislators are public-spirited as a matter of 
course is a bit more optimistic than were the suppositions of the 
Federalists who created the Constitution. In justifying the faction-
thwarting structure of the national legislature, Madison warned that 
"enlightened statesmen will not always be at the helm."75 In 
justifying judicial review, Hamilton warned that "designing men" 
might sway legislative choices, and that even when such legislators 
choose to remain within constitutional bounds, they would do so 
because of "iniquitous intentions."1s 
But even assuming that legislators are not all public-spirited, 
they still could be less likely to enact unconstitutional legislation if 
the Court were more clearly to articulate the substantive 
constitutional boundaries on legislative discretion. Even if motivated 
by selfish interests, opponents of a bill would have the opportunity to 
use constitutional arguments, predicated on the Court's clearly 
articulated substantive constitutional principles, to sway legislators 
who might be more public-spirited, or otherwise doubtful about the 
merits of the policy at issue. Although Thayer's analysis of the 
political function might not readily justify the degree of deference to 
Congress that he urged, it at least suggests that deference is more 
warranted to the extent that the Court's constitutional doctrine can 
74. For more on probabilistic considerations for allocating the burden of persuasion 
in constitutional adjudication, see infra text accompanying notes 152-57, 198-207, 446· 
53. 
75. THE FEDERALIST No. 10, at 80. 
76. THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 469. 
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and does "duly instruct" legislators about the substantive boundaries 
of their discretion. 77 
What more successful implementation of judicial review could 
there be than to reduce the probability that legislatures would choose 
to make unconstitutional choices? Thayer's analysis implies, and I 
agree, that the most successful judicial review would be that which, 
through its political function, enhances the responsibility of 
legislatures, and thereby reduces the significance of courts and their 
adjudicative function for enforcing constitutional mandates. The 
means for achieving these objectives, as suggested throughout this 
Article, involve careful attentiveness to the structure of 
constitutional doctrine. Constitutional doctrine, like doctrine in 
virtually every other area of law, must be structured in a way that 
explicitly differentiates the derivation and definition of substantive 
principles on the one hand, and adjudicative rules on the other. 
D. Robert Bork and Legitimacy 
For Robert Bork, "[t]he intended function of the federal courts is 
to apply the law as it comes to them from the hands of others."78 This 
contemplates the adjudicative function. Yet, much of what Bork says 
about how the Court should "apply the law as it comes to them from 
the hands of others" implies a political function for judicial review as 
well. 
Bork's grundnorm is "legitimacy." For Bork, to exercise judicial 
power legitimately is to decide cases in a manner "ensuring that the 
democratic authority of the people is maintained in the full scope 
given by the Constitution."79 Bork argues that the cardinal sin in 
exercising the power of judicial review is to legislate from the bench; 
that the judge's task is to identify policy choices made by the 
sovereign. Furthermore, if a court is to decide particular cases 
"legitimately" and thereby to avoid wrongly intruding on the 
sovereign's prerogatives, it must enforce the Constitution's mandates 
"neutrally."80 Bork insists that "[t]he Court can act as a legal rather 
than a political institution only if it is neutral . . . in the way it 
derives and defines the [constitutional] principles it applies" and that 
"[t]he philosophy of original understanding is capable of supplying 
[such] neutrality .... "81 
77. See infra text accompanying notes 159-91, 310-12, 323-26, 348-49, 382-83, 454-
65, 475-76. 
78. ROBERT BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA 4 (1990). 
79. Id. 
80. Id. at 143-53. 
81. Id. at 146 (emphasis added). 
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Beyond the neutral derivation and definition of principle, Bork 
urges that "the Court cannot ... avoid being a naked power organ" 
without "the neutral application of legal principle" as well.82 Bork 
states: 
The neutral or nonpolitical application of principle ... is a 
requirement, like the others, addressed to the judge's integrity. 
Having derived and defined the principle to be applied, he must 
apply it consistently and without regard to his sympathy or lack 
of sympathy with the parties before him. This does not mean 
that the judge will never change the principle he has derived 
and defined. Anybody who has dealt extensively with the law 
knows that a new case may seem to fall within a principle as 
stated and yet not fall within the rationale underlying it. As 
new cases present new patterns, the principle will often be 
restated and redefined. There is nothing wrong with that; it is, 
in fact, highly desirable. But the judge must be clarifying his 
own reasoning and verbal formulations and not trimming to 
arrive at results desired on grounds extraneous to the 
Constitution. 83 
In this passage, Bork seems to suggest two notions concerning 
the "application" of principle. On the one hand, Bork speaks of 
applying identified principle to the facts of a case "consistently, and 
without regard to his sympathy" for one party or another.84 On the 
other hand, Bork speaks of purposefully changing principle in 
response to new circumstances not considered in previous cases.85 
The first notion of applying principle neutrally, without bias for 
one party or another, seems concerned with "application" in the sense 
that I have been using the concept. A non-neutral "application" of law 
to facts, in effect, changes the law-albeit on an ad hoc basis. Thus, 
toward fulfilling the jury's functions of finding facts and applying to 
those facts the law about which they are to be instructed, potential 
jurors are screened for bias. Jury bias in performing either the 
factfinding function, or the law application function-jury 
nullification-effectively transforms the jury into an institution that 
makes law rather than one that applies law made by others.86 
Bork's second notion of neutrally "applying" principle supposes 
that a judge might decide to change the definition of established 
82. Id. (emphasis added). 
83. Id. at 151 (emphasis added). 
84. BORK, supra note 78, at 151. 
85. Id. 
86. This notion of "applying'' substantive interpretations of constitutional text to 
the facts and circumstances of a particular case requires, as I have suggested, 
carefully constructed adjudicative rules designed to account for the possibility of 
factfinding error. See supra text at notes 33-38. 
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principle in response to facts and circumstances not previously 
contemplated. This essentially involves a determination that a legal 
principle articulated in a prior case-the reason for the decision-
amounted to dicta (that it swept more broadly than necessary to 
decide a case because it encompassed facts not actually presented), or 
was framed too restrictively, and that the theretofore established 
principle should be changed, and then "applied" to the facts and 
circumstances found to be presented. Changing (or refining) legal 
principle in response to new circumstances not presented in prior 
cases is a paradigmatic example of defining legal principle. 
It is this second meaning of "application" with which Bork is 
most concerned in developing his analysis of legitimacy through 
neutrality, and neutrality through originalism. Illustrating this 
notion, Bork examines Shelley v. Kraemer.s1 Shelley considered 
whether the Equal Protection Clause prohibits racially restrictive 
covenants among private parties---or, more precisely, whether it 
prohibits state courts from enforcing such covenants.ss The Court 
decided that judicial enforcement of racially restrictive covenants in 
a contract among private parties was state action that violated the 
Equal Protection Clause.s9 
In Bork's view, the Shelley opinion is an example of failing to 
apply principle neutrally, because (he posits) the Court would never 
"apply" the Shelley principle in contexts beyond racial 
discrimination.9o The Court would never, for example, find state 
action in violation of the First Amendment if the state were to 
enforce its trespass laws on behalf of a property owner who sought to 
exclude an invitee for having expressed objectionable opinions. "The 
result of the neutral application of the principle of Shelley v. Kraemer 
87. 334 U.S. 1 (1948). 
88. See id. The Shelley decision rested on several propositions. First, "the action 
inhibited by the first section of the Fourteenth Amendment is only such action as may 
fairly be said to be that of the States. That Amendment erects no shield against merely 
private conduct .... " Id. at 13. Second, so long as the purposes of the restrictive 
covenants were achieved through voluntary compliance, there would be no need for 
judicial enforcement-therefore no state action and no conceivable violation of the 
Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 12-14. Third, judicial enforcement of the covenants 
under circumstances where parties to the agreement do not voluntarily comply does 
amount to state action and, therefore, could violate the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 
13-14. 
89. Id. at 20. In particular, this state action, under the facts and circumstances of 
Shelley, did violate the Equal Protection Clause because "the difference between 
judicial enforcement and non-enforcement of the restrictive covenants is the difference 
between being denied rights of property available to other members of the community 
and being accorded full enjoyment of those rights on an equal footing." Shelley, 334 
U.S. at 19. 
90. BORK, supra note 78, at 152-53. 
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[here] would be both revolutionary and preposterous. Clearly, it 
would not be applied neutrally .... "91 
Of course, here Bork is using the notion of "application" not in 
the sense of applying a previously defined principle to the facts and 
circumstances of a particular case, but in the sense of choosing the 
level of generality at which the governing principle should be 
defined.92 This focus on the derivation and definition of principle-
even as Bork writes of the neutral application of principle for the 
adjudicative function and its legitimate exercise-suggests a concern 
about the political function of judicial review and its legitimate 
exercise.93 Indeed, Bork's animating passion is: 
[N]ot ... ultimately about legal theory. It is about who we are 
and how we live; it is about who governs us and how, about our 
freedom to make our own moral choices, and about the 
difference that makes in our daily lives and in the lives of 
generations yet to come.94 
More directly suggesting concern with the political function, 
Bork laments that the non-neutral definition of (substantive 
constitutional) principle-the legislating from the bench that he so 
abhors-is significant not only because it can wrongly deny to 
political majorities their right to enforce preferred policies in 
particular cases, but also because the judiciary's arrogation of the 
legislature's policymaking discretion damages the perceptions, 
91. Id. at 153. 
92. Furthermore, Bork's actual concern is not with defining "state action," but with 
defining that state action which violates the mandates of equal protection. After all, it 
seems undeniable that judicial decisions are state action, and it seems clear that the 
Court would treat a judicial decision as such in any context, subject to applicable 
substantive constitutional prohibitions. For example, if a litigant alleged that a state 
court judge engaged in a pattern of deciding against the claims of black litigants, she 
would have alleged conduct which, if proved, not only would qualify as state action, 
but also would amount to purposeful discrimination in violation of the Equal 
Protection Clause. In Shelley, the question was whether the Equal Protection Clause 
prohibits state courts from treating racially restrictive covenants as they treat other 
contracts. See Shelley, 334 U.S. at 4. This is a matter of defining unconstitutional 
racial discrimination when committed by state courts; it is not a matter of defining 
state action. More importantly for present purposes, it certainly is not a matter of 
applying previously defined substantive principle to the facts and circumstances of a 
particular case. The aspect of Shelley with which Bork disagrees is its (substantive 
constitutional) principle for identifying those facts and circumstances that trigger a 
finding of unconstitutional racial discrimination, not the determination of whether the 
facts of the case satisfy an established substantive definition of state action. For 
discussion of an analogous definition of unconstitutional racial discrimination when 
inflicted by state courts in the context of child custody decrees, see infra note 464. 
93. See BORK, supra note 78, at 152-53. 
94. Id. at 11. 
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values, and conduct of citizens in the processes of democratic self-
government.95 
Among the stakes is the full right of self-government that the 
Founders bequeathed us and which they limited only as to 
specified topics. In the long run, however, there may be higher 
stakes than that. As we move away from the historically rooted 
Constitution to one created by abstract, universalistic styles of 
constitutional reasoning, we invite a number of dangers. One is 
that such styles teach disrespect for the actual institutions of the 
American nation. A great many academic theorists state 
explicitly, and some judges seem easily persuaded, that elected 
legislators and executives are not adequate to decide the moral 
issues that divide us, and that judges should therefore take 
their place. But, when Americans are morally divided, it is 
appropriate that our laws reflect that fact.96 
For Bork, legislating from the bench is the cardinal sin in 
constitutional adjudication not only because it promises to invalidate 
laws that should be enforced (thereby intruding through the 
adjudicative function on the right of self-government with respect to 
the particular policies wrongfully invalidated) but also because it 
teaches lessons that undermine respect for self-government (thereby 
tainting through the political function the manner in which citizens 
perceive and exercise their ongoing right of self-government). 
It is hardly a stretch from these concerns about the harmful 
political consequences of illegitimately articulating and enforcing 
constitutional principle to posit beneficial political consequences from 
properly articulating and enforcing constitutional principle-in other 
words, the complete political function of judicial review as 
contemplated by Hamilton and Thayer. Indeed, Bork implicitly 
recognizes this broader political function with the following 
admonition: 
When ... the Supreme Court ... pronounces in the name of the 
Constitution upon the meaning of racial justice, sexual 
morality, or any other subject, a cultural lesson is taught. Most 
people revere the Constitution as a basic compact that defines 
American civic morality. A decision does more than decide a 
case; it adds weight to one side of our cultural war, even when 
the decision is in fact not supported by the actual 
Constitution.97 
Bork here suggests that judicial decisions add weight to one side or 
the other of political controversies-whether those decisions are 
"correct" or not. It should follow for Bork that "correctly" articulated 
95. See id. at 1-11 
96. Id. at 352 (emphasis added). 
97. Id. at 137-38. 
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substantive constitutional principles would "duly instruct" (Thayer's 
words) citizens and their representatives about the extent and the 
limits of political discretion, and would enhance the public's ability to 
refrain from enacting policy that they understand transgresses 
constitutional bounds. 
It is significant that a theorist so concerned with the legitimate 
exercise of judicial power and so critical of legislating from the bench 
could contemplate the political function as so fundamental. Because 
Bork's concern for legitimacy contemplates not only the adjudicative 
function, but also a political function for judicial review, he could 
embrace the proposition that constitutional doctrine should be 
comprised of explicitly differentiated substantive constitutional 
principles for legitimately deriving and defining the meaning of 
constitutional text, and adjudicative rules for legitimately 
determining whether a particular challenged governmental act 
violates applicable substantive constitutional prohibitions.9s 
E. Cooper v. Aaron and Obedience 
In Cooper v. Aaron,99 the Court elaborated on its supreme 
authority to interpret and enforce the mandates of constitutional 
text. Not only are litigating parties bound to comply with judicial 
orders; pursuant to judicial supremacy, all those government actors 
who would be bound under the holding of a decided case if an action 
were brought against them should comply with that holding, so as to 
avoid the need to bring such an action.100 Cooper's judicial supremacy 
contemplates the political function of judicial review. 
In the aftermath of Brown v. Board of Education,101 some public 
officials in Arkansas developed very different notions about their 
98. For Bork, deriving and defining (substantive constitutional) principle is not 
akin to the inductive common law process of accreting specific cases toward identifying 
patterns and inferring general principle under the rubric of stare decisis. Rather, for 
Bork, the derivation and definition of principle involves a deductive process of 
inferring and declaring as governing principle the intentions and choices of people who 
joined together politically to create and ratify constitutional text. This is, perhaps, why 
Bork is so concerned with "application" in the sense of defining a principle's 
appropriate level of generality. For Bork, the legitimacy of the principles the Court 
defines depends on the accuracy of the Court's judgment as to the substantive values 
and goals of those who created the constitutional text at issue. Such an articulation of 
principle must be in a form that applies in general and for the future, as do the terms 
of a statute or of the Constitution itself. Indeed, to a significant extent, articulating 
principles in a way that would be dicta in the context of common law adjudication is, 
for Bork, an essential judicial task in the context of constitutional adjudication. On 
this, I tend to view Bork as correct. 
99. 358 U.S. 1 (1958). 
100. See infra text accompanying notes 110-15. 
101. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
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prerogatives and responsibilities. On May 23, 1954, the Little Rock 
School Board declared their intent to comply with Brown's mandates, 
stating that "[i]t is our responsibility to comply with Federal 
Constitutional Requirements and we intend to do so when the 
Supreme Court of the United States outlines the method to be 
followed."102 The Board then developed plans to desegregate Little 
Rock's public schools.103 Nine black students were to be admitted to 
the otherwise all-white Central High in September of 1957.104 
In contrast, the Governor of Arkansas employed the Arkansas 
National Guard to prevent this scheduled first step in the 
desegregation of Central High. The United States Attorney General 
and the U.S. Attorney for the District of Arkansas then brought an 
action against the Governor, seeking to enjoin him from further 
efforts to resist the desegregation plan by force. The federal district 
court issued the injunction. Governor Faubus complied and withdrew 
his troops. 
The Governor's decision to resist desegregation until he was 
directly enjoined from continuing was the last in a series of political 
efforts to resist Brown's implications for segregated schools in 
Arkansas. The Arkansas Constitution was amended in 1956 to 
command the General Assembly to resist Brown. The Assembly 
enacted legislation in early 1957 establishing a "State Sovereignty 
Commission" and "relieving school children from compulsory 
attendance at racially mixed schools."105 
In the face of such political resistance, the School Board itself 
petitioned the District Court "seeking a postponement of their 
program for desegregation."1os The Board argued that despite its 
earlier good faith efforts to comply with Brown, subsequent political 
resistance had generated "extreme public hostility," and that unless 
its desegregation plan were postponed, "maintenance of a sound 
educational program at Central High School, with the Negro 
students in attendance, would be impossible."101 The District Court 
granted the Board's petition.ms The Court of Appeals reversed, and 
its judgment of reversal was affirmed by the Supreme Court.109 
All of this is background to that aspect of the Court's opinion 
that was concerned with reinforcing judicial supremacy, and with it, 
102. Cooper, 358 U.S. at 7. 
103. Id. at 8. 




108. Cooper, 358 U.S. at 13. 
109. Id. at 14. 
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the political function of judicial review. Even while recognizing its 
assertions as dicta, the Court declared, "we should answer the 
premise of the actions of the Governor and Legislature that they are 
not bound by our holding in the Brown case."110 It continued: 
Article VI of the Constitution makes the Constitution "the 
supreme law of the land." ... [Marbury] declared the basic 
principle that the federal judiciary is supreme in the exposition 
of the law of the Constitution, and that principle has ever since 
been respected by this Court and the Country as a permanent 
and indispensable feature of our constitutional system. It 
follows that the interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment 
enunciated by this Court in the Brown case is the supreme law 
of the land, and Art. VI of the Constitution makes it of binding 
effect on the States .... Every state legislator and executive and 
judicial officer is solemnly committed by oath taken pursuant to 
Art. VI, if 3, "to support this Constitution." ... The principles 
announced in [Brown] and the obedience of the States to them, 
according to the command of the Constitution, are 
indispensable for the protection of the freedoms guaranteed by 
our fundamental charter for all of us. Our constitutional ideal of 
equal justice under law is thus made a living truth.m 
These propositions go well beyond the adjudicative function. The 
Court was asserting not only that state judges, but also legislators 
and governors were bound by the Court's interpretation of the 
Fourteenth Amendment in Brown~by the substantive constitutional 
principles announced in Brown-even if such officials were not 
parties to any of the suits actually adjudicated in Brown. When the 
Court said that a Governor could not, consistent with judicial 
supremacy, nullify a court order, its concerns were derived from the 
adjudicative function.112 When the Court said that state judges must 
abide by the "principles announced in [Brown]," its concerns also 
were derived from the adjudicative function, and the responsibility of 
courts deciding a case today to abide by authoritative precedent.113 
But when the Court declared that when enacting and enforcing 
legislation, state legislatures and governors must abide by "the 
principles announced in [Brown]" because such judicially-defined 
principles are the supreme law of the land, its concerns were derived 
from the political function-<:ounseling political actors that they 
have, indeed, been "duly instructed" by the Court on the 
constitutional boundaries of their discretion.114 
110. Id. at 17 
111. Id. at 18-20. 
112. See id. 
113. See id. 
114. See Cooper, 358 at 18-20. 
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Thus, in asserting, pursuant to judicial supremacy, that judicial 
opinions should command broad political obedience, Cooper added 
force to Hamilton's own assertion of the political function-that 
judicial review: 
[O]perates as a check upon the legislative body in passing 
[unconstitutional acts]; who, perceiving that obstacles to the 
success of an iniquitous intention are to be expected from the 
scruples of the courts, are in a manner compelled, by the very 
motives of the injustice they mediate, to qualify their 
attempts.115 
Ill. SUBSTANTIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PRINCIPLES AND ADJUDICATIVE 
RULES (OR THEIR ABSENCE) IN OPERATION: CASE STUDIES 
This section tests the proposition that explicitly differentiating 
the derivation and definition of substantive constitutional principles 
and adjudicative rules is necessary for effectively fulfilling the 
adjudicative and political functions of judicial review. It does so by 
closely examining several contexts in which the Court has failed to 
construct constitutional doctrine explicitly in terms of these two very 
different kinds of legal rule. Before turning to these case studies, 
however, I address a potential objection: that in framing 
constitutional doctrine, ambiguity is inevitable and, perhaps, 
desirable. 
A. Preliminary Observations: Some Reasons for Doctrinal 
Ambiguity and their Limited Relevance for this Article's 
Prescriptions 
One might argue that ambiguity in framing constitutional 
doctrine is inevitable because achieving a majority among the 
Justices is an intrinsically political process that must accommodate 
their different views. An opinion might purposefully obfuscate a 
doctrinal point in order to command the support of a majority. One 
might further argue that this doctrinal ambiguity is desirable, as it 
enables the Justices to work through issues of constitutional 
meaning over time, rather than committing themselves, and the 
Court, to positions that might come to be viewed as ill-conceived. 
Finally, one might argue in the fashion of Bickel that obfuscatory 
doctrine can enable to the Court to achieve results that it could not 
attain through clarity and candor. 
Consider each point in turn. Ambiguity is not inevitable when 
there is majority support for a ratio decidendi, or when a Justice 
writes a concurrence or dissent for herself. In Bakke, Justice Powell 
115. THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 470. 
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was beholden to no one but himself. Yet, as we will see, his opinion in 
that case is a model of ambiguity and incoherence that could have 
been avoided had he sought to derive and define doctrine through 
explicitly differentiating substantive constitutional principles and 
adjudicative rules.116 
The putative inevitability of doctrinal ambiguity does not 
establish its desirability. Some might argue that creating ambiguous 
doctrine can enable the Court to work through complex issues, or to 
achieve results that otherwise would be resisted. One might respond 
briefly to both points. If Justices create doctrinal ambiguity to avoid 
resolving issues prematurely, the rationale anticipates their eventual 
resolution.117 There comes a point at which areas of constitutional 
116. See infra Part 111.C. Furthermore, to posit that not all Justices would follow 
suit no more challenges my suggestions for structuring constitutional doctrine than 
does the Court's failure to embrace Bork's originalism, or Dworkin's "Herculean" 
pursuit of coherent principle, or Bickel's passive virtues, challenges the respective 
merits of their proposals. Prescriptions for the manner in which judicial review ought 
to be exercised are inherently idealistic. That no prescription could possibly be 
achieved in reality does not vitiate its potential for casting new light on otherwise 
intractable issues. 
117. Richard Fallon has explored the challenges of crafting constitutional doctrine 
in the face of "reasonable disagreement." See generally Fallon, supra note 17. He 
suggests that because Justices might disagree about foundational values, compromise 
is necessary. Id. at 59-60. He acknowledges that compromise undermines the goal of 
"fidelity" to the Constitution-that is, of correctly interpreting its meaning. See id. at 
60. Thus, he argues, "[m]ore than fidelity theorists have appreciated, constitutional 
law needs a theory of the second-best." Id. at 117. Fallon views principles defining 
prohibited purposes, for example, as potentially underenforcing true constitutional 
meaning, but the best that Justices can do, given reasonable disagreement about 
constitutional meaning. See id. at 90-102. He states that "purpose-focused ... 
doctrines-at least when they are the practically exclusive mechanisms for the judicial 
implementation of constitutional norms-reflect at most a thin, minimalist conception 
of the democratic processes to which courts are often asked to defer." Id. at 105. 
I would suggest that purpose-focused doctrines reflect more a minimalist conception 
of constitutional mandates than a minimalist conception of democratic processes. 
Beyond this, I would suggest that any substantive constitutional principle identified 
by the Court must be one which the national electorate plausibly has created, or 
plausibly would create, in constitutional politics, toward constraining their own 
ordinary political discretion. See, e.g, Chang, Critique, supra note 37. From this 
perspective, is a constitutional law comprised of "thin" substantive constitutional 
principles truly second-best, or is it the most plausible understanding of the roles 
accorded to the realms of constitutional and ordinary decisionmaking by those 
responsible for creating the Constitution's provisions? See infra note 309. In any event, 
the value-indeed necessity-of explicitly differentiated substantive constitutional 
principles and adjudicative rules, independently derived and defined to serve their 
respective functions, does not depend on any particular view about the substance of 
constitutional law. Indeed, recognizing the essential and functional distinctions 
between substantive constitutional principles and adjudicative rules could help to 
structure a search for "a theory of the second-best"--or, more precisely, one "theory of 
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law mature and crystallize. Even if only at that point, this Article's 
main proposition stands: explicitly differentiating the derivation and 
definition of substantive constitutional principles and adjudicative 
rules is necessary, even if not sufficient, for creating constitutional 
doctrine with a clarity most likely to fulfill the adjudicative and 
political functions effectively. 
If Justices create doctrinal ambiguity toward making decisions 
that would be more politically unpalatable or resisted if reached 
through clearly derived and defined principles, one might seriously 
question the tactic's legitimacy, as Joseph Goldstein challenged 
Alexander Bickel's "passive virtues."11s One's view of such willful 
ambiguity depends on one's conception of judicial review, and of the 
Justices' responsibilities when wielding that power. Bickel sees 
Justices as exercising platonic judgment in ways concerned as much 
about preserving political peace as enforcing properly construed 
constitutional mandates. Goldstein far more emphasizes the latter, 
and would condition any pursuit of the former on a candid and 
explicit acknowledgement of the Court's agenda. In my view, like 
Goldstein's, the Court has no business making decisions that intrude 
(or fail to intrude) on governmental discretion in the name of the 
Constitution except in pursuit of its best judgment, clearly and 
candidly explained, as to what the Constitution prohibits, and what 
it permits. 
For those who would advocate willful ambiguity, prescriptions 
for achieving doctrinal clarity might be of little use.119 Yet even they 
the second-best" for deriving and defining substantive constitutional principles, and 
another "theory of the second-best" for deriving and defining adjudicative rules. 
ll8. Compare JOSEPH GOLDSTEIN, THE INTELLIGIBLE CONSTITUTION (1992), with 
BICKEL, LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH, supra note 54. 
ll9. Cass Sunstein urges "minimalism" in adjudicating "issues on which the nation 
is sharply divided." Sunstein, supra note 17, at 50. By "minimalism," he means 
"deciding only those issues that were necessary for disposition" of the particular case. 
Id. at 49. He suggests that minimalism would have been appropriate for cases such as 
Dred Scott, Brown, and Roe. Id. at 48-51. Minimalism does not necessarily entail 
providing an ambiguous rationale for decision, but it does contemplate giving an 
incomplete explanation of the decision as the result of legitimate interpretation. 
Sunstein views Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996), as a good, if flawed, example of 
minimalism. He notes that Romer must be understood as defining a new category of 
constitutionally impermissible purpose-a purpose "to discourage homosexuality or 
homosexual behavior." Sunstein, supra note 17, at 62. He acknowledges that this is 
not minimalist in the sense that the decision was predicated on a real and contested 
substantive judgment-that, indeed, the Court had taken sides in Justice Scalia's 
culture wars. Id. at 63. Sunstein also acknowledges that Justice Kennedy's rationale 
for framing the contested value judgment as a new constitutional mandate could have 
been "clearer" and "more coherent." Id. at 63-64. He acknowledges that the Court 
failed "even to do what is minimally necessary for self-defense." Id. at 64. Yet, he views 
the case as "a legitimate and in many ways salutary exercise in judicial minimalism," 
id. at 52, because the Justices could not agree on a deeper rationale, or lacked 
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must recognize that not all constitutional issues arise in a context 
that calls for willful ambiguity. For non-Bickelian contexts, 
inadvertent ambiguity undermines the adjudicative and political 
functions in ways that will be elaborated below. If the Court were to 
follow this Article's prescriptions toward creating more clarity, at 
least in non-Bickelian contexts, the contrast with those willfully 
obscured Bickelian contexts would be stark. Willful obfuscation could 
be less effective if it were transparent that there has been an attempt 
to muddle. Thus, those who wish to preserve space for willful 
ambiguity must determine whether the benefits of preserving that 
option are more significant than the costs incurred through a body of 
constitutional doctrine that is universally more ambiguous and 
unjustified than it otherwise could be and, therefore, that is less well 
suited to serve the adjudicative and political functions across the 
broad range of constitutional issues on which the Court pronounces 
its judgment. 
B. The Pre-Bakke Adjudication of Claims that Racial 
Classifications Violate the Equal Protection Clause 
1. The Implicit Substantive Constitutional Principle and 
Implicit Adjudicative Rule 
In Korematsu v. United States,120 the Supreme Court determined 
that a military order excluding persons of Japanese ancestry from 
confidence that they were correct, or "because of strategic considerations having to do 
with the timing of judicial interventions into politics." Id. at 64. 
BU:t if Romer's result was correct, the failure of derivational "self-defense," the 
failure to identify interpretive method, and the failure to connect to the 
impermissibility of purposes rooted in racist animus or sexist value judgments, all 
undermined the potential of the case to fulfill the political function-to articulate with 
clarity the principles by which governmental actors should feel constrained. Sunstein, 
supra note 17, at 64 .. If Romer's result was not correct, the failure of derivational self-
defense hardly diminished decision costs and error costs-Sunstein's two prime 
concerns. Id. at 16-19. If the Justices were indeed unable to reach consensus on a 
deeper rationale for the impermissibility of purposes rooted in anti-gay animus, but 
could reach consensus on the principle itself, or at least the result, each could have 
written a separate opinion, each with its own effort toward self-defense and 
interpretive depth. Cf. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 118. If the Justices truly were unsure 
that they were correct, certiorari could have been deemed improvidently granted. Any 
strategic considerations about the timing of judicial interventions into politics would 
have been better served by dismissal, rather than a politically controversial decision 
unsupported by anything resembling interpretive legitimacy. For further discussion of 
Sunstein's "minimalism," see infra note 309. 
120. 323 U.S. 214 (1944). 
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presence within certain areas on the west coast did not violate 
principles of equal protection.121 Justice Black stated: 
[A]ll legal restrictions which curtail the civil rights of a single 
racial group are immediately suspect. That is not to say that all 
such restrictions are unconstitutional. It is to say that courts 
must subject them to the most rigid scrutiny."122 
This statement begs several questions. Why are laws with racial 
classifications "immediately suspect"? What is a court to look for in 
closely scrutinizing laws with racial classifications? What 
distinguishes racial classifications that are unconstitutional from 
those which are not? 
Significantly, Justice Black also said: "[p]ressing public necessity 
may sometimes justify the existence of such restrictions; racial 
antagonism never can. ''123 Applying these propositions to the facts 
and circumstances of the case, Justice Black determined that these 
racial classifications should not be invalidated, saying that "[t]he 
judgment that exclusion of the whole group was . . . a military 
imperative answers the contention that the exclusion was in the 
nature of group punishment based on antagonism to those of 
Japanese origin."124 He concluded: 
To cast this case into outlines of racial prejudice, without 
reference to the real military dangers which were presented, 
merely confuses the issue. Korematsu was not excluded from 
the Military Area because of hostility to him or his race. He was 
excluded because we are at war with the Japanese Empire .... 
121. Principles of equal protection have been deemed applicable to federal policies 
through the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause. This proposition was crystallized 
nearly a decade after Korematsu was decided. See generally Bolling, 347 U.S. 497. For 
a review of the Court's application of equal protection principles to the federal 
government before Bolling, see Justice O'Connor's opinion in Adarand v. Pena, 515 
U.S. 200, 213-17 (1995). O'Connor notes that the Court left quite an ambiguous picture 
in Korematsu and Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81 (1943), of how principles 
of equal protection applied to the federal government through the Fifth Amendment. 
Adarand, 515 U.S. at 213-15. One might suggest that these ambiguities could have 
been mitigated significantly had the Court attended explicitly to the distinction 
between substantive constitutional principles and adjudicative rules, as developed in 
this section. On the applicable substantive constitutional principle, should the federal 
government have been viewed as having more discretion than the states to pursue 
purposes rooted in racial prejudice? If not, on the applicable adjudicative rule, should 
the federal government be viewed as less likely than states to have pursued purposes 
rooted in racial prejudice when adopting policies containing racial classifications? For 
analysis of these two questions, see David Chang, Discriminatory Impact, Affirmative 
Action, and Innocent Victims: Judicial Conservatism or Conservative Justices?, 91 
COLUM. L. REV. 790, 825-27 (1991) [hereinafter Chang, Judicial Conservatism]. 
122. Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 216. 
123. Id. (emphasis added). 
124. Id. at 219. 
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There was evidence of disloyalty on the part of some, the 
military authorities considered that the need for action was 
great, and the time was short.125 
Justice Black thus implied a substantive definition of 
unconstitutional racial discrimination framed in terms of prohibited 
purposes-that if a racial classification were enacted because of 
racial antagonism, then it would be unconstitutional. Having 
determined that the challenged racial classification in fact was not 
adopted because of purposes rooted in racial antagonism, but because 
of bona fide considerations of military necessity, he determined that 
this particular racial classification should be upheld. 
Furthermore, Black's opinion implied an adjudicative rule for 
determining whether a law containing racial classifications will be 
upheld or invalidated.126 Laws with racial classifications are 
presumed unconstitutional. Such laws are viewed with suspicion. 
About what is the Court suspicious when faced with a law containing 
racial classifications? The implicit answer: the Court is suspicious 
that the law was adopted because of purposes rooted in racial 
antagonism. What must the government demonstrate to rebut the 
presumption that its policy contammg racial classifications 
discriminates unconstitutionally because of race? The implicit 
answer: the government must prove that the law was not adopted 
because of purposes rooted in racial antagonism.121 Thus, implicitly, 
the Court would subject a law containing racial classifications to "the 
most rigid scrutiny" to determine whether it was enacted because of 
racial antagonism.12s 
125. Id. at 223-24 (emphasis added). 
126. See id. at 216. 
127. See id. 
128. In Palmore u. Sidoti, Chief Justice Burger articulated these substantive and 
adjudicative propositions more clearly and explicitly than the Court ever had before, or 
since, stating: "(c]lassifying persons according to their race is more likely to reflect 
racial prejudice than legitimate public concerns." 466 U.S. at 432. This single, simple 
sentence implicitly expresses an antiracism principle as the applicable substantive 
constitutional principle: Racial prejudice is not a legitimate public concern. It also 
implies a rationale for the presumed unconstitutionality of racial classifications-they 
are categorically more likely to reflect racial prejudice than permissible purposes. In 
other words, in choosing to use racial classifications, the government probably violated 
the antiracism principle. Therefore, it is the government's burden to show that this 
statute is among the minority of laws containing racial classifications that are 
constitutionally permissible. Furthermore, the sentence implies something of the 
nature of the showing that the government must make. The government must 
persuade the court that the statute in question was not adopted because of racial 
prejudice, but instead was adopted for legitimate public concerns. 
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2. Failures in Explicitly Deriving and Defining 
Substantive Constitutional Principles and Adjudicative 
Rules Undermine the Adjudicative Function 
a. Substantive Constitutional Principles for Properly 
Identifying Issues of Relevant Fact 
Definitional Ambiguity. Justice Black declared that "racial 
antagonism" could never "justify" a racial classification.129 He also 
stated that laws "which curtail the civil rights of a single racial 
group" are "suspect," and "that courts must subject them to the most 
rigid scrutiny."130 As suggested above, these statements imply a 
substantive definition of unconstitutional racial discrimination: If the 
government "justifies" a law containing racial classifications with 
"racial antagonism," then that law violates the Equal Protection 
Clause. 
If one were to have considered this implicit proposition explicitly, 
however, one would have identified ambiguities reqmrmg 
clarification. First, what does it mean for the government to "justify" 
a law by reference to racial antagonism? Is the concept of 
governmental "justification" concerned with the actual purposes for 
which the challenged law was enacted? Is it concerned with the 
purposes that the government asserts during litigation, regardless of 
what the actual purposes might have been? These two different 
definitions of "justify" would make different facts and circumstances 
constitutionally relevant. It surely must matter for determining 
whether a particular racial classification should be upheld which of 
these two concepts of "justification" the Court were to choose. 
Second, what, exactly, does "racial antagonism" mean? Does it 
mean a dislike of people of a particular race solely because of their 
race? Does it extend to making policy judgments about members of a 
certain race, apart from whether there is antagonism or dislike, 
because of assumed facts about that race-because, in other words, of 
racial stereotyping? These different definitions of "racial antagonism" 
each would make different facts and circumstances constitutionally 
relevant.131 It surely must matter for determining whether a 
particular racial classification should be upheld which of these 
definitions of "antagonism" the Court were to choose. 
Derivational Ambiguity. For the sake of further analysis, one can 
posit that Justice Black was concerned about the actual reasons a 
challenged policy was adopted, and that his notion of prohibited 
129. Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 216. 
130. Id. 
131. See id. 
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antagonism was limited to disliking people solely because of their 
Japanese ancestry. Again, he said that "Korematsu was not excluded 
from the Military Area because of hostility to him or his race."132 
Justice Murphy, in dissent, seemed to have a broader substantive 
definition of unconstitutional racial discrimination than that implied 
by Black's opinion. Murphy said that the rationality required by 
equal protection: 
[I]s lacking because the exclusion order necessarily must rely 
for its reasonableness upon the assumption that all persons of 
Japanese ancestry may have a dangerous tendency to commit 
sabotage and espionage.133 
For Murphy, this unexamined, unsupported assumption that race 
correlates with behavioral tendencies amounted to a "legalization of 
racism" that violates the Equal Protection Clause.134 In other words, 
Murphy's (implicit) substantive constitutional principle was 
concerned with racial stereotyping; Black's was not. 
Does the constitutional mandate of equal protection, properly 
interpreted, encompass substantive constitutional principles 
prohibiting only laws enacted because of purposes rooted in racial 
antagonism or, more broadly, laws enacted because of purposes 
rooted in racist values and racial stereotypes? This question lies at 
the heart of effectively performing the adjudicative function in 
Korematsu and in other cases challenging laws with racial 
classifications. How one defines an applicable substantive rule-
whether a definition of manslaughter in criminal law, or a 
substantive constitutional principle defining impermissible racial 
discrimination in constitutional law-is centrally significant in 
identifying which questions of fact and circumstance are legally 
relevant and, therefore, in shaping the course and the outcome of 
cases in which those rules are invoked. Murphy's implicit principle 
made relevant some issues of fact that Black's did not. Murphy's 
underlay a finding of unconstitutionality; Black's did not.135 
Explicitly endeavoring to derive a substantive constitutional 
principle as sound interpretation would require focusing on its 
elements. Had he done so, Justice Black more likely could have 
acknowledged that his definition of unconstitutional racial 
discrimination-establishing the irrelevance of stereotype-was 
132. Id. at 223. 
133. Id. at 235. 
134. Id. at 242. 
135. Of course, Justice Black's conclusion that the exclusion order was not 
unconstitutional is also explained by his failure to follow through with the adjudicative 
rule he purported to employ-the presumption that laws containing racial 
classifications are unconstitutional. See infra text accompanying notes 139-57. 
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substantially narrower than that of Justice Murphy. Had he done so, 
Justice Black would have been put to the task of justifying his 
narrower definition of unconstitutional racial discrimination as a 
better interpretation than Justice Murphy's. 
Adjudicative Legitimacy. Whether a putative substantive 
constitutional principle is a proper interpretation of relevant 
constitutional text requires confronting questions of interpretive 
methodology. Should the substantive meaning of the Fifth 
Amendment's Due Process Clause be defined according to the 
original understanding? If so, why? If not, then what methodology 
should be employed, and why? Whether the interpretive method a 
Justice invokes is Bork's originalism, Wellington's conventional 
morality, Dworkin's philosophically coherent "principle,"136 Ely's 
representation reinforcement,137 Amar's documentarianism,13s or 
something else, an explicitly identified interpretive method provides 
benchmarks that must be accounted for in defining the applicable 
principle's particular elements. Confronting these questions could be 
far more likely if our legal culture conceptualized constitutional 
doctrine explicitly in terms of substantive constitutional principles 
and adjudicative rules. Such a conceptualization would engender an 
expectation that rules designated as substantive constitutional 
principles must be justified as such-that is, as principles properly 
derived from and evoking values deemed to underlie constitutional 
text. Apart from noting their central relevance in deriving 
substantive constitutional principles, further exploring such 
questions of interpretive method is beyond the scope of this Article. 
b. Adjudicative Rules for Properly Resolving Issues of 
Relevant Fact 
An essential component of both criminal and civil adjudication is 
a clearly defined and justified burden of persuasion with respect to 
disputed legally significant facts. If the factfinder lacks a clear sense 
of which party has the burden of persuasion and why, it must be 
hindered, perhaps to the point of incapacity, in determining whether 
such facts and circumstances have been proved to the necessary 
degree of certainty. 
The Analysis Black Did Pursue. In Korematsu, Justice Black 
suggested that the order excluding persons of Japanese ancestry 
from certain west coast areas would be presumed unconstitutional. 
136. See Ronald Dworkin, The Forum of Principle, 56 N.Y.U. L. REV. 469, 516-17 
(1981) (arguing that Justices should define constitutional meaning in pursuit of 
philosophically coherent principle more than instrumental policy). 
137. See JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST (1980). 
138. See Amar, supra note 17. 
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[A]ll legal restrictions which curtail the civil rights of a single 
racial group are immediately suspect. That is not to say that all 
such restrictions are unconstitutional. It is to say that courts 
must subject them to the most rigid scrutiny.139 
One might explore certain definitional ambiguities in this statement. 
In particular, what is the nature of the "most rigid scrutiny" that 
Justice Black promises? For what is such scrutiny searching? What 
must the government do to persuade a court that what the scrutiny 
is looking for is (or is not) present? 
Perhaps because Justice Black did not explicitly confront any of 
these issues essential to deriving and defining the applicable burden 
of persuasion, his analysis collapsed in determining whether his 
implicit substantive constitutional principle had, in fact, been 
violated. Justice Black concluded, as a matter of fact, that the order 
was not adopted because of racial antagonism, but to serve purposes 
of military necessity, simply because the government said so.140 Of 
course, concluding that the government wins simply because it has 
"answer[ed] the contention" of racial antagonism reveals a posture of 
deference.141 Resting satisfied with a government contention is 
inconsistent with any notion of "suspicion," let alone the focused 
suspicion that could have been framed if Black had explicitly sought 
to derive and define adjudicative rules for determining whether a 
particular policy containing racial classifications should be deemed 
impermissible. 
An Analysis Black Should Have Pursued. Why, then, should laws 
which curtail the civil rights of specified racial groups be viewed as 
"suspect"-not necessarily unconstitutional, but "subject to the most 
rigid scrutiny"? Why not apply James Bradley Thayer's deferential 
"rule of administration"? Why not accord such laws the same 
presumption of permissibility that is applied in adjudicating most 
claims of unconstitutionality? Then again, why are most 
constitutional claims adjudicated under a presumption that the 
challenged governmental act is not unconstitutional? What analytical 
139. Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 216. 
140. See id. at 222-24. 
141. Id. at 219. Earlier, Black took the same posture of deference to the asserted 
interest in military necessity that the Court had taken in Hirabayashi. 
[W]e cannot reject as unfounded the judgment of the military authorities and 
of Congress that there were disloyal members of that population, whose 
number and strength could not be precisely and quickly ascertained. We 
cannot say that the war-making branches of the Government did not have 
ground for believing that in a critical hour such persons could not readily be 
isolated and separately dealt with, and constituted a menace to the national 
defense and safety, which demanded that prompt and adequate measures be 
taken to guard against it. 
Id. at 218 (quoting Hirabayashi, 320 U.S. at 99) (emphasis added). 
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frameworks and factors are relevant for determining whether 
particular kinds of governmental act should be presumed 
permissible, or presumed impermissible? 
I will now present an extended analysis of methodologies 
relevant for deriving and defining adjudicative rules in constitutional 
cases. Though the virtues and vulnerabilities of originalism and the 
many competing methodologies for deriving and defining substantive 
interpretations of constitutional text have been exhaustively 
considered through the generations, scant attention has been devoted 
to methodologies for deriving and defining adjudicative rules in the 
context of constitutional adjudication.142 For criminal adjudication, 
142. But see Berman, Guillen and Gullability, supra note 12, at 1522. Professor 
Roosevelt has conceptualized the creation of "decision rules"-or, in my terms, 
adjudicative rules-not only in terms of assigning a burden of proof, but also in terms 
of whether the Court should "choose decision rules that differ substantially from the 
operative propositions they are intended to implement." Roosevelt, supra note 20, at 
1658 (emphasis added). By the latter, I believe, he refers to rules identifying issues of 
subsidiary fact from which inferences about issues of ultimate fact (dispositive under 
the [operative] substantive constitutional principle) might be made. See infra text 
accompanying notes 402-11 (suggesting that doctrine concerned with whether 
regulated activity has a substantial economic effect on interstate commerce serves as 
an adjudicative rule for enforcing a substantive constitutional principle requiring 
congressional pursuit of economic purposes under the Commerce Clause). Roosevelt 
identified five factors relevant for constructing "decision rules"-including 
institutional competence, costs of error, frequency of unconstitutional action, 
legislative pathologies, enforcement costs, and guidance for other governmental actors. 
See Roosevelt, supra note 20, at 1658-67. In my view, Roosevelt's five factors are 
reducible to the probabilistic and normative analyses presented here, see infra text 
accompanying notes 143-57. 
Roosevelt acknowledges that "institutional competence could be a general answer, 
subsuming many of the other factors." Roosevelt, supra note 20, at 1659. I would agree 
and, indeed, would suggest that even those facets of institutional competence on which 
he focuses are subsumed by other essential considerations. For example, Roosevelt 
suggests that: 
If a constitutional operative proposition sets up a question that is within the 
peculiar competence of the courts, then the Court might adopt a decision rule 
that closely tracks the operative proposition and grants no deference to other 
actors .... Alternatively, a court confronting a question within the legislative 
competence might craft a deferential rule-such as the rational basis test-
that will tend to uphold almost all legislative acts, even those that judges 
would deem unconstitutional if not deferring. 
Id. at 1660-61. Roosevelt provides no example of a constitutional operative proposition 
constraining legislative discretion that poses issues peculiarly within the competence 
of courts. If issues were particularly within the judicial competence, one might suppose 
that the Constitution would allocate to courts primary authority for their resolution-
and that any operative propositions would constrain judicial discretion. Principles of 
due process constraining adjudication, and principles governing the exercise of judicial 
review itself, would seem paradigmatic examples of contexts in which decisionmaking 
authority is vested with courts-and constrained by operative propositions applicable 
to courts-precisely because courts are viewed as having special competence. In 
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contrast, Roosevelt identifies the "rational basis test" as an example of a deferential 
decision rule for implementing an operative proposition that frames questions 
particularly within legislative competence. See id. In one sense, the operative 
proposition that he views rationality review as implementing-"the government may 
not treat some people worse than others without adequate justification"-does refer to 
questions of policy peculiarly with the legislative competence. Id. at 1657 (quoting 
Amar, supra note 17, at 45). Legislatures are viewed as having those institutional 
traits that justifies vesting them with authority to make policy choices within 
constitutional boundaries. The deference of rationality review, however, is applied only 
in circumstances in which legislatures are viewed as unlikely to have acted for 
constitutionally prohibited reasons. See id. at 1660-61. Such deference is not applied in 
contexts where legislatures, though still better suited than courts for choosing 
"adequate justifications" for statutory requirements, are viewed as more likely to have 
acted for constitutionally prohibited reasons-for example, when classifying by race. 
See id. at 1663-64. Thus, at least for the example of rationality review, it seems that 
the "institutional competence" factor may be subsumed within the probabilistic basis 
for allocating a burden of persuasion. Roosevelt, supra note 20, at 1661. Of course, it 
might be that a substantive constitutional principle (or an operative proposition) poses 
issues that courts are not well suited to answer reliably-for example, whether 
Congress acted for a constitutionally authorized purpose under the Commerce Clause. 
See infra text accompanying notes 386-411. Here, the Court might adopt a decision (or 
adjudicative) rule providing a best-available basis from which inferences of dispositive 
fact might be drawn-for example, as alluded to earlier in this footnote, a rule 
concerned with effects from which congressional intent might be inferred. See infra 
text accompanying notes 406-11. Yet this would be a function of relative judicial 
competence to answer different questions of fact made relevant by one substantive 
constitutional principle or another, toward reducing the probability of erroneously 
upholding or invalidating acts under the applicable substantive constitutional 
principle. It would not be a function of whether the substantive constitutional 
principle (or operative proposition) poses a question more within the judicial 
competence or legislative competence. 
By "costs of error," see Roosevelt, supra note 20, at 1661-63. Roosevelt refers to 
considerations that I analyze under "the normative analysis" for allocating 
presumptions in constitutional adjudication. See infra text accompanying notes 143-
51. By "frequency of unconstitutional action," see Roosevelt, supra note 20, at 1663- 64, 
he refers to considerations that I analyze under "the probabilistic analysis" for 
allocating such presumptions. See infra text accompanying notes 152-57. By 
"legislative pathologies," Roosevelt refers to "justification for an anti-deferential 
decision rule . . . when there is reason to doubt the good faith of the legislature." 
Roosevelt, supra note 20, at 1664. As an example, he cites laws that entrench 
legislators, and those that benefit "locals while burdening out-of-staters." Id. In my 
view, this point restates concerns about the probability of unconstitutional action in 
relation to operative propositions (substantive constitutional principles) mandating 
particular definitions of legislative "good faith." Roosevelt also identifies concerns 
about "enforcement costs"-where "operative propositions may require courts to decide 
questions that they simply cannot," at least not "without burdensome ... evidence 
gathering." Id. at 1665. Yet, such concerns seem less relevant for allocating the burden 
of persuasion than for devising adjudicative rules defining questions of subsidiary fact 
from which the questions of ultimate fact, dispositive under the applicable operative 
proposition, might be resolved. Finally, he suggests a "guidance for other 
governmental actors factor" for constructing decision rules. Id. at 1666-67. But this 
seems less relevant for determining what decision rules should be adopted and how 
they should be framed, and more relevant to rationales for explicitly differentiating 
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however, rules allocating the burden of persuasion regarding 
contested issues of material fact have been exhaustively analyzed. 
One might consider whether the basis for allocating the burden of 
persuasion in criminal prosecutions might inform analysis of the 
analogous issue for constitutional adjudication. 
A normative approach for allocating the burden of persuasion in 
constitutional adjudication. Consider a prosecution for murder. A 
(substantive) definition of murder is "intentionally to cause the death 
of another human being." This (substantive) definition of murder 
makes certain facts and circumstances relevant, and determines the 
issues of fact and circumstance that must be adjudicated when in 
dispute-specifically, whether the defendant intended to kill his 
victim; if so, whether the defendant engaged in conduct with such 
intent; and, if so, whether the defendant's conduct caused such death. 
Accordingly, in a prosecution for murder, the state would need to 
make the factual argument that the defendant did intend to kill; the 
defendant would need to deny that he intended to kill. 
Similarly, in the constitutional context, an applicable 
substantive constitutional principle would make certain facts or 
quasi-factual circumstances legally relevant.143 Where the parties 
dispute those relevant facts, rules allocating the burden of 
persuasion are necessary because the court might erroneously adopt 
the challenger's version of the facts (and therefore erroneously 
invalidate the challenged governmental act); or erroneously adopt 
substantive constitutional principles and adjudicative rules in the first place---i.e., 
toward serving the political function of judicial review. On the political function, and 
its service through explicitly differentiating substantive constitutional principles and 
adjudicative rules, see supra Part II; infra text accompanying notes 159-91, 310-12, 
323-26, 348-49, 382-83, 454-65, 475-76. 
143. The term "quasi-factual circumstances" contemplates rules such as those that 
require determining, first, what interest the government was pursuing in enacting a 
challenged policy, and second, whether such state interest qualifies as "compelling." 
Whether the determinations are matters of "pure" fact, or mixed questions of Jaw and 
fact, and whether the determinations are for the court, as is finding the existence of 
duty in a negligence action, or for the jury, as is finding the existence of breach in a 
negligence action, are questions that largely have been neglected in the Court's 
definition of constitutional doctrine. See supra note 30. These questions far more likely 
could be addressed if constitutional doctrine were derived and defined in a manner 
explicitly distinguishing between substantive constitutional principles and 
adjudicative rules. Because carefully analyzing whether an issue presented by a 
particular element of a particular constitutional rule should be deemed one of pure fact 
(for the jury), mixed law and fact, or pure law (for the court) would warrant its own 
article-length treatment, and because such an analysis must build on first having 
made the case for distinguishing between substantive constitutional principles and 
adjudicative rules, this Article will eschew unpacking the concept of "quasi-factual" 
circumstance in favor of focusing on the more foundational set of issues. 
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the government's version of the facts (and therefore erroneously 
uphold the challenged governmental act). 
Consider how this analysis, far from complete so far, applies to 
Justice Black's opinion in Korematsu. Recall the implicit substantive 
constitutional principle (which I have suggested should have been 
explicitly derived and defined)-if a law curtailing the rights of a 
specified racial group was adopted because of purposes rooted racial 
antagonism, then that law is unconstitutional. This substantive 
principle makes certain facts and circumstances relevant, and 
determines the issues of fact and circumstance that must be 
adjudicated when in dispute-specifically, was the challenged law 
adopted because of purposes rooted in racial antagonism? Given the 
substantive principle with which Justice Black implicitly was 
working, Korematsu would have had to make the factual argument 
that the exclusion order was adopted because of racial antagonism. 
The government would have had to make the factual argument that 
the order was not adopted because of racial antagonism. 
In the criminal context, our legal culture has determined that 
the prosecution should bear the burden of persuasion with respect to 
all issues of material fact, and that the burden should be heavy. The 
rationale for these adjudicative rules begins with the recognition that 
adjudicative error is a real possibility. A court might erroneously 
convict a (truly) innocent defendant, or might erroneously acquit a 
(truly) guilty defendant. Based on a normative judgment that one of 
these errors is far worse than the other-that it would be far worse to 
convict the innocent than to acquit the guilty-our society has 
determined that the state should bear the burden to prove beyond a 
·reasonable doubt every fact necessary to constitute the crime 
charged.144 
Consider how a normative analysis of adjudicative error applies 
to the constitutional context. In the adjudication of constitutional 
claims, a court might erroneously determine that a (truly) 
permissible law is unconstitutional, or erroneously determine that a 
(truly) unconstitutional law is permissible. Would invalidating a law 
that, in fact, is not unconstitutional be worse than upholding a law 
that, in fact, is unconstitutional? Might one reach the opposite 
conclusion? If so, how? 
In my view, the normative evaluation of potential adjudicative 
errors can be of only questionable helpfulness in the constitutional 
context.145 The criminal context has made this normative judgment 
144. See generally In Re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970). 
145. Cf. Berman, Guillen and Cul/ability, supra note 12, at 1522 (positing that 
judges "might reasonably believe that the social disutility of false positives and false 
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by defining, then evaluating, the social costs of each kind of 
adjudicative error. The social cost of an erroneous acquittal is a lost 
opportunity to enforce criminal prohibitions and to vindicate their 
underlying policies. The social cost of an erroneous conviction 
includes the unjust deprivation of an individual's liberty, the risk of 
over-deterrence, and the dilution of the retributive condemnation of 
the guilty.146 Because the social costs of erroneous conviction are 
viewed as so much worse than the social costs of erroneous acquittal, 
whether the crime in question is murder or trespass, we have made 
the categorical determination that the prosecution must prove 
beyond a reasonable doubt all facts necessary to establish the crime 
charged.147 
Can one make a categorical determination that it is worse to 
uphold a (truly) unconstitutional act than to invalidate a (truly) 
permissible act, or vice versa? Toward making this comparative 
judgment, one must define the relevant social costs of each 
adjudicative error. For constitutional adjudication, the stakes must 
be framed in constitutional terms. Though Korematsu involved a 
challenge to a military policy authorized by congressional delegation, 
it will be more broadly instructive, at least initially, to frame this 
normative analysis in terms of a typical constitutional challenge to a 
legislative act. Thus, what is lost of constitutional significance in an 
erroneous decision to invalidate a statute? What is lost of 
constitutional significance in an erroneous decision to uphold a 
statute? What are the constitutional values relevant to each kind of 
adjudicative error? 
In the broadly categorical sense now in question, the failure to 
invalidate a (truly) unconstitutional statute leaves unenforced some 
constitutional restriction on governmental discretion, and the values 
from which that restriction is derived. The invalidation of a (truly) 
permissible statute intrudes on the legislative discretion that the 
Constitution, properly enforced, would require to be respected. Which 
category of constitutional value is more important-those 
constitutional values which restrict legislative discretion, or the 
foundational constitutional value that legislatures have the right to 
make policy within constitutional bounds? 14s 
negatives in the adjudication of any particular constitutional operative proposition are 
not identical"). 
146. See In re Winship, 397 U.S. at 363-64. 
147. Justice Harlan made the point in his Winship concurrence: "I view the 
requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt in a criminal case as bottomed on a 
fundamental value determination of our society that it is far worse to convict an 
innocent man than to let a guilty man go free." Id. at 372 (Harlan, J., concurring). 
148. My characterization of the relevant competing considerations in a normative 
analysis for allocating the adjudicative presumption in constitutional cases-weighing 
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Are all constitutional restrictions on legislative discretion of 
equal importance, and categorically more important than the norm 
that legislatures have the right to legislate within constitutional 
the value of the particular restriction on governmental discretion against the broad 
norm of politically accountable governmental discretion within constitutional bounds-
differs from the mode of ad hoc balancing that characterizes judicial inquiry in many 
constitutional contexts. See T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Constitutional Law in the Age of 
Balancing, 96 YALE L. J. 943 (1987). This ad hoc balancing seeks to weigh the relevant 
constitutional norm against the particular state interest pursued through the 
challenged governmental act. 
Indeed, it is important to recognize that the normative analysis-or balancing-
about which I am concerned is functionally different from, and must be prior to, the 
balancing that occurs in, for example, the fundamental rights version of "strict 
scrutiny." The ad hoc balancing involved in determining whether, say, a state's 
interest in protecting a fetus is more important than a woman's right to choose (and 
whether a particular law's pursuit of the state interest is more significant than that 
law's intrusion on the competing constitutional right) is a function of the applicable 
substantive constitutional principle. Such balancing cannot be undertaken without a 
prior determination of which party bears the burden of persuasion on the ultimate 
question of constitutionality-in other words, a determination of the applicable 
adjudicative presumption. 
Thus, Justice Blackmun's balancing in Roe was a function of an implicit substantive 
constitutional principle: If a law intrudes on a woman's right to choose, and if the 
constitutionally significant value gained through its enforcement is not greater than 
the constitutionally significant value lost through its enforcement, then it is 
unconstitutional. Enforcing this substantive constitutional principle requires 
evaluating the particular state interest at stake--whether protecting a fetus, enforcing 
sexual morality, or protecting maternal health. But determining which party should 
bear the burden of persuasion for adjudicating the constitutionality of an act 
challenged under such a balance-oriented substantive constitutional principle cannot 
depend on the particular state interest asserted (and its putative weight), because the 
particular state interest asserted (and its putative weight) are elements of the 
applicable substantive constitutional principle. Determining the constitutionally 
significant weight of a state's interest in maternal health, or preserving a fetus, 
therefore, is an issue that must be answered under the applicable substantive 
constitutional principle limiting state discretion-and is an issue with respect to which 
the burden of persuasion must be allocated. Put another way, particular state interests 
can be weighed against particular constitutional mandates under either a presumption 
of priority (permissibility) or a presumption of inferiority (impermissibility). Thus, the 
relevant considerations in a normative analysis for allocating the burden of persuasion 
would seem to be the relative importance of, on the one hand, the particular 
substantive constitutional principle limiting electorally accountable discretion and, on 
the other hand, the competing substantive constitutional principle that the people, 
through their representatives, have the right to create and enforce their preferred 
policies within constitutional bounds. 
Professor Aleinikoff critiqued the ad hoc balancing required by balancing-oriented 
substantive constitutional principles in large part because of methodological problems 
involved in calibrating the balance in a constitutionally meaningful and justifiable 
way. See Aleinikoff, supra note 148, at 972-79. This problem is a more intense version 
of the problems I have suggested undermine the helpfulness of a normative approach 
for deriving and defining adjudicative rules that allocate burdens of persuasion in 
constitutional adjudication. See supra text accompanying notes 142-51. 
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bounds? Or, perhaps, is there some hierarchy of restrictions on 
legislative discretion, such that even the least important restriction 
on legislative discretion is more important than the norm that 
legislatures have the right to legislate within constitutional bounds? 
Unless one can answer either of these two questions in the 
affirmative, one cannot justify in the constitutional context the kind 
of sweeping categorical normative judgment and correspondingly 
allocated burden of persuasion that so easily determines the 
adjudicative presumption in the context of criminal law. 
No one would argue that all constitutional restrictions on 
legislative discretion have equal weight. The freedom of speech, for 
example, would seem to be more foundational, more important, than 
is the requirement that "[t]he terms of the President and Vice 
President shall end at noon on the 20th day of January."149 It also 
would be difficult to argue persuasively that the least significant 
restriction on legislative discretion-whether the January 20th 
provision, or another-is more important than the foundational 
principle that legislatures have the right to make law within 
constitutional bounds. Thus, the presumed impermissibility of 
Korematsu 's challenged order cannot be justified on such a 
categorically defined normative basis. 
One might evaluate whether each particular substantive 
constitutional principle limiting legislative discretion is more, or less, 
important than is the principle that legislatures have discretion to 
make policy within constitutional boundaries. Such a comparative 
evaluation begs the question of the methodology a judge should 
employ for making this comparative judgment. Choosing the proper 
methodology for identifying the relative weight of different 
substantive constitutional principles involves precisely the same 
challenges as determining the proper methodology for deriving the 
definition of substantive constitutional principles-whether Bork's 
originalism, Wellington's conventional morality, Dworkin's coherent 
"principle,'' or something else. 
Beyond choosing an interpretive methodology, a court must 
apply it. The challenges involved in the derivation and definition of 
substantive constitutional principles are daunting. But defining the 
relative weight of substantive constitutional principles must be even 
more challenging. Indeed, determining the weight of a substantive 
constitutional principle is essentially a matter of defining the content 
of that principle to a greater level of precision and refinement than is 
required "merely'' for identifying its elements. An analogy: However 
difficult it is to peer into a distant field, obscured by fog, to determine 
whether two grazing animals are cows, horses, or one of each, would 
149. U.S. CONST. amend. XX. 
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be little compared to the difficulty of trying to determine whether the 
animal that might be a cow weighs more, or less, than the animal 
that might be a horse. 
Having identified these difficulties, one might question whether 
a normative approach could have helped Justice Black to justify a 
doctrinal proposition that laws with racial classifications are 
constitutionally suspect, and should be presumed unconstitutional. 
First, he would have had to identify the constitutionally relevant 
costs in erroneously upholding the exclusion order and erroneously 
invalidating the exclusion order.150 Second, analyzing which mistake 
is worse would require determining whether to evaluate the 
competing constitutional norms in the abstract, or in the particular 
context presented.151 Third, analyzing which mistake is worse would 
require determining whether the relative weights of the competing 
constitutional norms should be determined with an originalist 
methodology, or something else. Thus, employing a normative 
analysis for deriving and defining adjudicative presumptions might 
reveal critical questions, but would present perhaps intractable 
methodological challenges in justifying any answers. 
A probabilistic approach for allocating the burden of persuasion 
in constitutional adjudication. Consider another approach for 
allocating the burden of persuasion that seeks to minimize the 
systemic costs of adjudicative error by maximizing the probability of 
factfinding accuracy. Recall Black's implicit substantive 
constitutional principle: if a law was adopted because of purposes 
150. Erroneously upholding the exclusion order would have failed to enforce the 
substantive constitutional principle prohibiting laws adopted because of racial 
antagonism. Conversely, erroneously invalidating the exclusion order-that is, 
wrongly determining that it was adopted because of racial antagonism when, in fact, it 
was not-would have sacrificed the constitutional norm that government may exercise 
discretion (more precisely, military discretion established pursuant to a congressional 
delegation) within constitutional bounds. 
151. Is the prohibition of racial antagonism more important when individual liberty 
is at stake, or exclusion from one's home, or admission to a school, or eligibility for a 
driver's license, or the choice of a marital partner, or is its significance to be 
determined in an abstract and broadly categorical sense? Similarly, is the principle of 
politically accountable government discretion within constitutional bounds more 
important when the policy at issue is concerned with national security, or traffic 
safety, or marital morality, or is its significance to be determined in an abstract and 
broadly categorical sense? Some might argue that the normative approach for 
allocating a presumption in constitutional adjudication can be dispositive when the 
challenged policy is justified on grounds of national security, whether created by the 
military or by legislative choice, to the extent that the costs of erroneously invalidating 
such a policy might be viewed as categorically more significant than the costs of 
erroneously invalidating ordinary police power legislation and, arguably, as 
categorically more significant than (at least certain) constitutional limits on 
policymaking discretion. Indeed, this point might be prominently urged especially 
today-and vigorously contested-as during any time of war. Cf. supra note 148. 
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rooted in racial antagonism, then it is unconstitutional. Laws with 
racial classifications are not per se unconstitutional, but laws 
adopted because of racial antagonism are. Implicitly, when Black 
proclaims "suspicions" about such laws, and declares that such laws 
are subject to "the most rigid judicial scrutiny," he suggests a 
"suspicion" that such laws were. adopted because of racial 
antagonism. But why? 
One might have reason for a meaningful suspicion if one 
believed, in a categorical sense, that a law curtailing the civil rights 
of a single racial group probably was adopted because of racial 
antagonism and, therefore, probably violates the applicable 
substantive constitutional principle. If one were to determine that 
most laws with racial classifications were adopted because of 
purposes rooted in racial antagonism, and if all one knew about a 
particular law is that it contains a racial classification, it would be 
rational to wager-based on the categorical probabilities, without 
additional information, and toward minimizing the systemic costs of 
adjudicative error-that such particular law was adopted because of 
racial antagonism. 
Indeed, there is good reason to believe that a law targeting a 
single racial group for harmful treatment was adopted because of a 
purpose rooted in racial antagonism, animus, disdain, or some other 
similar negative value judgment about race. One can look, most 
obviously, to the historical use of laws with classifications targeting a 
specific racial group. The "Black Codes" enacted in southern states 
during the immediate aftermath of the Civil War fit the category of 
"laws which curtail the civil rights of a single racial group," and 
clearly were adopted because of racial antagonism. One could 
canvass and catalogue all laws targeting a racial group for harmful 
treatment enacted through the time Korematsu was decided. In doing 
so, one would find a stark pattern suggesting that nearly all, if not 
all, were indeed adopted because of purposes rooted in antagonism. 
The historical pattern would suggest a probability that any 
particular law within the category (i.e. laws which curtail the civil 
rights of a single racial group) was indeed adopted because of racial 
antagonism.152 
Beyond this empirically-rooted rationale for positing relevant 
probabilities, one could canvass the range of conceivable state 
purposes which might rationally be pursued by enacting a law 
152. One might posit a similar historically-indicated probability that laws with 
racial classifications have been adopted because of purposes rooted in the racial 
stereotyping about which Justice Murphy was concerned. For the proposition that 
racial stereotyping tends to characterize people's thoughts when thinking explicitly in 
terms of race, see, for example, GORDON ALLPORT, THE NATURE OF PREJUDICE 187-99 
(1958). 
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containing a classification that specifies a racial group for harmful 
treatment. Few purposes that are not tainted by racism could be 
rationally pursued with laws that contain racial classifications. Most, 
if not all, purposes that are tainted by racial antagonism can 
rationally be pursued with laws containing racial classifications. 
Thus, beyond an analysis of historical usage, an analysis of the 
logical relationships between racial classifications and the universe 
of governmental objectives also suggests a probability that laws with 
racial classifications were adopted because of purposes rooted in 
racial antagonism.153 
One way to reduce the systemic costs of adjudicative error-in 
this context, upholding an act that is unconstitutional, or 
invalidating an act that is not unconstitutional-is to reduce the 
likelihood of adjudicative error. If the majority within an identified 
category of governmental act are unconstitutional, a rational 
approach for reducing the likelihood and systemic costs of 
adjudicative error would place the burden on the government to 
prove that a particular challenged act (possessing the relevant 
categorical characteristic) is among the minority of permissible acts 
within that category.154 
153. In McLaughlin v. Florida, the Court articulated this probabilistically-framed 
rationale for the "strict scrutiny'' of racial classifications-that such classifications are 
"in most cases irrelevant to any constitutionally acceptable legislative purpose." 379 
U.S. 184, 191 (1964) (quoting Hirabayashi, 320 U.S. at 100). 
154. Lawrence Sager has suggested that some constitutional norms are 
"underenforced" while others are "overenforced." See Sager, supra note 17. Professor 
Roosevelt builds on the proposition-stating, for example, that "knowledge that certain 
kinds of classification have been used for illegitimate reasons, and seldom for 
legitimate ones, would justify overenforcement of equal protection." See Roosevelt, 
supra note 20, at 1663. In my view, these concepts can be clarified by reference to the 
normative and probabilistic rationales for allocating a burden of persuasion in 
constitutional adjudication, and for defining supplemental adjudicative rules (for 
example, those making a law's effects a basis from which to infer legislative purpose 
under a substantive constitutional principle concerned with such purposes). See supra 
note 142; infra text accompanying notes 402-11. To the extent that an adjudicative 
presumption is justified by probabilistic considerations, as Roosevelt contemplates 
above, there ought not to be "overenforcement" or "underenforcement" of the relevant 
substantive constitutional principle. Indeed, a probabilistically justified adjudicative 
rule seeks to maximize adjudicative accuracy. In contrast, adjudicative rules that are 
justified by normative considerations might well result in "overenforcement" or 
"underenforcement," at least as viewed in relation to the number of cases in which a 
false finding of permissibility, or a false finding of unconstitutionality, is made. This 
would be so in the sense that the burden of persuasion in criminal prosecutions, 
normatively justified, results in more false acquittals than false convictions and, 
therefore, in a purely numerical sense, an "underenforcement" of the criminal law. But 
the point of the normative basis for allocating the adjudicative burden of persuasion, 
and for defining supplemental adjudicative rules, is that one adjudicative error is more 
significant than the other and, therefore, is more to be avoided. Thus, from the 
perspective of social utility, as opposed to simply counting the number of false 
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Based on such probabilistic reasoning, had he sought explicitly 
to derive and define an adjudicative presumption, Justice Black 
might have said that all laws which curtail the civil rights of a single 
racial group are immediately suspect, because most laws containing 
such racial classifications were adopted because of racial antagonism. 
Any given law within that category, therefore, probably violates the 
governing substantive constitutional principle and, therefore, 
probably is unconstitutional.155 Thus, any particular challenged 
policy within the category of laws curtailing the civil rights of a 
single racial group is subject to the most rigid judicial scrutiny: The 
government bears the burden of showing that the particular 
challenged policy was not adopted because of racial antagonism and, 
therefore, is among the minority of acts within that category adopted 
for permissible purposes.156 
positives versus false negatives (an appropriate benchmark for a probabilistically-
allocated burden of persuasion) the normative perspective results not in 
"overenforcement" or "underenforcement," but, rather, in optimal enforcement---or, at 
least, such is its design. Indeed, "overenforcement" or "underenforcement" could result 
to the extent that adjudicative rules are defined in a way that ineffectively accounts 
either for probabilistic or normative considerations, which is precisely why properly 
deriving and defining adjudicative rules are essential tasks for the adjudicative 
function. 
155. In Palmore, the Court succinctly articulated a probabilistic rationale for the 
"strict scrutiny" of racial classifications. See Palmore, 466 U.S. at 432; see also supra 
note 128. The Court has settled on a definition of prohibited racial prejudice that 
includes purposes rooted in racist values (whether animus or favoritism) or racial 
stereotypes. See infra note 197. 
156. In contrast, consider laws that do not contain racial classifications. The Court 
has employed an implicit substantive constitutional principle: If a facially neutral law 
was adopted because of purposes rooted in racial prejudice, then it violates the 
mandates of equal protection. See Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 266-71; Washington 
v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976); Chang, Judicial Conservatism, supra note 121, at 791, 
842 n.178, 843 n.179. Though the Court has not explicitly derived adjudicative rules 
for enforcing the prohibition of racist purposes in this context, it has defined applicable 
adjudicative presumptions more explicitly than in most doctrinal contexts. The 
challenger bears a burden to show than an "invidious discriminatory purpose," Davis, 
426 U.S. at 248, was "a motivating factor" in the government's having adopted the 
challenged policy. Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 266. If the challenger meets that 
burden, the act will be invalidated unless the state meets a burden to prove "that the 
same decision would have been made even had the impermissible purpose not been 
considered." Id. at 271 n.21. 
The foundational adjudicative presumption in this context-the presumption of 
permissibility-is readily justifiable with a probabilistic analysis. It seems obvious 
that, as a category, facially neutral laws probably were not adopted because of racial 
prejudice. Most laws are facially neutral; most laws do not contain racial 
classifications. Traffic regulations, principles of tort liability, employment 
discrimination statutes, contract law, criminal statutes, environmental regulations, 
tax laws, zoning laws, rules of evidence---one could go on and on-almost all such 
provisions fall within the category of "facially neutral" laws. Indeed, suppose one 
randomly pulled a statute book from the library shelves, and opened the book 
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Such an explicit identification of the governing substantive 
constitutional principle, the applicable adjudicative presumption, 
and the probabilistic rationale for that presumption, would have 
rendered painfully apparent the weaknesses of Justice Black's 
analysis of the facts of Korematsu's case. If Justice Black were truly 
focused on the proposition that a law which curtails the civil rights of 
a single racial group probably was adopted because of an 
impermissible purpose rooted in racial antagonism, tpen he could not 
have been satisfied that the government simply asserted a purpose of 
"military necessity." Indeed, an explicit and focused suspicion that 
the challenged exclusion order was adopted because of anti-Japanese 
antagonism would have generated a series of context-specific 
questions of fact-relevant to the ultimate question of impermissible 
purpose-that the court, or the challenger, could have posed to the 
government.157 Such specific questions thereby would have 
crystallized the content of the government's burden beyond any 
opaque formulation of "strict scrutiny." Failure to respond to these 
focused questions in a way that persuasively allays suspicions of 
racial antagonism would mean that the government fails to meet its 
burden and, therefore, should lose. 
*** 
The foregoing has illustrated the proposition that to serve the 
adjudicative function of judicial review, a court not only must 
randomly to find a statute. Suppose, as well, that all one knew about that statute was 
its facial neutrality. Suppose, based on just that information, one had to place a wager 
as to whether that statute was adopted because of purposes rooted in racism. It would 
seem rational to bet that the law was not adopted because of purposes rooted in 
racism, based on the fact that the policies addressed by most facially neutral laws 
simply have nothing to do with particular contexts and particular policies in which 
racism tended to be manifested in American history. Thus, if courts were to determine 
that most facially neutral laws were not adopted because of racial prejudice, and if all 
one knew about a law is that it does not contain a racial classification, it would be 
rational to wager-based on the categorical probabilities, without additional 
information, and toward reducing the systemic costs of adjudicative error-that such 
law was not adopted because of racial prejudice. It would be rational to place the 
burden of demonstrating unconstitutionality on the challenger. One might note, 
however, that because the Court has not explicitly derived and defined substantive 
constitutional principles and adjudicative rules in this context, the resulting doctrine 
is plagued by ambiguities that inhibit both the adjudicative and political functions in 
ways similar to those revealed by this Article's close examination of other doctrinal 
contexts. 
157. Why the Japanese? What was the basis for the belief that persons of Japanese 
ancestry would commit acts of sabotage and espionage against the United States? Why 
not impose similar restrictions against persons of Italian and German ancestry on the 
east coast? Why were these policies framed without providing for an individualized 
assessment of each internee's ties to and sympathies for Japan, and likelihood of 
committing acts endangering the national interest? 
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explicitly derive and define substantive constitutional principles for 
identifying issues of relevant fact, but also must explicitly derive and 
define adjudicative rules for resolving issues of relevant fact. Because 
Justice Black's applicable substantive constitutional principle was 
only implicit, the prohibition of "racial antagonism" was poorly 
defined. Not a word was written toward deriving this substantive 
constitutional principle as sound interpretation. Furthermore, 
because the definition and derivational rationale for the adjudicative 
presumption in Korematsu was only implicit, Justice Black shifted 
from a presumption of impermissibility to deference, and found that 
the challenged policy was not adopted because of racial antagonism. 
In short, when the Court fails explicitly to derive and define 
substantive constitutional principles and adjudicative rules, the costs 
to the adjudicative function are poorly derived and defined 
propositions oflaw and poorly made findings offact.158 
3. Doctrinal Clarity, Correctness, and the Political 
Function 
From Madison and Hamilton, to Thayer and Bork, and from the 
Supreme Court through its insistence on judicial supremacy, those 
who have thought seriously about judicial review have contemplated 
158. Professor Berman suggests that "full appreciation of constitutional decision 
rules could pave the way for a more robust congressional role in the enterprise of 
constitutional implementation: The Court could permit Congress to substitute its 
judgment for the Court's on just what the applicable decision rule should be." Berman, 
Constitutional Decision Rules, supra note 12, at 104. I am skeptical about this. The 
adjudicative function of judicial review requires, as does any adjudicative context, 
substantive rules (for identifying issues of relevant fact) and adjudicative rules (for 
resolving issues of relevant fact). See supra text accompanying notes 33-38. 
Furthermore, the Court should derive and define adjudicative rules from either a 
normative perspective or a probabilistic perspective. See supra text accompanying 
notes 142-57. If a judicially-defined adjudicative rule has been derived from a 
normative analysis, see supra text accompanying notes 142-51, a congressionally 
enacted rule to the contrary would intrude on the Court's interpretive authority to 
define the Constitution's meaning. If a judicially defined adjudicative rule were 
predicated on a probabilistic analysis, see supra text accompanying notes 152-57, a 
congressionally enacted rule to the contrary would intrude on the judiciary's 
factfinding authority. Thus, to the extent that the Court determines that a particular 
adjudicative rule is necessary for the optimal enforcement of a particular substantive 
constitutional principle, whether from the normative or probabilistic perspective, that 
adjudicative rule would seem no less worthy of protection by judicial supremacy from 
legislative erosion than is the substantive constitutional principle itself. In short, 
adjudicative rules can be deemed just as much a function of constitutionally mandated 
meaning in court as are the substantive constitutional principles themselves. For a 
broad challenge to judicial supremacy, see generally Chang, Critique, supra note 37. 
For the proposition that some aspects of constitutional doctrine have not been framed 
by the Court as constitutionally mandated interpreted meaning, see generally Fallon, 
supra note 17; Monahan, supra note 17. 
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a function beyond the adjudication of particular cases. Indeed, as 
elucidated in Cooper, judicial supremacy is designed to inhibit the 
enactment and enforcement of unconstitutional policies, through 
mandating that political actors seek to remain within judicially-
defined constitutional boundaries. Because it is a systemic part of the 
political process, unlike the episodically intrusive nature of the 
adjudicative function, this political function of judicial review can 
promise greater benefits as well as higher risks. The better a 
substantive constitutional principle is derived and defined, the better 
it can be enforced through the decisions of political actors who seek to 
remain within constitutional bounds. Conversely, poorly conceived 
constitutional doctrine could inhibit the enactment of laws that are 
not unconstitutional, as well as fail to inhibit the enactment of laws 
that are unconstitutional. One would suppose that Korematsu's 
doctrinal ambiguities undermined not only the adjudicative function, 
but also the political function. Rather than explore Korematsu's 
relationship to the political function, however, the following will so 
examine another foundational case that helped to shape the "suspect 
classification" doctrine.159 
a. Substantive Constitutional Principles: Definitional 
and Derivational Ambiguity Preclude a "Duly 
Instructed" Electorate 
In Bolling v. Sharpe,160 the Court invalidated a congressionally-
enacted policy providing for racial segregation in the public schools of 
the District of Columbia. Chief Justice Warren stated that 
"[c]lassifications based solely upon race must be scrutinized with 
particular care."161 Defining the principles of equal protection that 
govern the federal government through the "liberty" protected by the 
Fifth Amendment, Warren said: 
Liberty under law extends to the full range of conduct which 
the individual is free to pursue, and it cannot be restricted 
except for a proper governmental objective. "162 
159. One might note, however, that the essential point concerns deviations from 
doctrinal clarity and correctness-which result from failures explicitly to derive and 
define substantive constitutional principles and adjudicative rules, and which result in 
barriers to fulfilling both the adjudicative and political functions. Thus, one just as 
well could analyze Bolling and Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967), in relation to the 
adjudicative function, and Korematsu in relation to the political function. 
160. 347 U.S. 497 (1954). 
161. Id. at 499. The Court continued: "since they are contrary to our traditions and 
hence constitutionally suspect." For discussion of this proposition as a rationale for the 
close scrutiny of laws with racial classifications, see infra text accompanying notes 
189-91. 
162. Bolling, 347 U.S. at 499-500 (emphasis added). 
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Applying that principle to the facts of Bolling, Warren concluded: 
Segregation in public education is not reasonably related to any 
proper governmental objective, and thus it imposes on Negro 
children of the District of Columbia a burden that constitutes 
an arbitrary deprivation of their liberty in violation of the Due 
Process Clause."163 
833 
In focusing on whether D.C.'s segregation was adopted because 
of a "proper" governmental objective, Warren implicitly applied a 
substantive constitutional principle similar to that applied in 
Korematsu. A similar adjudicative rule-the presumption that laws 
with racial classifications were adopted because of improper 
purposes-is implicit in the Court's declaration that racial 
classifications "must be scrutinized with particular care," and in its 
nondeferential, rather conclusory determination that the D.C. 
segregation policy was not adopted for a "proper" purpose.164 
Although Bolling's implicit substantive constitutional principle 
conceptualized invalid racial discrimination in terms of 
impermissible purposes, there was not a word that defined those 
objectives that are constitutionally "improper." There was not a word 
that identified the putative "improper" objectives underlying the 
District of Columbia policy. Beyond this, Warren's Bolling opinion 
did nothing to derive the substantive constitutional principle 
proscribing certain (undefined) "improper" purposes-nothing to 
justify it as a sound interpretation of equal protection. 
This Article thus far has suggested in broad strokes that judicial 
review cannot effectively fulfill the political function unless 
applicable substantive constitutional principles are explicitly 
defined.165 Unless applicable legal rules are clearly defined, those 
subject to their strictures-whether lower court judges or political 
actors-cannot be "duly instructed." Beyond this, prior discussion 
suggested that judicial review cannot effectively serve the political 
function unless clearly defined substantive constitutional principles 
are also expressly and persuasively derived as sound interpretation. 
The Hamiltonian justification for vesting with federal judges the 
power to interpret and enforce the Constitution's mandates 
presupposes that judges reach their decisions through the exercise of 
"judgment," not "will."166 Derivation that is express and plausible-if 
not persuasive-not only can help political actors understand the 
163. Id. at 500 (emphasis added). 
164. Unstated, but implicit, was a finding of material fact-that the District of 
Columbia policy of racial segregation was enacted for the same racist purposes as were 
similar policies of racial segregation throughout the South. 
165. See supra text accompanying notes 39-115. 
166. See THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 465. 
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content of the principle they are bound to obey, but also might soften 
the resolve of those otherwise not inclined to comply. 
Definitional Clarity. Consider how greater clarity in the 
definition of Bolling's (otherwise ambiguous and implicit) substantive 
constitutional principle might have affected the political function. 
Few personified the political resistance at which the Court targeted 
its lectures in Cooper more than Senator James Eastland of 
Mississippi. Senator Eastland made the southern politician's typical 
assertions about segregation. "The principle of segregation of the 
white and colored races in the institutions of the South is not and has 
never been based upon the concept that one race should be inferior to 
the other before the law."161 He further declared: 
The white people of the South do not have race prejudice. They 
have race consciousness, and they are proud to possess this 
awareness of the significance of race. Had they not possessed it, 
the South would have been mongrelized and southern 
civilization destroyed long ago. The South is historically 
justified in its unflinching stand for racial integrity.168 
Eastland's formal (and fantastic) assertions about southern 
segregation rest on several propositions. First, race consciousness is 
not equivalent to "race prejudice."169 Second, the prevention of 
"mongrelization," and the preservation of "racial integrity" are not 
the equivalent of race prejudice.110 Third, segregation in pursuit of 
"racial integrity" is not predicated on the proposition that one race 
should be inferior to another before the law.m All of these 
propositions raise conceptual and legal questions for defining that 
"race prejudice" (or consciousness) which is constitutionally 
167. 100 CONG. REC. 7129, 7253 (1954). 
168. 100 CONG. REC. 7129, 7256 (1954). 
169. This proposition is valid, and had been at least implicitly recognized in 
Korematsu and Bolling. All racial classifications discriminate based on race and, 
therefore, are a product of race consciousness. Korematsu implied that only those 
classifications adopted because of "racial prejudice" or "antagonism" are 
unconstitutional. Bolling implied that only those classifications adopted because of 
"improper" purposes are unconstitutional. Whether "the people of the South" acted 
with permissible or impermissible "race consciousness" depended on the particular 
"significance of race" of which they proudly proclaimed awareness. 
170. This proposition identifies particular southern objectives relevant to race--
preventing "mongrelization" and protecting "integrity." Like the first proposition, this 
second acknowledges that race prejudice underlying public policy is at least politically 
(and perhaps constitutionally) problematic. Furthermore, it asserts the key proposition 
that Bolling failed to confront-that these purposes of preventing racial 
"mongrelization" and protecting racial "integrity" are not manifestations of (politically 
and constitutionally vulnerable) racial prejudice. 
171. This proposition implicitly acknowledges that a prescription of mandated legal 
inferiority would qualify as racial prejudice, and raises factual issues about the 
purposes that did underlie segregation. 
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problematic, and factual questions about the purposes that did 
underlie policies of racial segregation. Significantly, however, by 
these assertions, Eastland at least implicitly acknowledges that if 
segregation were predicated on "race prejudice," it would be 
politically vulnerable, if not constitutionally so. 
By following Korematsu in conceptualizing unconstitutional 
racial discrimination in terms of prohibited purposes, Bolling 
presented an opportunity for the Court to address the very questions 
that people like Eastland were raising. Yet, Bolling's vague 
propositions about "proper" purposes left unchallenged Eastland's 
conceptual assertion that the pursuit of "racial integrity" is not race 
prejudice, as it left unchallenged Eastland's implicit assertion that 
the pursuit of "racial integrity" is not unconstitutional. 
If the Court had defined "improper" purposes in Bolling, the 
political function could have been better served. Indeed, imagine that 
Bolling had defined impermissible racial discrimination as that 
pursued for purposes rooted in racist values or racial stereotypes-a 
proposition on which the Court has (at least implicitly) settled 
today.112 Framing such a principle explicitly in Bolling would have 
required defining what it means to place value on race per se, 
explaining why such racist value judgments are constitutionally 
prohibited, and demonstrating how the purposes for which public 
schools were segregated did, indeed, transgress such prohibitions. 
Such an analysis could have made clear that a purpose of preserving 
"racial integrity" values an individual of one race more than an 
individual of another race, and institutions that are mono-racial 
more than those that are multi-racial. Such an analysis, therefore, 
could have directly confronted Eastland's assertion that the purpose 
of preserving "racial integrity" is not racial prejudice. Thus, by failing 
to define "improper" purposes-by failing explicitly to define the 
applicable substantive constitutional principle-Bolling did less than 
it could have to place on political actors like Eastland a burden of 
defending their cherished policies, long predicated on a pervasive 
ideology of racism, against a clarified constitutional challenge.173 
172. See infra note 197 and accompanying text. This assumes that Justice Warren 
intended the implications of framing the proscription in terms of "improper" purposes, 
and the implications of finding that the D.C. schools were segregated for no "proper" 
purpose at all. Of course, the Court cannot clearly frame a substantive constitutional 
principle until it has itself developed a clear understanding of the definition of 
unconstitutionality at issue. 
173. This failure to define "improper" purposes can be contrasted with Justice 
Warren's opinion in Loving v. Virginia thirteen years later. In Loving, Justice Warren 
determined that Virginia's criminalization of interracial marriage was "designed to 
maintain White Supremacy" and suggested that such a purpose was not legitimate 
under the Equal Protection Clause. Loving, 388 U.S. at 11 & n.11. Yet even here, 
Justice Warren clouded the content of the applicable substantive constitutional 
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One might raise an objection. Even if clarity in defining 
substantive constitutional principles might influence the way that 
political actors exercise discretion in ordinary circumstances, the 
struggle over racial segregation involved such raging emotion that 
any judicial declarations, whether clear and nuanced or not, would 
have vaporized in the heat. Eastland perhaps revealed unreachable 
irrationality with statements such as those he made at a 1956 rally 
of the White Citizens' Council: 'When in the course of human events 
it becomes necessary to abolish the Negro race, proper methods 
should be used. Among these are guns, bows and arrows, slingshots 
and knives .... All whites are created equal with certain rights, 
among these are life, liberty and the pursuit of dead niggers."114 One 
who says this-and that "the white people of the South do not have 
race prejudice," and that racial segregation is not predicated on a 
view that blacks "should be inferior [to whites] before the law"115-
might be entirely beyond the reach of rational discourse. What of the 
political function of judicial review in such circumstances? 
Indeed, contemplating such sentiments, Alexander Bickel urged 
the "passive virtues" toward avoiding judicial decisions that would 
risk disobedience by parties directly subject to court order.176 Rather 
than confrontation through judicial decision, he urged judicial side-
stepping through misdirection and duplicity. Along these lines, even 
if the Court were to make (rather than to avoid) a controversial 
principle in declaring, ''There can be no doubt that restricting the freedom to marry 
solely because of racial classifications violates the central meaning of the Equal 
Protection Clause." Id. at 12 (emphasis added). This statement badly conflates the 
essential concern of the implicit substantive constitutional principle (the prohibition of 
discrimination because of racist purposes) and the implicit adjudicative rule (the 
probabilistically-rooted presumption that laws with racial classifications were adopted 
because of racist purposes). Apart from the fact that it is difficult to fathom what 
discrimination "solely because of racial classifications" might mean, this statement at 
best muddies the message to citizens and their representatives as to the normative 
proposition-the repudiation of purposes rooted in racism-which the Court 
(implicitly) deemed mandated by the Equal Protection Clause. Like jurors who would 
be ill-instructed in a murder prosecution if the court did not clearly distinguish 
between the substantive criminal statute (with all its elements) and the adjudicative 
rule requiring the prosecution to prove facts establishing each element beyond a 
reasonable doubt, so citizens and their representatives were ill-instructed by this 
Loving opinion as to the substantive constitutional principle that they should endeavor 
to respect in their policymaking. Again, were the Court explicitly to define 
constitutional doctrine in terms of substantive constitutional principles and 
adjudicative rules, it would be less likely to conflate elements from the two types of 
rule. Recall the discussion, above, of a hypothetical murder statute that conflates 
substantive and adjudicative considerations. See supra note 51. 
174. ROBERT A. CARO, THE YEARS OF LYNDON JOHNSON: MAsTER OF THE SENATE 767 
(2002). 
175. 100 CONG. REC. 7129, 7253 (1954). 
176. See BICKEL, LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH, supra note 54, at 244-72. 
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decision, as it did in Bolling, might it not be better to obscure the 
grounds of decision, toward avoiding direct ideological confrontation? 
Might resistance be less likely if political actors could maintain a 
pretense of continuing commitment to their constitutionally 
problematic ideology? 
Perhaps so, but the point seems vulnerable. Bickelian 
obfuscation would have the Court choose a strategic path toward 
maximizing compliance with judicially-declared mandates by issuing 
opinions designed to hide the content of those constitutional 
mandates. It would have the Court refrain from communicating 
clearly with those inclined to obey by anticipating the resentment of 
those inclined to rebel. It is an approach that seems akin to blurring 
the definition of murder for fear of inflaming the emotions of the 
criminally insane. 
Beyond this, it hardly makes sense to measure the success of 
rules aimed at deterrence by focusing on the undeterred and the 
undeterrable. Simply because some people continue to commit 
murder does not establish that the death penalty does not deter 
others. Even if some would disobey clearly defined substantive 
constitutional principles, it does not follow that clearly defining such 
principles would not maximally deter the enactment (or promote the 
repeal) of unconstitutional laws through influencing the decisions of 
those inclined to obey. Constructing vague doctrine might have 
anticipated the feared rebel, but it ensured that those political actors 
who could have felt constrained by judicial supremacy were left 
guessing about the limits on their discretion-here, the definition of 
"improper" purposes applied in Bolling. 
All of this assumes that Eastland and his ilk were the political 
equivalents of the criminally insane. If they were not, but merely 
duplicitous and stubborn, would not engagement, rather than 
avoidance, have been the best weapon for maximizing the political 
function? Indeed, one imagines that if the Bolling Court had 
explicitly defined a substantive constitutional principle withdrawing 
discretion to pursue purposes rooted in racist values or stereotypes, 
Eastland would have responded not only with his factual assertion 
that segregation is not predicated on notions of racial inferiority, but 
also with the legal assertion that equal protection, as originally 
understood, permitted racial segregation. This brings us to another 
critical proposition for this Article-that the political function can be 
enhanced not only by clearly defining substantive constitutional 
principles, but through their explicit derivation, as well. 
Derivational Clarity. Indeed, perhaps because Bolling's ratio 
decidendi was ill-defined, the ire of the white southern establishment 
was focused not on Bolling, but on Brown. It is important to 
recognize that Bolling and Brown were decided with respect to 
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fundamentally different (implicit) substantive constitutional 
principles. Bolling rested on an implicit prohibition of purposes 
rooted in racial prejudice. This implicit principle cast aside Plessy v. 
Ferguson's111 "separate but equal" as no longer applicable as a matter 
of law. In Brown, Warren declared that "in the field of public 
education the doctrine of 'separate but equal' has no place."178 
Critically important is Warren's reason for displacing Plessy's 
doctrine in Brown. His point was not that "separate but equal" was 
inapplicable as a matter of law, but rather that the principle was not 
satisfied as a matter of fact. "Separate educational facilities are 
inherently unequal," he declared, as a matter of fact, because even 
assuming equal tangible facilities, black students derive less benefit 
from such schools than do white students.179 
Eastland closely examined Warren's reasoning in Brown, to the 
point of quoting, and endeavoring to rebut, extended portions of the 
opinion.180 Eastland focused particularly on Warren's suggestion that 
"we cannot turn the clock back to 1868 when the Amendment was 
adopted."181 He responded that "the 14th amendment ... did not 
prevent segregation, and it was so understood at the time .... [T]he 
meaning of the Constitution or an amendment is fixed when it is 
adopted. It cannot conceivably have one meaning at one time, and 
another meaning in later years."182 
It could have been profoundly important for the political function 
if the Court had asserted explicitly that it was turning back the clock 
to 1868-at least in defining the substantive constitutional principle 
under which Brown was decided. What warranted the invalidation of 
racially segregated schools was not so much a change of legal 
principle-i.e., that segregated facilities are permissible so long as a 
mandate of equal facilities is satisfied-but the evolution of societal 
177. 163 U.S. 527 (1896). 
178. Brown, 347 U.S. at 495. 
1 79. See id.; see also David Chang, The Bus Stops Here: Defining the Constitutional 
Right of Equal Educational Opportunity and an Appropriate Remedial Process, 63 
B.U. L. REV. 1, 7-10 (1983) [hereinafter Chang, Equal Educational Opportunity]. 
180. Eastland also criticized Brown on other grounds, including allegations that 
some members of the Court were corrupt, see, for example, 100 CONG. REC. 11319, 
11526 (1954), and some were subject to Communist influence, see, for example, 100 
CONG. REC. 7129, 7255 (1954). 
181. Brown, 347 U.S. at 492. 
182. 100 CONG. REC. 7129, 7252 (1954). Most agree that the original understanding 
of the Equal Protection Clause did not prohibit racial segregation. See, e.g., Alexander 
M. Bickel, The Original Understanding and the Segregation Decision, 69 HARV. L. REV. 
1 (1955) [hereinafter Bickel, Original Understanding]; cf. Michael W. McConnell, 
Original ism and the Desegregation Decisions, 81 VA. L. REV. 94 7 (1995) (reinterpreting 
historical evidence). 
2006] STRUCTURING CONSTITUTIONAL DOCTRINE 839 
facts relevant to that principle's mandate of equality.183 It is 
(arguably) a very different matter-more responsive to Eastland's 
Bork-like insistence on interpretive legitimacy-to apply an 
originalist principle to the changed facts of the modern world, than to 
create a nonoriginalist principle, and apply that nonoriginalist 
principle to its relevant facts.184 Making this distinction clearly could 
have been facilitated by explicitly distinguishing between 
substantive constitutional principles and adjudicative rules-
between those constitutional principles that identify issues of 
relevant fact, and those constitutional rules devised for resolving 
issues of relevant fact. 
These arguments would not have persuaded Senator Eastland. 
He ridiculed the Court's determination that "segregated schools are 
inherently unequal," and its reliance on the findings of psychologists 
about the effects of segregated schools on black children.185 Indeed, 
recogmzmg the distinction between deriving and defining 
substantive constitutional principles and adjudicative rules would 
have placed a burden on the Court to explain how it determined that 
segregated educational facilities are inherently unequal-to address 
who should bear the burden of persuasion on that issue of fact, and 
why. Addressing this question would not have eliminated resistance 
and resentment, but it could at least have helped to crystallize the 
points in dispute. It would have "duly instructed" (or, at least, better 
instructed) political actors. And that is precisely what the political 
function is about. 
One should turn now from Brown and focus again on Bolling-
something the public never did. I have suggested that Bolling was, by 
far, more doctrinally radical and significant.186 Brown applied 
Plessy's originalist "separate but equal" principle. Bolling repudiated 
it. Bolling rested on an implicit substantive constitutional principle-
a prohibition of "improper" purposes-that was to confront the 
ideology of racism. Had the Bolling Court made this clearer, by 
having explicitly defined a substantive constitutional principle 
prohibiting purposes rooted in racist values or stereotypes, it surely 
183. It is, of course, arguable that Brown changed the content of the "separate but 
equal" principle by redefining what had to be equal-from equality of tangible facilities 
to equality of experiential benefits from those facilities. See Chang, Equal Educational 
Opportunity, supra note 1 79, at 8-9. 
184. For the former, the derivational task must explain why the originalist principle 
should continue to govern (a point that Eastland and his ilk would not contest) and 
why the Court should recognize the relevant implications of modern facts (a point that 
might be difficult to contest). For the latter, the derivational task must explain why 
the originalist principle should be modified, and to what. This is, of course, the 
essential point contested by those who proclaim allegiance to originalism. 
185. 100 CONG. REC. 7129, 7252 (1954). 
186. See generally Chang, Equal Educational Opportunity, supra note 179. 
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would have drawn more of Eastland's ire. It would have needed to 
anticipate that ire with an explanation as to why such a 
nonoriginalist interpretation of equal protection-one that fully 
repudiated racist values in law-was appropriate in 1954.187 Yet, not 
only did Warren's Bolling opinion fail effectively to define the 
substantive constitutional principle proscribing certain "improper" 
purposes; it did nothing to derive the principle-to justify it as a 
sound interpretation of equal protection. Thus, Eastland and his 
comrades not only lacked "due instruction" on the content of their 
constitutional boundaries; beyond this, had they noticed Bolling's 
doctrinal implications, they would have been left with less reason to 
follow the Court's instructions-to abide by their responsibilities 
under judicial supremacy-as they resentfully pondered the Court's 
failure to meet its own responsibilities of justification.188 
b. Adjudicative Rules: Definitional and Derivational 
Ambiguity Preclude a "Duly Instructed" Electorate 
Warren's Bolling opm1on briefly sought to justify the 
adjudicative proposition that laws with racial classifications are 
187. Bolling has been so overshadowed by Brown that Professor McConnell did not 
mention the case when reexamining the original understanding and the Supreme 
Court's desegregation decisions. See McConnell, supra note 182, at 1117-39. This is all 
the more significant because in McConnell's view, the original position on segregation, 
at least that of Senator Charles Sumner, did not depend on sociological judgments 
about the effect of segregation on educational performance. Rather, that original 
condemnation of segregation was rooted in repudiation of any "formal expression of 
subordination" because of racism. Id. at 1138-39. This is precisely the notion implied 
by Bolling. See supra text accompanying notes 160-76. For an effort to derive the 
Bolling principle (prohibiting racist purposes even in the originally protected context 
of segregation) as sound interpretation, see Chang, Constitutional Intent, supra note 
41, at 828-55. 
188. In Loving, Chief Justice Warren endeavored explicitly to derive the proposition 
that the Equal Protection Clause prohibits Virginia's criminalization of interracial 
marriage. Virginia argued that the original understanding of the Equal Protection 
Clause contemplated that anti-miscegenation statutes would remain permissible. 
Justice Warren's response was initially tentative, ultimately adamant, and internally 
inconsistent. On the one hand, Warren followed Brown in acknowledging that 
"although these historical sources 'cast some light,' they are not sufficient to resolve 
the problem; 'at best, they are inconclusive."' Loving, 388 U.S. at 9 (citation omitted). 
On the other hand, Warren declared that "the clear and central purpose of the 14th 
Amendment was to eliminate all official state sources of invidious racial 
discrimination .... " Id. at 10. Yet, to refer to the purpose of the Fourteenth 
Amendment in the past tense seems to be a statement about its original intent---0ne 
that views that original purpose as clear, not inconclusive. Thus, in Warren's Loving 
opinion, the derivation of the (implicit) substantive constitutional principle was 
incoherent. One might question which derivational failure-the complete absence of 
interpretive justification or the presentation of incoherent justification--engenders 
more political resentment and confusion, and more undermines the political function. 
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presumed unconstitutional. "Classifications based solely upon race 
must be scrutinized with particular care since they are contrary to 
our traditions and hence constitutionally suspect."1s9 The proposition 
that racial classifications are "contrary to our traditions" is, at best, 
contestable, and at worst, laughable. There has been a tradition in 
the United States of laws with racial classifications. That tradition 
has been pervasive and at least regionally deep. To say that such 
laws are "contrary to our traditions" must have rung hollow not only 
to those citizens and their representatives who favored segregation, 
but also to others who might have been more agnostic about such 
policies. Whatever one's response to the Court's bottom-line decision, 
reasoning that depended on such an odd statement about "our 
traditions" could not inspire confidence. It could only further 
undermine Bolling's potential to instruct political actors as to the 
substantive constitutional significance of the purposes they pursue, 
and the probabilistically-justifiable adjudicative presumption 
attaching to racial classifications.190 
The Court could have sent a message more capable of "duly 
instructing" political actors had it explicitly differentiated the 
derivation and definition of applicable substantive constitutional 
principles and adjudicative rules-had it clearly stated in Bolling 
that racial classifications are constitutionally significant because 
they indicate a probability that a substantive constitutional principle 
prohibiting racist purposes has been violated. Indeed, had it 
explicitly pursued the probabilistic rationale, the Court could have 
said that racial classifications serve this adjudicative function 
precisely because there has been a tradition of their use in such a 
manner.191 Thus, Bolling's substantive message concerning 
"improper purposes"--obscured first by the failure explicitly to derive 
and define the applicable substantive constitutional principle-was 
obscured further by the failure explicitly to derive and define the 
189. Bolling, 347 U.S. at 499. 
190. To the contrary, because the use of racial classifications is a part of the 
American tradition, and forms a pattern so clearly rooted in racism, the probabilistic 
rationale for the presumed impermissibility of racial classifications is well-warranted. 
See supra text accompanying notes 152-57. 
191. The pursuit of purposes rooted in racism is contrary to our better traditions. 
But as suggested above, because many such purposes were permitted by the original 
understanding, the Court had a responsibility to explain a substantive constitutional 
principle broadly repudiating such purposes as sound interpretation. Beyond this, the 
Court might have sent a clearer but entirely different normative message by 
suggesting that racial classifications have some normative significance independent of 
this evidentiary and adjudicative function-a normative significance that implicates 
some substantive constitutional principle other than the prohibition of purposes rooted 
in racial antagonism. See infra text accompanying notes 234-40 (discussing Powell's 
concerns about "justice" in Bakke). 
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applicable adjudicative presumption. Also obscured was an important 
concomitant message: Legislatures may use racial classifications so 
long as they do not act because of "improper" purposes. 
C. Powell in Bakke: Adjudicating Challenges to ''Affirmative 
Action" Racial Classifications 
In Regents of University of California v. Bakke,192 the Supreme 
Court considered whether a state university medical school's 
"special" admissions program violated the Equal Protection Clause. 
The school reserved sixteen of one hundred seats for blacks, 
Chicanos, Asians, and American Indians. It argued that these racial 
classifications should not be subjected to "strict scrutiny," because 
they were unlike those challenged in previous cases.193 The exclusion 
of Japanese-Americans in Korematsu, the prohibition of interracial 
marriage in Loving, and the racial segregation in Bolling, aimed 
legal harms at traditional targets of racism. The U.C. Davis racial 
classifications aimed legal benefits at traditional targets of racism. 
Addressing the school's doctrinal argument, Justices Powell and 
Brennan vigorously debated the proper "standard of review." Justice 
Powell rejected the school's position, as he determined that "racial 
and ethnic distinctions of any sort are inherently suspect and thus 
call for the most exacting judicial examination."194 For Powell, the 
U.C. Davis racial classifications, like all racial classifications, should 
be subject to "strict scrutiny"-that is, struck down unless the state 
meets a burden of showing that its racial classifications are 
"necessary" to serve "a compelling governmental interest."195 For 
Brennan, U.C. Davis' special admissions program should be 
presumed unconstitutional, but to a lesser degree. The U.C. Davis 
racial classifications, like other classifications "designed to further 
remedial purposes," must be struck down unless the state 
demonstrates that they "serve important governmental objectives" 
and are "substantially related to achievement of those objectives."196 
The intense dialogue between Powell and Brennan on the 
appropriate "standard of review" suggests that there is a meaningful 
distinction between a state interest that is "compelling" and one that 
is merely "important," and between a racial classification being 
"necessary" to achieve the state's objective, and one that is merely 
"substantially related" to achieve that objective. The following will 
192. 438 U.S. 265 (1978). 
193. See Bakke, 438 U.S. at 287-88 (arguing that "strict scrutiny" "should be 
reserved for classifications that disadvantage 'discrete and insular minorities"'). 
194. Id. at 291. 
195. Id. at 299. 
196. Id. at 359. 
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suggest that in considering whether something other than "strict 
scrutiny" should be applied to U.C. Davis' racial classifications, 
Powell failed to distinguish between substantive constitutional 
principles and adjudicative rules. He failed to build upon the implicit 
structure of constitutional doctrine developed by the Court in 
Korematsu, Bolling, and Loving. He failed to focus clearly on the 
implicit substantive constitutional principle (defining 
unconstitutional racial discrimination in terms of prohibited 
purposes rooted in racist values-whether animus or favoritism--or 
racial stereotypes)197 and the implicit adjudicative rule (designating 
laws with racial classifications as presumptively unconstitutional 
because, more likely than not, they were enacted because of 
impermissible purposes rooted in racist values or racial stereotypes). 
Indeed, the following discussion will suggest that rather than 
pursue an analysis about the adjudicative presumption appropriate 
for enforcing the substantive prohibition of purposes rooted in 
racism, Powell's analysis implicitly created new substantive 
constitutional principles, without any effort to define such principles 
with precision, or to derive such principles as sound interpretations 
of constitutional text and legitimate bases for judicial intrusion on 
legislative discretion. The resulting doctrinal confusion had profound 
consequences both for the new substantive constitutional principles 
that Powell implicitly created, and for the established substantive 
constitutional principle (prohibiting purposes rooted in racism) from 
which he departed. 
197. This assumes an explicit definition of prohibited purposes broader than that 
suggested by Black's Korematsu opinion, but implied in subsequent Supreme Court 
decisions-purposes rooted in racist value judgments, whether animus or favoritism, 
and purposes rooted in racial stereotypes, violate the Equal Protection Clause. Justice 
Powell's opinion in Bakke implied this fuller notion of prohibited racial prejudice. For 
Powell's view that racial favoritism is prohibited, see, for example, Bakke, 438 U.S. at 
307 ("Preferring members of any one group for no reason other than race . . . is 
discrimination for its own sake. This the Constitution forbids."). For Powell's view that 
purposes rooted in racial stereotyping are prohibited, see infra note 243. After Bakke, 
the Court has made rather clear that state action disfavoring people solely because of 
race is constitutionally prohibited (racial animus), as is state action preferring people 
solely because of race (racial favoritism), as is state action predicated on racial 
stereotypes. For example, Justice O'Conner, writing for the Court in Grutter v. 
Bollinger, indicated that the Equal Protection Clause prohibits racial classifications 
"motivated by illegitimate notions of racial inferiority," and motivated by "simple 
racial politics," or "illegitimate racial prejudice or stereotype." 539 U.S. at 326. 
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1. Building on a Structurally Ambiguous Doctrinal 
Foundation: Exacerbating Doctrinal Distortion 
a. Explicitly Deriving and Defining Adjudicative Rules 
for the U.C. Davis "Type" of Racial Classification: 
The Analysis Powell Should Have Pursued 
Immediately preceding his first pronouncement that U.C. Davis' 
racial classifications, like all other racial classifications, should be 
subject to "strict scrutiny," Powell cited statements from Hirabayashi 
and Korematsu that implicitly conveyed the substantive 
constitutional principle prohibiting purposes rooted in racial 
prejudice, and the adjudicative rule, justifiable from a probabilistic 
perspective, presuming that laws with racial classifications were 
adopted because of impermissible purposes rooted in racism. Powell 
said: 
Racial and ethnic classifications ... are subject to stringent 
examination .... "[A]ll legal restrictions which curtail the civil 
rights of a single racial group are immediately suspect. That is 
not to say that all such restrictions are unconstitutional. It is to 
say that courts must subject them to the most rigid scrutiny."19s 
If Powell had considered Bakke's "standard of review" issue with an 
explicit focus on the substantive principles and adjudicative rules 
that theretofore had implicitly comprised "strict scrutiny," how might 
his analysis have proceeded? 
Assuming this probabilistic rationale for "strict scrutiny," why 
insist that the state validate Bakke's racial classifications by proving 
them "necessary" (rather than substantially related) to achieve a 
"compelling" (rather than important) interest? What is the difference 
between a "compelling'' interest and an "important" interest? Indeed, 
what is the proper definition of a "compelling interest"? What 
distinguishes a "necessary" relationship (between a classification and 
the state's asserted purpose) from a "substantial" relationship? 
Indeed, what is the proper definition of the required relationship of 
"necessity" between the challenged racial classifications and the 
asserted state purpose? For whatever reason, neither Justice Powell, 
nor Brennan, nor anyone on the Court before or since, has engaged 
these definitional issues. 
Basic legal method resolves ambiguities in legal rules by 
reference to the functions and policies that those rules are created to 
serve. If the rationale for the "strict scrutiny" of racial classifications 
is a probabilistic suspicion that they were adopted because of 
purposes rooted in racist values or stereotypes, then all facets of the 
198. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 290-91 (quoting Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 216). 
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government's burden should be framed toward allaying that 
suspicion, and persuading the court that the particular racial 
classification in question is exceptional in not having been adopted 
because of racism. A "compelling'' interest, therefore, might be 
defined as one satisfying two elements: first, an interest that, on its 
face, does not manifest racist values or stereotypes-in other words, 
a purpose that is, on its face, constitutionally legitimate; and, second, 
an interest that, in relation to other facts and circumstances 
presented in the case at hand, persuasively allays suspicions that the 
classifications would not have been adopted but for purposes rooted 
in racist animus, favoritism, or stereotypes.199 
How might one conceptualize the requirement that the racial 
classifications in question be "necessary" to achieve the asserted 
"compelling" interest?200 A necessary or close relationship between 
the racial classification as a means of regulation, and the asserted 
"compelling" (or suspicion-allaying) non-racist purpose, would be one 
that persuasively helps to rebut the suspicion that the classifications 
were, in fact, employed because of purposes tainted by racist values 
or stereotypes. Use of racial classifications in a way that sweeps 
overinclusively in relation to the asserted legitimate purpose, or 
cherry-picks underinclusively, would reinforce the initial suspicion of 
racism. 
Indeed, analyzing particular aspects of a classification's 
overinclusiveness or underinclusiveness in relation to the state's 
asserted legitimate purposes would crystallize suspicions about 
actual impermissible purposes,201 and could generate questions about 
specific racist values or stereotypes that might have tainted the 
challenged policy.202 Answering these specific questions persuasively 
199. Consider how this definition of "compelling" would apply to the interest 
asserted by Virginia in Loving. Virginia claimed that it criminalized interracial 
marriage involving white persons because it sought to "preserve racial integrity." See 
Loving, 388 U.S. at 7, 11 & n.11. Such an asserted purpose would not get past the first 
element suggested above for defining "compelling," because the purpose itself reflects a 
racist value judgment: that persons of one racial background-"pure white"-are to be 
preferred over persons of mixed racial background. Indeed, in Loving, Justice Warren 
determined that either a purpose of "maintaining White supremacy" or one of 
"preserving the integrity of all races" would be deemed invalid on its face. Id.; see also 
supra note 173. 
200. It is not self-evident why either of the phrases discussed by Powell and 
Brennan ("necessary to achieve a compelling state interest" or "substantially related to 
an important state interest") are effectively framed as adjudicative rules for 
determining whether a particular racial classification was not adopted because of 
purposes rooted in racist valU:es or stereotypes. There will be more to say about this 
point as we delve deeper into Justice Powell's opinion. See infra Part 111.C. l.b. 
201. See supra note 157 and accompanying text. 
202. For discussion of particular questions that might have been raised about the 
special admissions program, see infra text accompanying notes 248-55, 278-80. 
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would become part of the burden the state would be required to 
overcome, and would be a far more focused and meaningful burden 
than that framed by the otherwise abstract terms of "strict 
scrutiny."203 
Given this understanding of the "strict scrutiny" applicable to 
racial classifications like those challenged in Korematsu, Bolling, and 
Loving, how might one analyze the doctrinal issue about which 
Powell and Brennan so vehemently disagreed? Is there a basis for 
believing, as a categorical matter, that the Bakke-type of 
classification is less (or, indeed, more) likely to have been adopted in 
violation of the substantive constitutional principle prohibiting 
purposes rooted in racist values or stereotypes than was the type of 
classification challenged in Korematsu, Bolling, and Loving? 
Brennan suggested that the U.C. Davis classifications should be 
subject to "intermediate scrutiny" because they were adopted for 
''benign" purposes. But whether a racial classification was adopted 
for impermissible purposes is precisely the question that close 
judicial scrutiny is supposed to answer. Thus, to posit a ''benign" 
purpose is to assume the dispositive matter at issue.204 Yet, one 
might reformulate Brennan's characterization. The Bakke 
classification seems to benefit traditional targets of racism. This is 
quite unlike the classifications in Korematsu, Bolling, or Loving, 
which fit the historic pattern of racial classifications that seemed to 
harm unpopular groups for purposes rooted in racist animus.205 
Thus, one might view the Bakke classifications as less likely to have 
been adopted because of racist animus than is a classification that 
seems to harm traditional targets of racism.206 
203. See supra text accompanying notes 155-58. 
204. Indeed, on this point, Powell himself said, "Justice Brennan ... offer[s] no 
principle for deciding whether preferential classifications reflect a benign remedial 
purpose or a malevolent stigmatic classification, since [he is] willing in this case to 
accept mere post hoc declarations by an isolated state entity-a medical school 
faculty-unadorned by particularized findings of past discrimination, to establish such 
a remedial purpose." Bakke, 438 U.S. at 295 n.34. 
205. In Wygant u. Jackson Board of Education, 476 U.S. 267 (1986), Powell himself 
suggested another way to reformulate Brennan's characterization of the Bakke-type of 
classification-a reformulation that would not assume the ultimate conclusion about 
the purpose underlying the challenged classification. He viewed Wygant's challenged 
classification as "operat[ing] against a group that historically has not been subject to 
governmental discrimination." Id. at 282. With a category of racial classifications so 
characterized, one might then explore whether there is reason to subject racial 
classifications that operate against groups not historically the targets of racial 
discrimination to a lesser (or different) presumption of unconstitutionality than is 
applicable to racial classifications that operate against groups that historically have 
been the targets of racial discrimination. 
206. See Bakke, 438 U.S. 265. 
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Yet, this analysis is presupposing an explicit substantive 
constitutional principle prohibiting purposes rooted in not only racial 
animus, but also favoritism and stereotypes.201 If (and only if) there 
is also reason to be less suspicious that a law seeming to benefit 
traditional targets of racism was adopted because of racial favoritism 
and stereotypes than was a law containing the Korematsu, Bolling, 
or Loving type of classification, then a fully relaxed burden of 
persuasion could be warranted. If, however, there is reason to believe 
that most racial classifications seeming to benefit traditional targets 
of racism were probably adopted because of purposes rooted in racial 
favoritism or purposes rooted in racial stereotypes, then judicial 
scrutiny of these classifications should still focus closely on the 
government's burden to allay these particular suspicions-despite a 
lessened suspicion that the policy was adopted because of prohibited 
animus. 
It is not necessary to posit answers to these questions to make 
the point at hand: Given the implicit substantive constitutional 
principles and adjudicative rules inherited from Korematsu, Bolling, 
and Loving-and making those implicit rules explicit-the issue, 
properly framed, concerns the probability that the substantive 
prohibition of purposes rooted in racism was violated, and whether 
there is some categorical basis for distinguishing (on such 
probabilistic grounds) between Bakke's classifications, which seem to 
benefit traditional targets of racism, and the Korematsu-Bolling-
Loving classifications, which seemed to harm traditional targets of 
racism. Debating adjectives and adverbs as Powell and Brennan 
did-"compelling" versus "important," and "necessary" versus 
"substantially related"-is fussing about form without content, and 
cannot begin to derive or define adjudicative rules for effectively 
avoiding both the failure to invalidate the unconstitutional law that 
was adopted because of impermissible racist purposes, and the 
invalidation of the permissible law that was not. 
b. Confusing the Nature and Role of Substantive 
Constitutional Principles and Adjudicative Rules: 
The Analysis Powell Did Pursue 
Powell's rationale for the "strict scrutiny" of Bakke's racial 
classifications is complex, and warrants extended quotation and 
examination. The early part of his analysis was marred by the failure 
to distinguish explicitly between the nature and functions of 
substantive constitutional principles and adjudicative rules. The 
latter part of his analysis was further marred by affirmatively 
confusing of the nature and functions of substantive constitutional 
207. See supra note 197 and accompanying text. 
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principles and adjudicative rules, and the factors relevant to the 
derivation and definition of each. In what follows, omitting only his 
citations, I present Justice Powell's discussion, interrupted by 
analysis and commentary. Powell began: 
Over the past 30 years, this Court has embarked upon the 
crucial mission of interpreting the Equal Protection Clause with 
the view of assuring to all persons "the protection of equal 
laws," ... in a Nation confronting a legacy of slavery and racial 
discrimination .... Because the landmark decisions in this area 
arose in response to the continued exclusion of Negroes from 
the mainstream of American society, they could be 
characterized as involving discrimination by the "majority" 
white race against the Negro minority. But they need not be 
read as depending upon that characterization for their results. 
It suffices to say that "[o]ver the years, this Court has 
consistently repudiated '[d]istinctions between citizens solely 
because of their ancestry' as being 'odious to a free people whose 
institutions are founded upon the doctrine of equality.'"2os 
In these sentences, Powell articulates part of the substantive 
constitutional principle implicitly invoked by the Court in 
Korematsu, Bolling, and Loving: Discrimination "solely because of' 
race is impermissible. In other words, discrimination in pursuit of 
racist value judgments-placing value on race, per se-is 
impermissible. Powell suggests that this principle is universally 
applicable to value judgments about any race, not simply animus 
against African-Americans, and to racist value judgments underlying 
discrimination in any policy context, not just those contexts to which 
the reach of the Equal Protection Clause was originally limited.209 
Powell continues: 
Petitioner urges us to adopt for the first time a more restrictive 
view of the Equal Protection Clause and hold that 
discrimination against members of the white "majority" cannot 
be suspect if its purpose can be characterized as ''benign." 
[Powell's footnote 34] The clock of our liberties, however, cannot 
be turned back to 1868 .... It is far too late to argue that the 
guarantee of equal protection to all persons permits the 
recognition of special wards entitled to a degree of protection 
greater than that accorded others. [Powell's footnote 35)210 
208. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 293-94 (citations omitted). 
209. As did the Court in Korematsu, Bolling, and Loving, Powell fails to address 
whether this is a nonoriginalist interpretation of the Equal Protection Clause and, if 
so, why this expansion beyond its original meaning is appropriate, thus generating 
questions about the legitimacy of the Court's decisions in enforcing the putative 
mandates of the Equal Protection Clause. 
210. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 294-95 (citations omitted). 
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Powell confronts U.C. Davis' argument-embraced by Brennan-
that racial classifications adopted for benign purposes are not 
suspect. In his footnote 34, Powell correctly recognizes that positing a 
permissible, remedial purpose is to assume the matter at issue.211 
U.C. Davis (and Brennan) "offer no principle for deciding whether 
preferential classifications reflect a benign remedial purpose or a 
malevolent stigmatic classification, since they are willing in this case 
to accept mere post hoc declarations by an isolated state entity-a 
medical school faculty-unadorned by particularized findings of past 
discrimination, to establish such a remedial purpose."212 So far, the 
discussion is consistent with implicit recognition of the substantive 
prohibition of purposes rooted in racist values, whether animus or 
favoritism, and of the adjudicative task to determine whether a 
particular challenged racial classification was, in fact, adopted 
because of such an impermissible purpose. 
Significantly, however, when he declares that "it is far too late to 
argue that the guarantee of equal protection to all persons permits 
the recognition of special wards entitled to a degree of protection 
greater than that accorded others,"213 Powell veers from the 
substantive prohibition of purposes rooted in racism. To decide that 
laws apparently benefiting traditional targets of racism warrant less 
suspicion than do laws apparently harming traditional targets of 
racism would not necessarily accord "less protection" to whites 
harmed by U.C. Davis' special admissions program than was 
accorded to blacks harmed, say, by the District of Columbia's racially 
segregated schools in Bolling. Rather, all people could be equally 
protected by a single substantive constitutional principle in both 
contexts-the prohibition of purposes rooted in racism. If different 
kinds of statute categorically warrant different degrees of suspicion 
that they were enacted because of racism-if they suggest different 
probabilities of unconstitutionality-then a different adjudicative 
presumption would be warranted for the sake of adjudicative 
accuracy.214 
211. Id. at 294-95 n.34. 
212. Id. (emphasis added). 
213. Id. at 295 (emphasis added). 
214. Indeed, black applicants to the D.C. police force in Davis were not accorded 
"less protection" against unconstitutional racial discrimination than were black school 
children in Bolling, nor indeed less protection than Bakke himself, simply because in 
Davis, an adjudicative rule presuming permissibility was employed, while in Bolling 
and Bakke adjudicative rules presuming impermissibility were employed. See 
generally Davis, 426 U.S. 229. Though the same substantive constitutional principle 
was at stake in all cases-the prohibition of purposes rooted in racist values or 
stereotypes-different kinds of statute (facially neutral versus facially discriminatory) 
categorically suggest different probabilities of unconstitutionality and, therefore, 
warrant different adjudicative presumptions. See supra note 156 and accompanying 
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In his footnote 35, Powell quotes Alexander Bickel's views on the 
remedial use of racial classifications: 
The lesson of the great decisions of the Supreme Court and the 
lesson of contemporary history have been the same for at least a 
generation: discrimination on the basis of race is illegal, 
immoral, unconstitutional, inherently wrong, and destructive of 
democratic society. Now this is to be unlearned and we are told 
that this is not a matter of fundamental principle but only a 
matter of whose ox is gored. Those for whom racial equality was 
demanded are to be more equal than others. Having found 
support in the Constitution for equality, they now claim support 
for inequality under the same Constitution.215 
Of course, the Court has never said that discrimination on the 
basis of race is illegal. If it had, there would be no "strict scrutiny" of 
racial classifications, because all racial classifications, by definition, 
discriminate on the basis of race, and all racial classifications would, 
therefore, be impermissible. Bickel was suggesting a substantive 
constitutional principle beyond that applied in Korematsu, Bolling, 
and Loving. Powell's reference to Bickel confuses analysis of the 
question at hand-whether a different adjudicative rule should be 
applied to determine the permissibility of the U.C. Davis 
classification in relation to the established substantive constitutional 
principle prohibiting purposes rooted in racial prejudice. 
Moving beyond Bickel, Powell continues: 
The Fourteenth Amendment is not directed solely against 
discrimination due to a "two-class theory"-that is, based upon 
differences between "white" and "Negro." Once the artificial line 
of a "two class theory" of the Fourteenth Amendment is put 
aside, the difficulties entailed in varying the level of judicial 
text. The same "degree of protection" is provided by a single, consistent, substantive 
constitutional principle. The adjudicative presumption appropriate for enforcing that 
substantive constitutional principle has varied in the doctrine that the Court has 
created for racial classifications and facially neutral laws and, from a probabilistic 
perspective, appropriately so. Thus, the proposition that people of all races are entitled 
to the same "degree of protection" does not advance Powell's analysis; it is simply 
beside the matter at issue. Professor Roosevelt makes this point as well in critiquing 
Justice O'Connor's requirement of "consistency" in Adarand-the requirement that all 
racial classifications be subject to the same scrutiny, regardless of the races benefited 
or burdened. See Roosevelt, supra note 20, at 1701-05. "The argument that consistency 
demands strict scrutiny for affirmative action . . . is mistaken. The operative 
proposition of equal protection is indeed symmetrical, protecting no person more than 
any other. But decision rules will have special favorites, as long as, and to the extent 
that, state actors have special victims." Id. at 1703. 
215. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 295 n.35 (quoting ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE MORALITY OF 
CONSENT 133 (1975)). 
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review according to a perceived "preferred" status of a 
particular racial or ethnic minority are intractable.216 
851 
Here, Powell frames the question as varying the level of judicial 
review "according to a perceived 'preferred' status of a particular 
racial or ethnic minority." It is not quite clear at this point what 
Powell means by this. Yet, a program's distribution of benefits based 
on race undeniably reflects the policymaker's preference based on 
race. As suggested above,211 the fact that a policymaker-say, a 
legislature-has chosen to "prefer" racial groups that traditionally 
have been targets of racism frames the issue relevant for 
determining the appropriate adjudicative presumption: Is there a 
categorical basis for distinguishing the probability that the 
"preferential" racial classifications at issue were adopted because of 
purposes rooted in racism, from the probability that a Korematsu-
Bolling-Loving type of classification was adopted because of racism? 
A court's determination that some categories of racial 
classification are less likely to have been adopted because of racial 
prejudice and, therefore, warrant a lesser presumption of 
unconstitutionality, would not depend on whether a particular 
legislature, in enacting a particular statute, has or has not chosen to 
enact such preferences. Furthermore, for a court to apply different 
adjudicative presumptions to different kinds of classification would 
not necessarily suggest that the court itself prefers some racial 
groups over others. Rather, determining whether legislative choices 
to benefit particular racial groups should be subject to a different 
adjudicative presumption-different from that applicable to 
traditional racial classifications-would require the Court to make a 
social, political, and historical judgment about the nature and 
prevalence of racism with respect to the particular groups in 
question. Whether making this kind of categorical probabilistic 
judgment involves "intractable" problems is a question Powell simply 
did not address.21s 
Powell continues: 
The concepts of "majority" and "minority" necessarily reflect 
temporary arrangements and political judgments. As observed 
above, the white "majority" itself is composed of various 
minority groups, most of which can lay claim to a history of 
prior discrimination at the hands of the State and private 
individuals. Not all of these groups can receive preferential 
treatment and corresponding judicial tolerance of distinctions 
drawn in terms of race and nationality, for then the only 
216. Id. at 295 (citation omitted). 
217. See supra text accompanying notes 198-207. 
218. See Bakke, 438 U.S. at 295. 
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"majority" left would be a new minority of white Anglo-Saxon 
Protestants.219 
This passage is ineffective in addressing the "standard of review" 
issue in two ways. First, Powell clearly now is confusing the 
judgments that policymakers might make in adopting preferences 
based on race, and the judgments that a reviewing court must make 
in determining whether the chosen policy based on race was adopted 
because of race. He says that not all racial groups can receive 
preferential treatment, presumably by policymakers creating 
affirmative action programs. This seems self-evident, and one could 
hardly imagine a sensible policy that was designed to give all racial 
groups a preference based on race. 
Beyond this, turning to issues relevant to the judicial review of 
legislative choices, Powell suggests that not all racial classifications 
that distribute benefits could receive a corresponding judicial 
tolerance.220 This might be true, or might not, but it misstates the 
matter at issue. As suggested above, the issue is whether the Bakke-
type of racial classification is categorically distinguishable from the 
Korematsu-Bolling-Loving type of racial classification in terms of the 
probabilities of having violated the substantive constitutional 
principle prohibiting purposes rooted in racial prejudice. 
Having asserted that racial classifications distributing benefits 
should not be accorded more "judicial tolerance" than are those 
imposing burdens, Powell considers whether there might be a basis 
for identifying other categories of racial classification that would 
warrant greater judicial tolerance, and concludes that none exists.221 
There is no principled basis for deciding which groups would 
merit "heightened judicial solicitude" and which would not. 
Courts would be asked to evaluate the extent of the prejudice 
and consequent harm suffered by various minority groups. 
Those whose societal injury is thought to exceed some arbitrary 
level of tolerability then would be entitled to preferential 
classifications at the expense of individuals belonging to other 
groups. Those classifications would be free from exacting 
judicial scrutiny. As these preferences began to have their 
desired effect, and the consequences of past discrimination were 
undone, new judicial rankings would be necessary. The kind of 
variable sociological and political analysis necessary to produce 
such rankings simply does not lie within the judicial 
competence-even if they otherwise were politically feasible 
and socially desirable.222 
219. Id. at 295-96. 
220. See id. 
221. Id. at 296-97. 
222. Id. (emphasis added). 
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In this passage, by referring to "the extent of prejudice ... 
suffered by various minority groups," Powell comes as close as he 
ever does to "the analysis that Powell (and Brennan) should have 
pursued," sketched above.223 Yet, the analysis remains deeply 
confused-still conflating the judgments that a policymaker might 
make with those that the reviewing court must make; and still failing 
to analyze questions about appropriate adjudicative presumptions by 
reference to the probabilities that the racial classifications at issue 
were, indeed, adopted in violation of the substantive constitutional 
principle prohibiting laws adopted because of purposes rooted in 
racial prejudice. Consider each sentence, in turn. 
"There is no principled basis for deciding which groups would 
merit 'heightened judicial solicitude' and which would not. '224 The 
question, of course, is not which groups warrant greater 'judicial 
solicitude," but which legislatively chosen classifications warrant less, 
or different, judicial suspicion. Legislative solicitude for certain 
groups would underlie legislative choices to use racial classifications 
that seem to benefit traditional targets of racism. And, as suggested 
above, there could be a principled basis for determining whether 
such legislative choices might warrant less susp1c10n of 
impermissible underlying purposes, or a different presumption of 
unconstitutionality, than is applicable to classifications that seem to 
harm traditional targets of racism.225 
"Courts would be asked to evaluate the extent of the prejudice and 
consequent harm suffered by various minority groups. '22s Here, 
Powell seems to have in mind a legislature's choice to use racial 
classifications for remedial purposes-to redress the effects of past 
racial discrimination. He seems to be suggesting that a court must 
second-guess the policymaker's judgment about the extent to which 
designated groups were targets of past racism, and the extent to 
which they bear the continuing effects of past racism. True or not, 
this point is simply irrelevant to the burden of proof question. 
Regardless of whether "strict scrutiny" or something less is applied-
whatever adjudicative presumption is employed-a reviewing court 
would have to make some kind of judgment about the legislature's 
basis for believing that the groups were targets of past racial 
discrimination, and about the legislature's basis for believing that 
any present and relevant underrepresentation of the group is the 
result of that past discrimination. 
223. See supra text accompanying notes 198-207. 
224. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 296 (emphasis added). 
225. See supra text accompanying notes 198-207. 
226. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 296 (emphasis added). 
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"Those whose societal injury is thought to exceed some arbitrary 
level of tolerability then would be entitled to preferential 
classifications at the expense of individuals belonging to other groups. 
Those classifications would be free from exacting judicial scrutiny. "221 
Powell continues to confuse the question of policy that the legislature 
might address and the question of constitutional law that the court 
must address. Whether a group is deemed entitled to preferential 
treatment is a question of policy for legislatures. Whether a 
legislatively-chosen classification warrants other than "strict 
scrutiny" is a question of law for the Court-the adjudicative rule 
with respect to which the policy's constitutionality is determined. 
This question of law properly can be resolved based on the likelihood 
in relevant categorical circumstances that legislatures act because of 
racist values or stereotypes.22s 
"As these preferences began to have their desired effect, and the 
consequences of past discrimination were undone, new judicial 
rankings would be necessary. ''229 Still, Powell confuses the question of 
policy that the legislature addresses from the question of 
constitutional doctrine that the court must address. As the 
continuing effects of past racial discrimination become mitigated, 
legislatures would need to consider whether, in their view, the race-
based preferences remain necessary to redress the effects of past 
racial discrimination. Such legislative judgments would be subject to 
judicial review, but the question for courts is not the policy 
determination about whether the effects of past racial discrimination 
should be deemed redressed, but a factual question as to whether a 
legislative assertion of, or belief about, the continued need for such 
policies has been tainted by racist values or stereotypes. 
This issue of fact, relevant under the substantive constitutional 
principle prohibiting purposes rooted in racist values or stereotypes, 
might be answered with a more demanding adjudicative 
presumption, or one less demanding. Determining the appropriate 
adjudicative presumption, based on the categorical likelihood that 
prejudice tainted a legislative judgment about historical facts, is 
analytically distinct from determining those historical facts 
themselves, just as determining whether a murder defendant acted 
in the heat of passion is distinct from the question of who should bear 
the burden of proving such material facts, and why.2ao Indeed, it is 
through the chosen adjudicative rule that a court determines the 
extent to which it views with deference, or suspicion, the legislature's 
227. Id. at 297 (emphasis added). 
228. See supra text accompanying notes 198-207. 
229. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 297 (emphasis added). 
230. See supra text accompanying notes 144-47. 
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assertions about the facts with respect to which its policy was 
framed. 
"The kind of variable sociological and political analysis necessary 
to produce such rankings simply does not lie within the judicial 
competence-even if they otherwise were politically feasible and 
socially desirable. ''231 The point should be that making a policy 
determination as to whether particular groups should be accorded 
preferential treatment for remedial purposes would involve the 
exercise of will, would amount to "legislating from the bench," would 
be beyond the judicial role-and therefore would be beyond the 
judicial competence. Determining whether a legislature's choice to do 
so was tainted by racist values or stereotypes, however, is within the 
judicial role and competence. Indeed, such is a question that courts 
must answer, given a substantive constitutional principle prohibiting 
purposes rooted in racism. And this question of fact must be 
answered, whether through an adjudicative rule of "strict scrutiny" 
for racial classifications, or the Arlington Heights presumption of 
permissibility for facially neutral governmental policies,232 or an 
adjudicative rule tailored to laws with racial classifications that seem 
to benefit traditional targets of racism. 
The foregoing misdirection in Powell's "standard of review" 
analysis resulted from a failure to focus clearly, and explicitly, on the 
conceptual distinction between substantive constitutional principles 
and adjudicative rules. Justice Powell failed to recognize that 
deriving and defining an appropriate adjudicative rule-which was 
the issue that he was debating with Brennan-requires a 
probabilistic (or normative) analysis tailored to the particular 
substantive constitutional principle at stake. Powell should have 
framed the issue as whether racial classifications that seem to 
benefit traditional targets of racism are categorically less likely to 
have been adopted because of racist values or stereotypes than were 
the more familiar kinds of classifications that seem to harm 
traditional targets of racism. Instead, he framed the issue as whether 
different racial groups should be accorded preferential treatment-
clearly an issue of policy for legislatures, rather than one of law for 
courts, at least in the context of the substantive constitutional 
principle prohibiting purposes rooted in racist values or stereotypes. 
But there was more confusion to come, with even more 
significant consequences. As he continued justifying the formalities 
of "strict scrutiny" in Bakke, Powell turned to "problems of justice 
connected with the idea of preference."233 In discussing these 
231. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 297 (emphasis added). 
232. See supra note 156. 
233. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 298. 
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"problems of justice," Powell not only failed to explore the 
probabilistic rationale for "strict scrutiny" as an adjudicative rule for 
enforcing the well-established substantive constitutional principle 
prohibiting purposes rooted in racial prejudice. Beyond this, Powell 
implicitly created two new substantive constitutional principles. 
He continued: 
Moreover, there are serious problems of justice connected with 
the idea of preference itself. First, it may not always be clear 
that a so-called preference is in fact benign. Courts may be 
asked to validate burdens imposed upon individual members of 
a particular group in order to advance the group's general 
interest .... Nothing in the Constitution supports the notion 
that individuals may be asked to suffer otherwise 
impermissible burdens in order to enhance the societal standing 
of their ethnic groups. Second, preferential programs may only 
reinforce common stereotypes holding that certain groups are 
unable to achieve success without special protection based on a 
factor having no relationship to individual worth .... Third, 
there is a measure of inequity in forcing innocent persons in 
respondent's position to bear the burdens of redressing 
grievances not of their making.234 
The first "problem of justice"-that members of the preferred 
racial groups might suffer "otherwise impermissible burdens in order 
to enhance the societal standing of their ethnic groups" -seems to 
contemplate that the community might simply assume that most 
members of the covered group would not have been admitted but for 
the special admissions program. This is, essentially, a concern that 
such programs might encourage racial stereotypes. Indeed, his 
second "problem of justice" refers explicitly to the possibility that 
"preferential programs may only reinforce common stereotypes 
holding that certain groups are unable to achieve success without 
special protection based on a factor having no relationship to 
individual worth." Thus, one might view both of these "problems of 
justice" as concerns that "preferential" racial classifications might 
promote racial prejudice, with harmful consequences for members of 
the preferred racial groups, as well as for the broader society. 
How does this concern help to justify the "strict scrutiny" of the 
U.C. Davis racial classifications? Is this concern at all relevant for 
the traditional (though implicit) rationale for the "strict scrutiny" of 
racial classifications, which is comprised of a substantive 
constitutional principle prohibiting purposes rooted in racist values 
or stereotypes, and an adjudicative rule presuming 
unconstitutionality based on the categorical proposition that a law 
234. Id. 
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containing racial classifications probably was adopted in pursuit of 
purposes rooted in racism? 
It is not self-evident why the fact that a policy might promote 
racism prospectively is relevant for determining whether that policy 
was itself adopted because of purposes rooted in racial prejudice. 
Indeed, one can think of laws that promoted racism, despite having 
been intended to curb racism and its effects. The Fourteenth 
Amendment, and other Reconstruction policies designed to protect 
the freedmen and women, promoted southern racism.235 Powell did 
nothing to connect a law's possible promotion of racism to the 
probabilistic rationale for strictly scrutinizing racial classifications. 
To this extent, the concern about promoting racism was entirely out 
of place in analyzing whether the U.C. Davis program should be 
examined under a different adjudicative rule than were the 
classifications challenged in Korematsu, Bolling, and Loving-at 
least toward determining whether the substantive constitutional 
principle prohibiting racist purposes had been violated. 
More significant than having tainted analysis of the proper 
adjudicative presumption for enforcing the established substantive 
prohibition of purposes rooted in racist values or stereotypes, 
Powell's discussion can be understood as implicitly creating an 
entirely new substantive constitutional principle. Powell's discussion 
implies that if a racial classification excessively promotes racial 
prejudice, then it violates the Equal Protection Clause. But why 
should the Court measure legislation against this norm? Is this an 
originalist interpretation of the Equal Protection Clause? If so, its 
provenance should have been identified. If not, whatever 
methodology was employed for its derivation and definition should 
have been identified, and justified. 
Beyond identifying the interpretive methodology with respect to 
which this new, implicit substantive constitutional principle was 
derived, Powell needed to define the principle's elements in some 
meaningful way. What does it mean to determine that a racial 
classification excessively promotes racial prejudice? Does the concept 
require balancing the significance of the prejudice fomented against 
the significance of the public objectives served by the program at 
issue? If so, what factors are relevant in determining the significance 
of the public benefits served by the challenged program? How is a 
court to determine whether a challenged policy will indeed foment 
racial prejudice, in what contexts, to what extent, and with what 
effects? And what factors are relevant in determining the significance 
235. See, e.g., ERIC FONER, RECONSTRUCTION: AMERICA'S UNFINISHED REVOLUTION 
119-23, 425-44 (1988). 
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of the prejudice fomented, to be measured against the significance of 
the public benefits obtained?236 
Beyond the responsibility explicitly to derive and define this new 
substantive constitutional principle-if, indeed, creating a new 
boundary on legislative discretion was his objective-Powell also 
needed explicitly to derive and define the adjudicative rules with 
respect to which that new substantive principle would be enforced. If 
laws are to be invalidated when they excessively promote racial 
prejudice, should laws with racial classifications be presumed to 
violate this substantive constitutional principle, or presumed not to? 
Do laws with racial classifications more likely than not excessively 
promote racial prejudice-under a necessary definition of 
"excessively" as discussed above? Would it be worse wrongly to 
uphold a classification that does have excessively unfair effects, than 
to strike down a law that does not? If the "excessively unfair effects" 
principle does warrant enforcement, it warrants enforcement 
through adjudicative rules tailored to enforcing that principle-
optimally tailored to avoid both striking down a law that does not 
violate that principle, and upholding a law that does violate that 
principle. 
Consider, now, Powell's third "problem of justice."231 As part of 
his rationale for the "strict scrutiny" of racial classifications that 
seem to benefit traditional targets of racism, Powell said that "there 
is a measure of inequity in forcing innocent persons in respondent's 
position to bear the burdens of redressing grievances not of their 
making."23s Does this concern with "inequity" have anything to do 
with the traditional rationale for closely scrutinizing racial 
classifications? Powell made no such point, and drew no connection 
between an "unfairness" concern and a suspicion that racial 
classifications were adopted because of impermissible purposes 
rooted in racial prejudice.239 Indeed, the concern about excessively 
unfair effects was entirely out of place in analyzing whether the U.C. 
Davis program should be examined under a different adjudicative 
236. See Chang, Judicial Conservatism, supra note 121, at 808. 
237. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 298. 
238. Id. (emphasis added). 
239. It is not self.evident why the proposition that a policy might have excessively 
unfair effects on "innocents" bears any relevance to whether that policy was adopted 
because of purposes rooted in racist values or stereotypes. Indeed, without defining 
this concept of "excessively unfair effects on innocents," it is simply impossible to 
determine whether making such a finding of "unfairness" in any way suggests a 
probability that the substantive constitutional principle prohibiting purposes rooted in 
racism has been violated. Powell neither demonstrated, nor made demonstrable, a 
connection between a racial classification's putatively unfair effects on innocents and 
the question of whether "strict scrutiny" should be applied to the classifications at 
issue in Bakke. 
2006] STRUCTURING CONSTITUTIONAL DOCTRINE 859 
rule than were the classifications challenged in Korematsu, Bolling 
and Loving, toward determining whether the established substantive 
constitutional principle prohibiting racist purposes had been violated. 
As with the concern about excessively promoting racism, Powell's 
concern that racial classifications might have excessively unfair 
effects on "innocent" persons implicitly created a new substantive 
constitutional principle. Powell implied that if a racial classification 
has excessively unfair effects on "innocent" parties, then it violates 
the Equal Protection Clause. Observations made above about the 
nascent "excessively promoting prejudice" principle apply to this 
nascent substantive constitutional principle as well. Why should the 
Court measure legislation against this putative constitutional norm? 
Is this an originalist interpretation of the Equal Protection Clause? If 
so, its provenance should have been identified. If not, whatever 
methodology was employed for its derivation and definition should 
have been identified, and justified. 
Beyond identifying the interpretive methodology with respect to 
which the principle was derived, Powell needed to define its elements 
in some meaningful way. An ill-defined substantive constitutional 
principle can be neither effectively justified as sound interpretation, 
nor effectively applied to adjudicate particular cases or controversies. 
An ill-defined substantive constitutional principle cannot effectively 
identify issues of material fact. What does it mean to determine that 
a racial classification has an excessively unfair effect on innocents? 
Does the concept requiring balancing the significance of the harms 
suffered by innocents against the significance of the public objectives 
served by the program at issue? If so, what factors are relevant in 
determining the significance of individual harms? What factors are 
relevant in determining the significance of the public benefits served 
by the challenged program? 
Powell needed not only explicitly to derive and define this new 
substantive constitutional principle, but also explicitly to derive and 
define the adjudicative rules with respect to which it would be 
enforced. The traditional rationale for the "strict scrutiny" of laws 
with racial classifications had nothing to do with whether such laws 
should be presumed to impose excessively unfair effects. If laws with 
racial classifications are to be invalidated when they have excessively 
unfair effects on innocents, should they be presumed to violate this 
substantive constitutional principle, or presumed not to? Should the 
burden be allocated by reference to a probabilistic analysis? If so, do 
laws with racial classifications more likely than not impose 
excessively unfair effects on innocents-under a necessary definition 
of "excessively" as discussed above? Should the burden be allocated 
by reference to a normative analysis? If so, would it be worse wrongly 
to uphold a classification that does have excessively unfair effects, 
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than to strike down a law that does not? If the "excessively unfair 
effects" principle does warrant enforcement, it warrants enforcement 
through adjudicative rules tailored to optimally avoiding both the 
invalidation of laws that do not violate that principle, and the failure 
to invalidate laws that do.240 
*** 
To summarize: Powell's analysis of the "standard of review" to 
apply to U.C. Davis' racial classifications was deeply flawed because 
it failed, even implicitly, to recognize the essential distinction 
between substantive constitutional principles and adjudicative rules, 
and the very different analyses appropriate for their respective 
derivation and definition. Before he turned to the "problems of 
justice," Powell's analysis obscured the fact that "strict scrutiny" at 
least implicitly had been comprised of two standards-a substantive 
standard and an adjudicative standard. Thus, Powell failed properly 
to frame the "standard of review" issue: whether there was a 
categorical basis for distinguishing the U.C. Davis classifications 
from the Korematsu, Bolling, and Loving classifications with respect 
to the probability of having been adopted in violation of the 
substantive constitutional principle prohibiting purposes rooted in 
racism. 
Beyond failing to frame and address this essential issue, Powell's 
justification of "strict scrutiny" relied on, and implicitly created, two 
new substantive constitutional principles-a prohibition of racial 
classifications that excessively promote racism; and a prohibition of 
racial classifications that have excessively unfair effects on 
"innocents." Invoking these new substantive constitutional principles 
distorted the inherited, established meaning of "strict scrutiny." If 
they were to be enforced legitimately against legislative discretion, 
these new substantive constitutional principles needed to be derived 
and defined on their own terms as interpretations of the Equal 
Protection Clause. Furthermore, if these two new substantive 
constitutional principles were to be enforced effectively, Powell ought 
to have derived and defined adjudicative rules tailored to enforcing 
each. 
The following will examine some consequences of Powell's failure 
to recognize the distinct nature and functions of substantive 
240. This new implicit substantive constitutional principle was confirmed by Justice 
Powell's opinion in Wygant, and provided the rationale for invalidating a policy 
containing racial classifications. All the foregoing issues concerning the substantive 
constitutional principle's derivation and definition, and the issues concerning the 
adjudicative presumption through which the principle ought to be enforced, remained 
just as unaddressed in Wygant as they were in Bakke. See infra text accompanying 
notes 313-22. 
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constitutional principles and adjudicative rules. In determining the 
legal significance of Bakke's facts. fowell undermined the 
adjudicative function in two significant ways. First, he failed 
effectively to determine whether the U.C. Davis program violated the 
established substantive constitutional principle prohibiting purposes 
rooted in racism. Second, he measured the Davis program against 
the prohibition of excessively unfair effects, without having analyzed 
whether this new (implicit) substantive constitutional principle 
should .be enforced, and how. Beyond this, Powell's opm10n 
undermined the political function. It failed to instruct political actors 
effectively as to the principles against which their policy choices 
would be measured. It failed to articulate clearly derived and defined 
substantive constitutional principles capable of inhibiting the 
enactment of unconstitutional law, while leaving legislators free to 
choose policy within constitutional bounds.241 
2. Consequences of Doctrinal Distortion 
a. Failing Explicitly to Derive and Define New 
Substantive Constitutional Principles Undermines 
the Adjudicative Function in Enforcing Previously 
Established Substantive Constitutional Principles 
U.C. Davis asserted four purposes that it sought to serve with 
the special admissions program: 
(i) "reducing the historic deficit of traditionally disfavored 
minorities in the medical schools and the medical profession;" 
(ii) countering the effects of societal discrimination; (iii) 
increasing the number of physicians who will practice in 
communities currently underserved; and (iv) obtaining the 
educational benefits that flow from an ethnically diverse 
student body.242 
241. Professor Roosevelt also considers the potentially pernicious consequences of 
failing to distinguish carefully between substantive constitutional (operative) 
principles and adjudicative (decision) rules. "Sometimes, when a stable jurisprudential 
regime has persisted for a period of time, decision rules can start to be mistaken for 
constitutional operative propositions. When this happens, a number of undesirable 
consequences follow. These consequences include ill-advised doctrinal reform, attempts 
to bind non-judicial actors to decision rules rather than operative propositions, and an 
undoing of the benefits of decision rules." See Roosevelt, supra note 20, at 1693. I 
would suggest that these pernicious consequences can result not only in the context of 
stable doctrine, but also with respect to new and evolving doctrine. Powell's opinion in 
Bakke provides a stark example, as do the affirmative action decisions that grew out of 
that opinion. For a discussion of one such case, see infra text accompanying notes 313-
26. 
242. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 306 (citations omitted). 
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Justice Powell considered each purpose, and determined that with 
respect to none of them was U.C. Davis able to overcome the 
demands of "strict scrutiny." 
Powell's consideration of two of U.C. Davis' asserted purposes-
"reducing the historic deficit of minorities in the medical schools and 
the medical professions," and "increasing the number of physicians 
who will practice in communities currently underserved," was largely 
consistent with the inherited (implicit) meaning of "strict scrutiny." 
Because a close examination of Powell's disposition of these two state 
objectives would not contribute significant additional insight into the 
adjudicative perils of failing explicitly to distinguish between 
substantive constitutional principles and adjudicative rules,243 we 
243. The deficiencies in these parts of Powell's opmion are much like those in 
Korematsu, Bolling, and Loving-deficiencies caused by failing explicitly to derive and 
define the substantive constitutional prohibition of purposes rooted in racism, and the 
adjudicative presumption that laws with racial classifications were adopted because of 
racial prejudice. Powell determined that the third asserted purpose--''increasing the 
number of physicians who will practice in communities currently underserved"-could 
not help to validate the program because there was "virtually no evidence in the record 
indicating that petitioner's special admissions program is either needed or geared to 
promote that goal. . . . Indeed, petitioner has not shown that its preferential 
classification is likely to have any significant effect on the problem." Id. at 310-11. 
Why, exactly, is the lack of evidence demonstrating that minority doctors will choose to 
practice in underserved communities a reason to find that the burdens of "strict 
scrutiny'' have not been met? One might frame an answer simply in terms of the 
formal elements of "strict scrutiny:" with no evidence that persons admitted through 
the special admissions program would practice in underserved communities, U.C. 
Davis had failed to show that its racial classifications were necessary to achieve its 
asserted interest, "compelling'' or not. Yet, this answer elevates the terms of "strict 
scrutiny'' to the level of substance, rather than maintaining clear the formulation's 
role as an adjudicative rule in service of the prohibition of purposes rooted in racist 
values or stereotypes. A better explanation would focus on the connection between that 
lack of evidence and the relevant substantive constitutional principle. Lacking 
evidence demonstrating in fact that blacks, Chicanos, Asians, and American Indians 
admitted through the special program would practice in underserved communities, all 
Davis had was an assumption that they would do so--an unexamined, unsupported 
assumption that race correlates with fact (behavior and career choices). This 
assumption is the very definition of prohibited racial stereotyping. The state's 
justification for the program as a means to educate doctors who would serve in 
underserved communities confirmed, rather than rebutted, the presumption of 
unconstitutionality. 
Powell rejected the first purpose--''reducing the historic deficit of traditionally 
disfavored minorities in the medical schools and the medical profession"-as 
impermissible, per se. Id. at 306. He said: "If petitioner's purpose is to assure within 
its student body some specified percentage of a particular group merely because of its 
race or ethnic origin, such a preferential purpose must be rejected not as insubstantial 
but as facially invalid. Preferring members of any one group for no reason other than 
race is discrimination for its own sake. This the Constitution forbids." Id. This point 
essentially states that aspect of the traditional substantive constitutional principle 
that prohibits purposes rooted in racist value judgments. If U.C. Davis acted based on 
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turn immediately to his consideration of the remaining two purposes 
on which U.C. Davis relied-"obtaining the educational benefits that 
flow from an ethnically diverse student body" and "countering the 
effects of societal discrimination." 
In this section, I will examine how Powell's importation of new 
substantive constitutional principles-in particular, the concern with 
"unfair effects"-distorted the meaning of "strict scrutiny" as 
adjudicative rule, and rendered it ineffective for enforcing the 
established and (by then) uncontroversial substantive constitutional 
principle prohibiting purposes rooted in racist values or stereotypes. 
Indeed, when applying his normatively contaminated conception(s) of 
"strict scrutiny" to Bakke's facts, Powell's opinion identified as 
constitutionally significant a range of factual issues that should have 
been deemed irrelevant-at least with respect to the established 
prohibition of purposes rooted in racism. Powell's focus on these 
unwarranted issues of fact generated an analysis inclined to strike 
down policies that should be deemed permissible under the 
substantive constitutional principle prohibiting purposes rooted in 
racism, and-perhaps paradoxically-to uphold policies that should 
be deemed impermissible under that established substantive 
constitutional principle.244 
1. Invalidating Policies That Do Not Violate an 
Established Substantive Constitutional Principle 
U.C. Davis claimed that it sought to enroll a student body in 
which fifteen percent of students were black, Chicano, Asian, or 
American Indian for a purpose of countering the effects of societal 
discrimination.245 When considering whether this asserted purpose 
race (i.e., used racial classifications) solely because of race, its purpose placed value on 
race, per se, and therefore was constitutionally impermissible. This analysis was 
fatally flawed, however, because Powell merely articulated the substantive 
constitutional principle, and never turned to determine whether the School's purpose 
of reducing the deficit of traditionally disfavored minorities in the medical profession 
was, in fact, rooted in placing value on race, per se. In other words, in examining this 
asserted purpose, he never even began to apply the adjudicative rule of "strict 
scrutiny" that he labored so hard to justify. This is yet another occasion in which the 
adjudicative function of judicial review was undermined by a failure to focus explicitly 
on the different nature and functions of substantive constitutional principles and 
adjudicative rules. 
244. It should be emphasized that this analysis does not assert that a substantive 
constitutional principle prohibiting racial classifications having an excessively unfair 
effect on "innocents" is necessarily erroneous and should not be enforced. Rather, it 
suggests that if such a substantive constitutional principle is to be enforced, it should 
be derived and defined on its own terms, and should be enforced independently of any 
other substantive constitutional principle, through adjudicative rules specifically 
derived and defined for its enforcement. 
245. See Bakke, 438 U.S. at 362. 
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could validate the challenged racial classifications, Powell revealed 
no clear vision as to what "strict scrutiny" should entail. Apparently 
elaborating on the meaning of "compelling'' and "necessary," he 
developed three requirements that must be met if a state is to 
validate racial classifications by asserting a remedial purpose.246 But 
a close examination reveals that two of these three requirements 
undermined "strict scrutiny'' as an adjudicative rule for enforcing the 
substantive constitutional principle prohibiting purposes rooted in 
racist values or stereotypes, and were the product of Powell's concern 
with the "unfair" effects principle. 
The analysis Powell should have pursued. The traditional notion 
of "strict scrutiny" was comprised of an implicit substantive 
constitutional principle prohibiting of purposes rooted in racism;247 
and an implicit adjudicative rule, justifiable from a probabilistic 
perspective, presuming that laws with racial classifications were 
adopted in violation of that substantive prohibition.248 Analyzing the 
facts and circumstances of Bakke's case, the judge (and the 
challenger's attorney) could have generated a series of pointed 
questions about the special admissions program to give specific 
content to otherwise vague suspicions of purposes rooted in racial 
prejudice. 
First, is the asserted purpose facially legitimate, or is it per se 
impermissible?249 Here, the asserted purpose of countering the effects 
of societal discrimination is not inherently rooted in racist values or 
stereotypes. Determining that members of a racial group bear the 
continuing effects of past discrimination does not necessarily reflect 
stereotype. Furthermore, determining that the continuing effects of 
past racial discrimination ought to be mitigated no more necessarily 
reflects improper favoritism than does providing a statutory remedy 
for individual instances of racial discrimination or, indeed, federal 
assistance for a region devastated by a hurricane. 
Second, does the asserted purpose qualify as "compelling''?250 As 
previously suggested, if one ·conceptualizes "strict scrutiny" as a 
probabilistically derived adjudicative rule for enforcing a substantive 
constitutional principle prohibiting purposes rooted in racism, one 
246. See infra text accompanying notes 256-75. 
247. See supra text accompanying notes 120-38, 197. 
248. See supra text accompanying notes 152-57. 
249. Recall that in Loving, Virginia failed to meet the burdens of "strict scrutiny" 
because it asserted a purpose that revealed racist values on its face-maintaining the 
"integrity" of the race. See supra notes 173, 199. 
250. Why should the scrutiny of racial classifications with respect to the substantive 
prohibition of purposes rooted in racism be concerned with qualifying an asserted 
purpose as "compelling" rather than "legitimate"? See supra notes 199-200 and 
accompanying text. 
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would define "compelling'' as meaning not only legitimate, but also 
persuasive toward rebutting suspicions of racism.251 One might view 
the asserted remedial purpose of countering the effects of societal 
discrimination as helpful in rebutting a suspicion of traditional racist 
animus. 
Yet, the state's assertion that it sought to achieve this purpose 
through the special admissions program should raise specific 
suspicions of racial favoritism or stereotype-suspicions focused on 
ways in which the program's details may seem an overinclusive or 
underinclusive means for achieving that purpose.252 These specific 
suspicions should generate specific questions. In particular, why did 
U.C. Davis include each group? Since Asians were well represented 
in the population of students admitted in the regular admissions 
program, why were they included in the special program?25a What 
societal discrimination against Asians did U.C. Davis identify that, 
in its view, had continuing effects in medical education?254 Is the 
inclusion of Asians in its program predicated on stereotype-the 
unexamined, unsupported assumption that race (Asian) correlates 
with fact (suffering the present effects of past racial 
discrimination)?255 
The state might be able to answer these specific questions 
persuasively; it might not. In the absence of persuasive answers, it 
251. See supra text accompanying note 199. 
252. Indeed, to ask whether a "legitimate" purpose is also "compelling'' obscures the 
point that any asserted purpose might allay some suspicions about impermissible 
purposes rooted in racism, and exacerbate other suspicions. Rather than ask whether 
an asserted purpose qualifies as "compelling," the "strict scrutiny" of racial 
classifications, focusing on the probabilistically-rooted suspicion that laws with racial 
classifications were adopted in violation of the substantive prohibition of purposes 
rooted in racism, would require the reviewing court to identify the specific suspicions 
that the asserted facially legitimate purpose allays, if any, and the specific suspicions 
that it reinforces. 
253. From 1971 through 1974, thirty-seven Asian students were enrolled through 
the regular admissions program, and twelve Asians were enrolled through the special 
admissions program. See Bakke, 438 U.S. at 275-76. 
254. See id. 
255. In relation to the formalities of "strict scrutiny," one might conceptualize these 
questions as relevant to determining whether the racial classifications are "necessary'' 
to achieve the asserted purpose. Conceptualizing the questions in terms of "necessity," 
however, may obscure, rather than sharpen, their significance. Indeed, consider an 
alternative conceptualization of these questions that connect them to the governing 
substantive constitutional principle: Posing such specific questions to the government 
crystallizes the suspicions of racial prejudice that it must overcome, and gives specific 
content to the burden it must meet-that is, to rebut a presumption that its racial 
classifications were adopted because of purposes rooted in racial prejudice. Such 
specific questions frame the government's burden far better than does the generic 
formulation requiring proof that the classification is "necessary to achieve a 
compelling state interest." 
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would fail to rebut the presumption that it adopted the special 
admissions program because of purposes rooted in racist values or 
stereotypes, and the policy should be invalidated. The adjudicative 
function thus could be fulfilled, through an explicit and focused 
distinction between substantive constitutional principles and 
adjudicative rules. 
The analysis Powell did pursue. Toward determining that U.C. 
Davis' asserted purpose of redressing the effects of past racial 
discrimination did not validate its use of racial classifications, Powell 
said: 
We have never approved a classification that aids persons 
perceived as members of relatively victimized groups at the 
expense of other innocent individuals in the absence of judicial, 
legislative, or administrative findings of constitutional or 
statutory violations .... Without such findings of constitutional 
or statutory violations, it cannot be said that the government 
has any greater interest in helping one individual than in 
refraining from harming another. Thus, the government has no 
compelling justification for inflicting such harm. Petitioner does 
not purport to have made, and is in no position to make, such 
findings. . . . [I]solated segments of our vast governmental 
structures are not competent to make those decisions, at least 
in the absence of legislative mandates and legislatively 
determined criteria.256 
These observations about the U.C. Davis program suggest three 
conditions that must be satisfied if a remedial purpose is to validate 
the use of racial classifications. First, the entity that uses racial 
classifications for remedial purposes must make contemporaneous 
findings of fact identifying the past discrimination, the effects of 
which it seeks to redress. Second, that past discrimination must have 
been illegal-a violation of constitutional or statutory mandates. 
Third, the entity must be competent to make such findings and to 
adopt the policy at issue. 
The following analysis will consider how Powell justifies each of 
these requirements. It also will consider how each of these 
requirements, and Powell's justifications for them, relate to the 
traditional (implicit) rationale for the "strict scrutiny" of racial 
classifications-that a law with racial classifications is presumed 
unconstitutional because it probably violates the substantive 
constitutional principle prohibiting purposes rooted in racist values 
or stereotypes.257 Finally, it will suggest that two of these three 
requirements place restrictions on governmental discretion 
unwarranted by the prohibition of purposes rooted in racist values or 
256. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 307-310 (emphasis added). 
257. See supra text accompanying notes 152-57, 198-207. 
. 2006] STRUCTURING CONSTITUTIONAL DOCTRINE 867 
stereotypes, and flow instead from Powell's new (implicit) 
substantive constitutional principle prohibiting excessively unfair 
effects on "innocents." 
First, before adopting racial classifications for remedial 
purposes, a policymaker must make "findings of constitutional or 
statutory violations."25s Although Powell seems to treat this as one 
requirement,259 I would like to consider separately the requirement of 
contemporaneous factfinding to identify the relevant past racial 
discrimination, and the requirement that such identified past racial 
discrimination must have amounted to a constitutional or statutory 
violation. How do each of these two factfinding requirements relate to 
the traditional (implicit) rationale for the "strict scrutiny'' of racial 
classifications? 
To require factfinding can be understood as directly tailored to 
the probabilistically-rooted presumption that racial classifications 
were adopted because of racial stereotyping.260 Indeed, if U.C. Davis 
had made findings of fact identifying the historic discrimination 
against blacks, Chicanos, Asians, and American Indians that 
explained their putative underrepresentation, it less likely would 
have used racial classifications in a way that was tainted by the 
unexamined, unsupported assumption that all such groups were 
targets of past racial discrimination, and that such past 
discrimination has continuing effects in medical school admissions.261 
Because relevant factfinding can reduce the probability that 
government will have acted unconstitutionally in this way, imposing 
such a requirement seems supportable as an adjudicative rule for 
enforcing the relevant substantive constitutional principle 
prohibiting purposes rooted in racial prejudice.262 
258. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 308. 
259. Id. at 308-09. 
260. See supra note 152. 
261. Formal factfinding could have induced U.C. Davis to reconsider, for example, 
its inclusion of Asians in the special admissions program-as a significant number of 
Asians were admitted each year through the regular admissions program. See supra 
note 253 and accompanying text. 
262. Viewing Powell's factfinding requirement as a device to reduce the probability 
of constitutional violations does not make it vulnerable in the way that Mitchell 
Berman views Miranda's exclusionary rule as vulnerable. See Berman, Constitutional 
Decision Rules, supra note 12, at 21. Scholars have grappled with the implications of 
Miranda's original characterization of the exclusionary rule as not mandated by the 
Fifth Amendment, but as "prophylactic" in relation to the amendment's prohibition of 
compelled self-incrimination. See id. For Berman, and others, the injunction that "'[n]o 
person . . . be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself" is 
"directed to trial courts, not to the police." See id. at 116-17 (citing U.S. CONST. amend. 
V). Professor Berman goes to great lengths to characterize Miranda's exclusionary rule 
as a "decision rule," (that is, in my terms, an adjudicative rule) designed to promote 
adjudicative accuracy in enforcing an "operative proposition directed to judges (do not 
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Second, how does the requirement that the past identified 
discrimination must have been illegal-a constitutional or statutory 
violation-relate to enforcing the substantive prohibition of purposes 
rooted in racist values or stereotypes? Consider the implications of 
the illegality requirement. If a policymaker may not seek to redress 
the effects of identified past discrimination that was not illegal, then 
the effects of slavery, of Jim Crow, of racial segregation through 
1954, all would be off-limits, because all such discrimination was 
legal. Resting on a bedrock of historic legal discrimination, the many 
and vast sedimentary layers of racially disproportionate 
disadvantage could not be addressed by policies employing racial 
classifications-if Powell's requirement of "constitutional or statutory 
violations" were taken seriously. 
Yet, one surely can conceive of a policymaker who determines-
without having been animated by any racist value judgment or 
stereotype-that slavery, Jim Crow, and racial segregation were 
gravely wrong, even when legal, and that their continuing 
consequences should be mitigated.2sa Thus, while the factfinding 
admit a statement against a criminal defendant that has been compelled) .... " See id. 
at 136-38. Recognizing that Miranda's doctrine of mandated warnings also "is 
intended to affect police behavior," he nevertheless suggests that this purpose is not an 
independent end, but a means to the end of promoting adjudicative accuracy on the 
question of whether a confession was compelled. See id. at 129-32. Berman does so for 
two reasons. First, to constrain the behavior of police is of questionable legitimacy as a 
device to enforce an operative proposition (substantive constitutional principle) 
directed to trial judges. See id. Second, he suggests more broadly that "a decision rule's 
legitimacy is likely to be most secure insofar as it is designed to reduce adjudicatory 
error." See Berman, Constitutional Decision Rules, supra note 12, at 129. 
Berman suggests that deterring police conduct compelling confessions serves 
adjudicative accuracy because trial courts are otherwise unable effectively to sift the 
compelled from the voluntary confessions on a case-by-case basis. See id. at 131. 
Whatever the supportability of this view, such analytical maneuvers are not necessary 
for viewing Powell's factfinding requirement as a legitimate and prophylactic 
adjudicative rule-at least in the sense that, unlike for Berman's view of Miranda's 
doctrine, both the substantive constitutional principle (prohibiting purposes rooted in 
racism) and the adjudicative rule (the factfinding requirement) are directed at the 
same governmental actors. Under such circumstances, I suggest that the legitimacy of 
a decision rule (or adjudicative rule) can, and should, be measured beyond the 
parameter of adjudicative accuracy. In framing adjudicative rules applicable to the 
same government actor constrained by the governing substantive constitutional 
principle, the Court can and should seek to serve the political function, at least to the 
extent that doing so does not undermine the goal of minimizing adjudicative error. 
Under such circumstances, preventing the breach of substantive constitutional 
principles by inhibiting the creation of unconstitutional policies has to be understood 
as a legitimate basis for framing adjudicative rules-especially if the foundational 
adjudicative rule makes the challenged act presumptively unconstitutional based on a 
probabilistic rationale. For a similar analysis of a factfinding requirement in the 
context of Commerce Clause challenges to congressional acts, see infra Part 111.E.3. 
263. See Chang, Judicial Conservatism, supra note 121, at 821-23. 
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requirement directly confronts-and reduces-the probability of 
purposes rooted in racial stereotyping, the "illegality" requirement 
bears no relationship to enforcing the prohibition of purposes rooted 
in racist values or stereotypes. 
Instead, Powell's "illegality" requirement was derived from his 
concern with the "unjust" effects of affirmative action programs on 
"innocent" white victims who otherwise would receive the program's 
benefits.264 He introduced the "illegality" requirement by 
characterizing the U.C. Davis program as one aiding "persons 
perceived as members of relatively victimized groups at the expense of 
other innocent individuals .... "265 Pointing even more clearly to his 
concern with "unfair" effects, Powell declared that "[w]ithout such 
findings of constitutional or statutory violations, it cannot be said 
that the government has any greater interest in helping one 
individual than in refraining from harming another."266 
As discussed above, a concern that laws with racial 
classifications should not have an excessively unfair effect on 
"innocents" is distinct from a norm prohibiting purposes rooted in 
racism.267 If this concern warrants enforcement, it should be justified 
as a properly derived and defined substantive constitutional 
principle, and enforced through its own explicitly derived and defined 
adjudicative rules.268 But to rely on this "fairness" norm in 
generating an "illegality" requirement, and to apply that "illegality" 
requirement in identifying constitutionally significant issues of fact, 
contaminates the adjudication of whether a given racial classification 
violates the prohibition of purposes rooted in racist values or 
stereotypes-and promises to invalidate policies that are permissible 
in relation to that substantive constitutional principle.269 
Third, a policymaking institution that chooses to use racial 
classifications for remedial purposes, and that makes the requisite 
264. See Bakke, 438 U.S. at 290. 
265. Id. at 307 (emphasis added). 
266. Id. at 308-09. Similarly, Powell declared that a purpose to help "victims of 
societal discrimination"-as opposed to victims of identified illegal discrimination-
"does not justify a classification that imposes disadvantages upon persons like 
[Bakke], who bear no responsibility for whatever harm the beneficiaries of the special 
admissions program are thought to have suffered." Id. at 310. 
267. See id. 
268. See supra Part III.B.2.b. 
269. Indeed, Powell framed the requirement of factfinding to identify past illegal 
discrimination as a precondition for finding the state's remedial purpose to be 
"compelling." He said: "Without such findings of constitutional or statutory violations, 
it cannot be said that the government has any greater interest in helping one 
individual than in refraining from harming another. Thus, the government has no 
compelling justification for infl,icting such harm." Bakke, 438 U.S. at 308-09 (emphasis 
added). 
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findings of fact, must be "competent" to do so.210 In Powell's view, 
neither the California Board of Regents nor U.C. Davis qualified as 
"competent."2n He said: 
For reasons similar to those stated in Part III of this opinion, 
isolated segments of our vast governmental structures are not 
competent to make those decisions, at least in the absence of 
legislative mandates and legislatively determined criteria. 
Before relying on these sorts of findings in establishing a racial 
classification, a governmental body must have the authority 
and capability to establish, in the record, that the classification 
is responsive to identified discrimination.272 
By disparaging "isolated segments of our vast governmental 
structures," and by seeming to require "legislative mandates and 
legislatively determined criteria," Powell suggests that electoral 
accountability is an essential element of institutional "competence." 
How does disabling electorally insulated governmental institutions 
from using racial classifications for remedial purposes relate to 
enforcing the prohibition of purposes rooted in racist values or 
stereotypes? 
Unless one posits that electorally accountable decisionmakers 
are categorically less likely to pursue purposes rooted in racism when 
using racial classifications, Powell's requirement of institutional 
"competence" seems irrelevant to the traditional probabilistic 
rationale for the "strict scrutiny" of racial classifications. Yet, this 
categorical proposition is problematic. A political community might 
well make the judgment that biases of various sorts-including 
racism and beyond-are less likely pursued by institutions less 
politically accountable, rather than more. That is a theory underlying 
the formation of independent commissions and agencies. Federal 
courts are not electorally accountable, and this design has been 
justified, at least in part, to inhibit decisionmaking tainted by bias.273 
Indeed, our system relies on electorally insulated federal courts to 
police legislative decisions for purposes rooted in racism. 
270. Id. at 309. 
271. See id. at 309-10. 
272. See id. Part III of Powell's opinion focused on justifying the "strict scrutiny" of 
all racial classifications, including those challenged by Bakke, and was discussed 
extensively above. See supra Part III.C.l.b. It is difficult to fathom what Powell meant 
in suggesting that his reasons for the "strict scrutiny'' of all racial classifications also 
explain why "isolated" governmental segments are not "competent" to make findings 
as to which groups suffer what effects of past racial discrimination. 
273. See, e.g., Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304, 347 (1816} 
(positing that federal courts were accorded jurisdiction over certain categories of case 
to avoid impediments to "the regular administration of justice" resulting from the 
influence on state courts of "state attachments, state prejudices, state jealousies, and 
state interests"). 
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What, then, explains this "competence" requirement?214 Perhaps 
it is a view that legislatures are less likely than are politically 
"isolated" decisionmakers to adopt race-specific remedial programs 
and less likely, therefore, "unfairly" to trammel the interests of 
innocent victims. Perhaps Powell believed that the potentially 
"unfair" intrusion on the interests of innocent whites is legitimate 
only if adopted by politically accountable decisionmakers. Both of 
these rationales emanate from the concern with "excessively unfair 
effects."215 Neither of these rationales, however, is related to 
enforcing the substantive constitutional principle prohibiting 
purposes rooted in racism. Indeed, like the requirement that 
government may use racial classifications only to redress the effects 
of illegal past discrimination, the requirement of "competence" 
promises to undermine the adjudicative function by invalidating 
policies that were not adopted because of purposes rooted in racism. 
*** 
It bears repeating: To say that the concern with "unfair effects" 
undermined enforcing the prohibition of racist purposes is not to 
suggest that one principle is correct, and the other interpretive error. 
It is to suggest, however, that each substantive constitutional 
principle should be understood and treated as if it were a separate 
cause of action, or a separate "constitutional crime." A racial 
classification might be impermissible if enacted because of purposes 
rooted in racism.21s A racial classification also might be 
impermissible if it has excessively unfair effects on innocents.211 To 
address both bases of potential impermissibility through analytical 
garble and confusion-rather than determining whether each basis of 
impermissibility was violated through separate and specifically 
tailored analyses-is akin to determining whether a defendant 
should be civilly liable by asking whether there was negligent 
consideration (mixing elements of tort and contract); or whether a 
criminal defendant should be convicted by asking whether the victim 
consented to be killed (mixing elements of rape and murder). Quite 
obviously, a civil defendant might be liable in tort, or contract, or 
both, or neither. A criminal defendant might be guilty of murder, or 
274. In his dissent, Justice Brennan challenged Powell's requirement of 
"competence," stating that "the manner in which a State chooses to delegate 
governmental functions is for it to decide," and that the California constitution's 
delegation of legislative authority over the University to the Board of Regents "is 
certainly a permissible choice." Bakke, 438 U.S. at 366 n.42 (Brennan, J., concurring in 
part and dissenting in part). 
275. See Chang, Judicial Conservatism, supra note 121, at 821-31. 
276. See supra text accompanying notes 198-207. 
277. See supra text accompanying notes 237-40. 
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rape, or both, or neither. But it enforces no legal principle 
effectively-it undermines adjudicative efficacy-to fail to enforce 
each substantive legal rule separately, on its own terms. 
n. Failing To Invalidate Policies That Do Violate an 
Established Substantive Constitutional Principle 
U.C. Davis' fourth claimed purpose was to attain the educational 
benefits flowing from a racially diverse student body.21s Powell's 
application of "strict scrutiny" to this purpose was an odd 
combination. His analysis not only imposed restrictions unwarranted 
by the substantive constitutional principle prohibiting purposes 
rooted in racist values or stereotypes, but also licensed policies that 
clearly would violate that principle. Both problems were created by a 
meandering analysis that was contaminated by his new substantive 
concern with "unfair" effects on "innocents," and by his failure 
explicitly to differentiate the derivation and definition of substantive 
constitutional principles and adjudicative rules.21s 
The Analysis Powell Should Have Pursued. Based on a 
probabilistically-rooted presumption that a racial classification was 
adopted in violation of a substantive constitutional principle 
prohibiting purposes rooted in racist values or stereotypes, the judge 
and the challenger's attorney could generate a series of questions 
about the special admissions program's details in relation to the 
purpose it is purported to serve. First, is the asserted purpose of 
attaining the educational benefits of a racially diverse student body 
inherently rooted in racist values or stereotypes, or is it possible for 
such a purpose to be permissible? Second, if the asserted purpose is 
conceivably permissible, was U.C. Davis' particular version of that 
purpose rooted in racist values or stereotypes? 
Digging deeper, the judge (or challenger's attorney) might ask, 
for example: What educational benefits do you seek to gain? What is 
your basis for believing that such benefits can flow better from a 
student body that is racially diverse than from one that is not? What 
is your basis for believing that such benefits can flow by forging a 
student body in which at least fifteen percent are black, Chicano, 
Asian, or American Indian? What specific educational benefits do you 
believe members of each group can bring? What is your basis for 
believing that having a particular racial background enables a 
particular student to bring such educational benefits to the 
classroom? 
U.C. Davis, or schools in other cases defending their own race-
specific programs on similar grounds, might provide persuasjve 
278. See Bakke, 438 U.S. at 311. 
279. See id. at 307. 
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answers to these questions, and thereby rebut the probabilistic 
suspicion that the challenged program was adopted because the 
school placed value on race per se, or because the school acted 
because of unexamined, unsupported assumptions that race 
correlates with fact. Failure to provide persuasive responses, 
however, would leave the adjudicative presumption of 
unconstitutionality unrebutted, and would render the program 
properly subject to invalidation.280 
The Analysis Powell Did Pursue. Consider Powell's analysis of 
whether the asserted purpose of "obtaining the educational benefits 
that flow from an ethnically diverse student body"281 is "legitimate," 
whether it qualifies as "compelling,'' and whether the use of racial 
classifications is "necessary" to achieve a "compelling'' state 
purpose.282 He begins: 
The fourth goal asserted by petitioner is the attainment of a 
diverse student body. This clearly is a constitutionally 
permissible goal for an institution of higher education. 
Academic freedom, though not a specifically enumerated 
constitutional right, long has been viewed as a special concern 
of the First Amendment. The freedom of a university to make 
its own judgments as to education includes the selection of its 
student body.283 
Powell easily concludes that a purpose to attain a diverse 
student body is constitutionally permissible because academic 
280. This analysis does not mechanically apply the formal elements of "strict 
scrutiny." It did not ask whether the asserted purpose qualifies as "compelling." 
Indeed, previous analysis has suggested that the "compelling'' requirement obfuscates 
the scrutiny that racial classifications should bear toward determining whether they 
violate the proscription of racist purposes. See supra note 252. Nor does it ask whether 
the racial classification is "necessary" to achieve the asserted legitimate purpose, 
though many of the specific questions, derived from a focus on the presumption of 
racism, can be conceptualized as consistent with a requirement of "necessity." See 
supra note 255. Once again, I suggest that properly framed adjudicative rules, tailored 
to determining whether a particular challenged policy violates a particular substantive 
constitutional principle, can effectively serve the adjudicative function of judicial 
review-avoiding the invalidation of permissible policies, and the failure to invalidate 
impermissible policies-far better than can an all purpose, abstract formalism such as 
the elements of "strict scrutiny." Indeed, the elements of "strict scrutiny'' must be 
defined, and their definition must be a function of the reasons for applying "strict 
scrutiny." It is those reasons for close scrutiny that generate the nature of the scrutiny 
that is appropriate, rather than the otherwise abstract terms of "strict scrutiny," as 
will be further illustrated in the discussion that follows immediately below. Recall the 
discussion, above, deriving definitions of "compelling'' and "necessary" for enforcing the 
substantive constitutional principle prohibiting purposes rooted in racist values or 
stereotypes. See supra text accompanying notes 198-207. 
281. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 306. 
282. See id. at 306-15. 
283. Id. at 311-12. 
874 RUTGERS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 58:4 
freedom is rooted in the First Amendment.284 One might ask, 
however, what academic freedom has to do with whether a university 
has made choices rooted in racist values or stereotypes-purposes 
illegitimate under the Equal Protection Clause. Brown and Bolling 
make clear that academic freedom does not trump the prohibitions of 
equal protection. One readily can imagine certain notions about the 
educational benefits of racial diversity that would reflect purposes 
rooted in racist values-for example, that a student body of one race 
or another is intrinsically better than one of many races; or that a 
student body that is racially balanced in a particular way is 
intrinsically better than one that is not. Similarly, certain notions 
about the educational benefits that flow from a racially diverse 
student body also could be rooted in racial stereotypes-for example, 
an unexamined, unsupported assumption that members of particular 
racial groups have particular views to contribute to classroom 
discussion. Thus, diverted by the First Amendment, unfocused on the 
applicable substantive constitutional principle, and unmindful of the 
adjudicative presumption of unconstitutionality based on the 
probabilistic suspicion of racist purposes, Powell squandered the 
occasion to crystallize the ways in which the U.C. Davis policy might 
indeed have violated the equal protection proscription of purposes 
rooted in racial prejudice. 
Powell then turned, mechanically, to the "strict scrutiny" 
requirement of a "compelling" interest.285 He concluded, without 
analysis, that a goal of student body diversity is (or can be) not only 
"legitimate," but also "compelling."286 Immediately thereafter, 
however, when purporting to turn (again mechanically) to the 
element of "strict scrutiny" requiring that the classification be 
"necessary" to achieve the state's "compelling" interest, Powell makes 
clear not only that mere racial or ethnic diversity is not "genuine 
diversity," but also that a purpose of attaining the educational 
benefits of mere racial diversity cannot qualify as "compelling."281 
It may be assumed that the reservation of a specified number of 
seats in each class for individuals from the preferred ethnic 
groups would contribute to the attainment of considerable 
ethnic diversity in the student body. But . . . the argument 
misconceives the nature of the state interest that would justify 
consideration of race or ethnic background. It is not an interest 
in simple ethnic diversity .... The diversity that furthers a 
compelling state interest encompasses a far broader array of 
qualifications and characteristics of which racial or ethnic 
284. See id. at 312. 
285. See id. at 315. 
286. Id. at 314-15. 
287. See Bakke, 438 U.S. at 314-15. 
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origin is but a single though important element. Petitioner's 
special admissions program, focused solely on ethnic diversity, 
would hinder rather than further attainment of genuine 
diversity.288 
875 
Consider the failings of this analysis-both its internal 
contradictions and its irrelevance for determining whether U.C. 
Davis' asserted purpose can help rebut a presumption that the 
special admissions program actually was adopted because of 
prohibited purposes rooted in racist values or stereotypes. Recall that 
Powell relied on the First Amendment value of academic freedom in 
determining that a purpose of fostering educational diversity is not 
only "legitimate," but also "of paramount importance."289 Yet, 
Powell's conclusion that the purpose of attaining a racially diverse 
student body does not qualify as "compelling"-because narrower 
than his own concept of "genuine" diversity290--reflects an odd (more 
to the point, incoherent) notion of academic freedom.291 
Furthermore, a purpose of attaining educational benefits from 
"mere" racial diversity is not necessarily rooted in racist values or 
stereotypes. Perhaps a university believes (as a matter of value) that 
enrolling students having perspectives shaped by racism against 
blacks in America is the only specific element of diversity that 
warrants compromising the usual highest test score approach for 
choosing among applicants. Perhaps the university believes (as a 
matter of fact) that one must experience life and discrimination as an 
African-American truly to understand the experiences of blacks with 
racism in America. Perhaps the university has evidence that 
supports this view, beyond unsupported, unexamined assumptions. 
Perhaps the university asks applicants to write an essay discussing 
their experiences with racism. A university claiming an interest in 
securing educational benefits from racial diversity might well rebut a 
presumption that it acted because of racist values or stereotypes. If a 
university were to rebut this presumption, neither the notion of 
academic freedom, nor the more fundamental norm of legislative 
discretion within constitutional boundaries, could even begin to 
support disqualifying its purpose as not "compelling."292 Justice 
Powell's analysis, however, foreclosed a route to validate the U.C. 
Davis program-and other schools' programs in subsequent cases-in 
288. Id. at 315 (emphasis in original). 
289. See id at 311-13; see also supra text accompanying notes 281-84. 
290. See Bakke, 438 U.S. at 315. 
291. Beyond this, as previously suggested, tethering the conclusion of '1egitimacy" 
to academic freedom was irrelevant to the issue of whether the state had exercised 
that "freedom" in pursuit of purposes prohibited under the Equal Protection Clause. 
See supra text accompanying notes 284-85. 
292. See Bakke, 438 U.S. at 315. 
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relation to the substantive constitutional principle prohibiting 
purposes rooted in racial prejudice, as enforced through the 
traditional notion of "strict scrutiny" developed in Korematsu, 
Bolling, and Loving.293 
What, then, explains the line Powell drew designating as 
"compelling" the pursuit of his broader concept of diversity, but 
rejecting as inadequate the pursuit of a more focused view of 
diversity?294 Once again, Powell seems to have in mind his concerns 
about excessively unfair effects on "innocents."295 He cautions that 
"although a university must have wide discretion in making the 
sensitive judgments as to who should be admitted, constitutional 
limitations protecting individual rights may not be disregarded."296 
Though it is conceivable that Powell is talking about the individual 
right to be free from regulation that violates the prohibition of 
purposes rooted in racism, it seems more likely that Powell is 
reverting to his new substantive concern that racial classifications 
must not have excessively unfair effects on "innocents."291 
Indeed, Powell lauds certain characteristics of Harvard's 
approach to attaining educational diversity in ways that not only 
suggest the unfair effects concern, but also demonstrate how the 
focus on fairness distorts analysis necessary for effectively enforcing 
the prohibition of purposes rooted in racist values or stereotypes.298 
The Harvard program awarded points to applicants based on their 
having characteristics on which Harvard placed special value.299 
Those diversity-enhancing characteristics included racial or ethnic 
background-some races necessarily receiving more points than 
others-but also included geography, and special talents, among 
others.3oo On the Harvard approach, Powell said: 
In such an admissions program, race or ethnic background may 
be deemed a "plus" in a particular applicant's file, yet it does 
not insulate the individual from comparison with all other 
candidates for the available seats . . . . This kind of program 
treats each applicant as an individual in the admissions 
process. The applicant who loses out on the last available seat 
to another candidate receiving a "plus" on the basis of ethnic 
background will not have been foreclosed from all consideration 
for that seat simply because he was not the right color or had 
293. See supra text accompanying notes 120-58. 
294. See Bakke, 438 U.S. at 315, 317-19. 
295. See id. at 298; see supra text accompanying notes 237-40. 
296. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 314 (emphasis added). 
297. See id. at 298; see supra text accompanying notes 237-40. 
298. See Bakke, 438 U.S. at 317-19. 
299. See id. at 317-18, 323-24. 
300. See id. 
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the wrong surname. It would mean only that his combined 
qualifications, which may have included similar nonobjective 
factors, did not outweigh those of the other applicant. His 
qualifications would have been weighed fairly and competitively, 
and he would have no basis to complain of unequal treatment 
under the Fourteenth Amendment.301 
877 
Note that Powell's approval of the Harvard approach is 
predicated not on a determination that Harvard was pursuing 
purposes untainted by racism, but on a determination that Harvard 
treated white applicants "fairly." Consider, now, two points that 
clearly illustrate how Powell's concern with "fair" effects undermined 
enforcing the prohibition of purposes rooted in racist values or 
stereotypes. First, the fact that Harvard considers factors other than 
race in constructing a "diverse" student body does not explain why 
Harvard does consider race at all. Indeed, Harvard could consider 
race in a way that violates the prohibition of purposes rooted in racist 
values or stereotypes. Powell cited a statement in Harvard's 
description of its program: 
A farm boy from Idaho can bring something to Harvard College 
that a Bostonian cannot offer. Similarly, a black student can 
usually bring something that a white person cannot offer.302 
301. Id. at 317-19 (citation omitted) (emphasis added). Apart perhaps from special 
bills, all legislation classifies, and all classifications treat people as members of groups. 
Selecting applicants on the basis of grade point averages and MCAT or LSAT scores 
treats them as members of groups defined in terms of grades and test scores. Given a 
substantive constitutional principle prohibiting purposes rooted in racist values or 
stereotypes, the issue really is not whether a selection policy treats applicants as 
individuals or as members of groups. Rather, the issue, properly framed, is whether 
the policy uses race in a way that places value on race per se, or that engages in racial 
stereotyping by making unexamined and unsupported assumptions that race 
correlates with fact. 
302. Id. at 323. In Grutter, Justice O'Connor implicitly connected the concept of 
"individualized consideration" to the prohibition of racial stereotyping: 
That a race-conscious admissions program does not operate as a quota does 
not, by itself, satisfy the requirement of individualized consideration. When 
using race as a "plus" factor in university admissions, a university's 
admissions program must remain flexible enough to ensure that each 
applicant is evaluated as an individual and not in a way that makes an 
applicant's race or ethnicity the defining feature of his or her 
application .... Here, the Law School engages in a highly individualized, 
holistic review of each applicant's file, giving serious consideration to all the 
ways an applicant might contribute to a diverse environment. 
Grutter, 539 U.S. 336-37. Although O'Connor characterizes her notion of 
"individualized consideration" as an application of Justice Powell's, it is altogether 
different. Because he referred approvingly to Harvard's statement vaguely 
differentiating black and white students, one can conclude that Powell was not 
concerned with how and why race was considered, but only with whether race was 
considered along with other sources of diversity. The Michigan law school policy, as 
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What, exactly, is the "something" that a black student can 
usually bring that a white person cannot? Is Harvard acting based on 
a racial stereotype? Had he taken seriously the presumption that 
racial classifications were adopted because of purposes rooted in 
racist values or stereotypes, Powell should have presumed that 
Harvard's use of racial classifications were rooted in stereotype, and 
should have cited Harvard's admissions policy not as a paradigm to 
be copied by public universities, but as beset with pitfalls to be 
avoided.303 
Why, then, does Powell laud the Harvard program as a model for 
public institutions? Why would Powell not require a public school to 
make findings of fact, identifying the traits that it believes correlate 
with race, traits that it wishes to bring to its student body, toward 
gaining the educational benefits of "genuine" (including racial) 
diversity, as he requires findings of fact identifying past illegal 
discrimination when the state relies on a remedial purpose?304 Why 
was Powell so insistent on the formalities of "strict scrutiny" in his 
great debate with Brennan, yet so lax in its application to the facts 
and circumstances of the Harvard plan? 
There is a second indication that Powell, beguiled by his 
"fairness" concerns, was distracted from the established concept of 
"strict scrutiny." Powell suggested (quite shockingly) that the 
Harvard program (if adopted by a public university) should be 
presumed permissible: 
It has been suggested that an admissions program which 
considers race only as one factor is simply a subtle and more 
sophisticated, but no less effective, means of according racial 
preference than the Davis program. A facial intent to 
discriminate, however, is evident in petitioner's preference 
program and not denied in this case. No such facial infirmity 
exists in an admissions program where race or ethnic 
background is simply one element, to be weighed fairly against 
other elements, in the selection process . ... And a court would 
not assume that a university, professing to employ a facially 
nondiscriminatory admissions policy, would operate it as a 
characterized by O'Connor, does not use race in a way that assumes a correlation 
between race and unspecified fact. Rather, it seems to consider the particular role that 
the applicant's race has played in her life, and in forming her perceptions and values. 
Unlike Powell's notion of "individualized consideration," this part of O'Connor's 
Grutter opinion is tailored to overcoming a presumption that race was considered in 
violation of a prohibition of purposes rooted in racist values or stereotypes. 
303. The point is not that Harvard would necessarily have been unable to respond 
persuasively to these suspicion-crystallizing questions, but that under "strict scrutiny" 
tailored to enforcing the substantive prohibition of purposes rooted in racism, Harvard 
(if a public institution) would have had the burden to do so. 
304. See supra text accompanying notes 256-73. 
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cover for the functional equivalent of a quota system. In short, 
good faith would be presumed in the absence of a showing to the 
contrary in the manner permitted by our cases.305 
879 
Somehow, Powell views the Harvard program as not facially 
discriminatory-as not employing racial classifications-and, 
therefore, as not warranting "strict scrutiny."306 But, of course, the 
Harvard program does use racial classifications in determining which 
races get what kind of "pluses." The fact that Harvard might give 
pluses based on factors other than race does not negate the fact that 
it does give pluses based on race, just as a private club's exclusion of 
members based on gender and religion would not negate the fact that 
the club discriminates based on race as well. How striking it is, after 
being so insistent that the formalities of "strict scrutiny" should be 
applied to all racial classifications, that Powell would suggest that a 
program like Harvard's ought to be insulated by a presumption of 
good faith.307 Apparently distracted by a visceral sense of its 
"fairness," he fails to see the racial classifications that the program 
does contain, and fails to be suspicious of the racist values or 
stereotypes on which those classifications probably were 
predicated.3os 
305. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 318-19 (emphasis added). 
306. See id. at 321-24. 
307. See id. at 318-19. 
308. This analysis of Powell's opinion suggests that an effort to "taxon" or categorize 
extant doctrine in terms of substantive constitutional principles and adjudicative rules 
might yield only limited benefits. Consider Professor Berman's consideration of 
whether "strict scrutiny" should be understood, in his terms, as an operative 
proposition or a decision rule. See Berman, Constitutional Decision Rules, supra note 
12, at 80 n.253. After laying out propositions from recent cases (which built upon and 
perpetuated the failings of Powell's Bakke opinion), and after recognizing that 
impermissible motivation can be a basis for invalidating a racial classification, 
Berman concludes: 
[S]trict scrutiny seems to rest on both evidentiary and justificatory 
rationales. Some demand for heightened justification is part of the operative 
proposition; narrow tailoring is supplied by the decision rule. Perhaps, then, 
the doctrine is best understood as follows. The operative proposition of equal 
protection prohibits states from treating people differently unless the public 
good pursued outweighs the harm to disadvantaged persons. The decision 
rule directs that, because racial classifications generally produce substantial 
harm, and because fully ad hoc balancing is cumbersome and unpredictable, 
courts should presume that the good does not outweigh the harm unless the 
good is "compelling." Furthermore, because our unfortunate history shows 
that states are especially likely to be pursuing illegitimate ends when 
employing racial classifications, the decision rule also directs courts to 
presume that the (putatively compelling) interest claimed by the state is not 
the real interest pursued unless the classification is narrowly tailored to 
advance that (putatively compelling) interest. 
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*** 
To summarize Powell's application of "strict scrutiny" to the facts 
of Bakke's case: Concerns about the effects on "innocents" generated 
restrictions on the discretion of a policymaker unwarranted for 
enforcing the prohibition of purposes rooted in racist values or 
stereotypes. Concerns about the effects on "innocents" also distracted 
Powell's attention from aspects of the "model" Harvard program that, 
if adopted by a public university, could well have violated the firmly 
established substantive constitutional principle prohibiting purposes 
rooted in racism. Thus, Powell's failure to distinguish explicitly 
between substantive constitutional principles and adjudicative rules, 
to attend to the enforcement of each substantive constitutional 
principle separately, and to do so through adjudicative rules 
specifically tailored to each, tainted the manner in which he 
examined the facts of Bakke's case. As a result, he presented an 
analysis that promised not only to invalidate policies that were not 
adopted for prohibited purposes rooted in racial prejudice, but also to 
uphold policies that were adopted for prohibited purposes-and 
thereby to undermine the adjudicative function.309 
Id. (emphasis added). In my view, this characterization of "strict scrutiny" tries too 
much to account for extant doctrine, and too little to critique current doctrine, in 
relation to the distinction between substantive constitutional principles (or operative 
propositions) and adjudicative (or decision) rules. This account of "strict scrutiny'' fails 
to reveal that the Court (beginning with Justice Powell) has been concerned with 
substantive concerns going beyond impermissible purpose-including the "fairness" of 
harming "innocents," and concerns about promoting racism. Instead, Berman 
identifies a normatively vague operative proposition: states may not "treatO people 
differently unless the public good pursued outweighs the harm to disadvantaged 
persons." Id. Having failed to tease out the distinct normative bases for distinct 
"operative propositions"--e.g., the prohibited purposes principle and the "unfair" 
effects principle-Berman's account of extant doctrine cobbles together a single 
"decision rule" that actually makes reference to two these two disparate substantive 
concerns-"pursuing illegitimate ends" and producing (an unspecified type of) 
"substantial harm." In my view, Berman's particular taxonomic account of extant 
"strict scrutiny'' is capable neither of effectively adjudicating whether any of the 
disparate substantive concerns have been violated, nor "duly instructing'' political 
actors about the boundaries of their discretion. The insight that constitutional 
doctrine, like doctrine in other areas of law, must be structured in terms of substantive 
constitutional principles and adjudicative rules, has a power that is more productively 
directed toward the critique of existing doctrine (that has not been framed with careful 
attention to the distinction), and the creation of new doctrine. To focus too much on the 
taxonomy of existing doctrine places too much credence on judicial thought processes 
that, at best, have been inchoate and implicit, and limits the clarifying potential of the 
underlying premise of the taxonomic agenda: analytical clarity comes from making 
explicit that which has been only implicit. 
309. Cass Sunstein characterizes Powell's opinion as "narrow," in leaving many 
questions open, Sunstein, supra note 17, at 46-47, but not "shallow, because it offered 
a number of relatively abstract judgments about the legitimate grounds for affirmative 
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action programs." Id. at 4 7 n.209. For Sunstein, whether a decision is "narrow" or 
"wide" depends on the extent to which it purports to reach facts beyond those of the 
case decided. Id. at 15-17. Whether a decision is "shallow" or "deep" depends on the 
extent to which it purports to be deduced from foundational first principles. Id. at 20-
21. It is difficult to understand how Powell's decision can be understood as "narrow," 
as he sweepingly deems a purpose of achieving racial diversity as not "compelling;" a 
purpose of remedying the effects of past legal discrimination as not "compelling;" a 
racial classification adopted for remedial purposes unsupported by contemporaneous 
findings of fact identifying past illegal racial discrimination as impermissible; and so 
on. Indeed, Powell's opinion was the foundation for Adarand, and Richmond u. J.A. 
Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989). Furthermore, Powell's opinion can be understood as 
"deep" rather than "shallow" not simply because it suggested abstract judgments about 
legitimate grounds for affirmative action programs, but also because it suggested 
abstract principles with respect to which such programs would be deemed invalid-for 
having excessively unfair effects, and for excessively promoting racial prejudice. See 
Bakke, 438 U.S. at 318-19. 
Toward minimalism, Sunstein urges case-by-case analysis rather than rules. See 
Sunstein, supra note 17, at 90-92. He conceives of a rule-based disposition of 
affirmative action policies in terms of a "court opinion outlawing affirmative action." 
Id. at 91. But one might question whether case-by-case disposition is necessarily, or 
even more probably, minimalist than would be rules-based disposition. It all depends 
on the rule. The inherited meaning of "strict scrutiny" applied a substantive 
constitutional principle prohibiting purposes rooted in racism. This rule is concerned 
only with legislative purpose, not the effects of the policy, its "fairness," its duration, or 
any other matter that a court might identify as relevant in the less disciplined 
common law manner for evaluating the facts of each case. See supra note 98. 
Furthermore, the rule prohibiting racist purposes does require a careful examination 
of each case's facts-but only so far as those facts are relevant for rebutting a 
presumption of impermissible purpose. Perhaps Sunstein has a notion of 
constitutional mandates that is denser than mine--that "correctly" interpreting 
constitutional text involves intricately evaluating and balancing a broad range of facts 
and policies. My notion of constitutionality is skeletal. See supra note 117. 
Constitutional provisions establish relatively discrete boundaries on governmental 
discretion, leaving most values and factual judgments permissible bases for the 
exercise of governmental discretion. Constitutional policy-as made by the People 
when acting as framers and ratifiers, and as properly interpreted by judges-does not 
replicate the full range of considerations relevant for making ordinary policies in 
legislative politics. Rather, it defines boundaries within which ordinary policy ought to 
be made. This is a minimalist concept of constitutional meaning, and implies a 
minimalist approach to judicial review. But it is minimalist in the sense of identifying 
minimalist substantive constitutional principles. In my view, disposing of affirmative 
action cases as all racial classifications had been evaluated before Bakke, i.e., 
according to a rule prohibiting racist purposes, is far more "minimalist" than was 
Powell's opinion, and far more minimalist than "case-by-case" dispositions building on 
the Powell opinion have been. See generally Chang, Judicial Conservatism, supra note 
121. 
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b. Failing Explicitly to Derive and Define New 
Substantive Constitutional Principles Undermines 
the Political Function for Enforcing Previously 
Established Substantive Constitutional Principles 
Justice Powell's three requirements for governmental entities 
seeking to use racial classifications for remedial purposes sent 
problematic messages that begged to be heeded by conscientious 
policymakers.aw Policymakers were not told that they may use racial 
classifications if their purposes are not rooted in racist values or 
stereotypes. Rather, they were told that if they seek to use racial 
classifications for remedial purposes, they must be politically 
accountable, and they may only seek to redress the effects of past 
discrimination that was illegal. Policymakers who conscientiously 
heeded these constraints were discouraged from enacting policies 
that would have been perfectly permissible-that they should have 
felt constitutionally free to enact-under the well-established 
substantive constitutional principle prohibiting laws with racial 
classifications adopted because of purposes rooted in racism. 
President Clinton sought to "mend it, not end it," but the definition of 
"mending'' was obscured by the failings of Powell's analysis and by 
subsequent decisions that built on Powell's foundation.an 
This point does not presuppose that the only legitimate 
definition of unconstitutional racial discrimination is that which 
violates the prohibition of purposes rooted in racism. It does not 
presuppose that Powell's additional, implicit substantive 
constitutional principles-the prohibition of racial classifications 
having excessively "unfair" effects on "innocents," and the prohibition 
of classifications that excessively promote racism-are necessarily 
erroneous.a12 It does suppose, however, that each substantive 
constitutional principle should be derived and defined on its own 
terms-that one or another putative substantive constitutional 
principle might be erroneous. It also supposes that a doctrinal hash 
of disparate substantive concerns and functionally distinct 
adjudicative considerations cannot begin to provide policymakers 
310. For discussion of those three requirements, see supra text accompanying notes 
256-77. 
311. In 1995, President Clinton sought to defend affirmative action against political 
and legal attacks. "Despite the strong sentiments in Clinton's speech, the 96-page 
review it introduced concludes that a number of minority set-asides will have to be 
revised or eliminated to comply with [a] recent Supreme Court ruling .... [S]ays a top 
Clinton aide, alluding to the impact of the Supreme Court decision, 'there's a day of 
reckoning coming."' See James Carney, Mend It, Don't End It, TIME, July 31, 1995, at 
35. 
312. See Bakke, 438 U.S. at 298-300; see also supra text accompanying notes 233-41. 
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with "due instruction" as to the constitutional norms by which they 
should feel their discretion constrained. 
c. Failing Explicitly to Derive and Define New 
Substantive Constitutional Principles (and 
Correlative Adjudicative Rules) Undermines the 
Adjudicative Function for Enforcing Those New 
Principles 
In Wygant v. Jackson Board of Education,313 Justice Powell 
authored a plurality opinion in which the reason for a finding of 
unconstitutionality was Bakke's implicit substantive constitutional 
principle prohibiting racial classifications that inflict excessively 
unfair effects on "innocents."311 Wygant involved a challenge to a 
local school board policy, established through a collective bargaining 
agreement with the teachers' union, that displaced a pure seniority 
principle of "last hired, first fired" with one providing for racially 
proportionate layoffs.315 
After noting that the Court would apply "strict scrutiny" even 
though "the challenged [racial] classification operates against a 
group that historically has not been subject to governmental 
discrimination,"316 Powell determined that because of the ''burden 
that [the] preferential layoffs scheme imposes on innocent parties," 
"the layoff provision was not a legally appropriate means of achieving 
even a compelling purpose"311 He continued: 
While hiring goals impose a diffuse burden, often foreclosing 
only one of several opportunities, layoffs impose the entire 
burden of achieving racial equality on particular individuals, 
often resulting in serious disruption of their lives. That burden 
is too intrusive. We therefore hold that, as a means of 
accomplishing purposes that otherwise may be legitimate, the 
Board's layoff plan is not sufficiently narrowly tailored. Other 
less intrusive means of accomplishing similar purposes-such 
as the adoption of hiring goals-are available. For these 
reasons, the Board's selection of layoffs as the means to 
313. 476 U.S. 267 (1986). 
314. Id. at 280-84. 
315. Id. at 270. The provision stated, "In the event that it becomes necessary to 
reduce the number of teachers through layoff from employment by the Board, teachers 
with most seniority in the district shall be retained, except that at no time will there 
be a greater percentage of minority personnel laid off than the current percentage of 
minority personnel employed at the time of the layoff." Id. 
316. Id. at 273. 
317. Id. at 278 (emphasis added). 
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accomplish even a valid purpose cannot satisfy the demands of 
the Equal Protection Clause.318 
Note the import of this passage: Even if the Court were to 
determine that racial classifications had not been employed in 
pursuit of purposes rooted in racist values or stereotypes-even if the 
state were to meet its burden of establishing that it employed racial 
classifications for constitutionally legitimate purposes-the 
classification could be struck down based on a judicial determination 
that it inflicted excessively unfair effects on "innocents." Powell's 
Wygant opinion makes undeniable that which was implicit in Bakke: 
the creation of a new substantive constitutional principle, beyond the 
proscription of purposes rooted in racism, prohibiting racial 
classifications deemed to have excessively unfair effects.319 
Powell failed to address the full range of issues relevant for 
deriving and defining this putative substantive constitutional 
principle. First, he did nothing to derive the constitutional pedigree 
of this principle-nothing to indicate whether, in his view, a concern 
with the "fairness" of racially disproportionate effects was an 
originalist interpretation of the Equal Protection Clause, whether he 
was employing a particular methodology other than originalism, why 
his chosen methodology was appropriate, or why his chosen 
methodology generates the concern with unfair effects. With all of 
these questions unaddressed and unanswered, the legitimacy of 
enforcing a judicial definition of "unfairness" is seriously 
questionable as "legislating from the bench."320 
Second, Powell failed to define the concept of "fairness" that he 
purported to enforce. Why is the injury from losing a job more 
significant than that from having one's job application rejected? More 
significantly, why is it unconstitutionally unfair for a white job 
holder to lose a job because of race-specific layoff policies that were 
adopted because of permissible purposes (untainted by racist values 
or stereotypes), but not unconstitutionally unfair for a black job 
318. Wygant, 476 U.S. at 283-84 (emphasis added). 
319. See Chang, Judicial Conservatism, supra note 121, at 821-23. 
320. See BORK, supra note 78 at 15-16 (noting that self-proclaimed judicial 
conservatives profess abhorrence for "legislating from the bench"); see also United 
States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 627 (2000) (Thomas, J .. , concurring); Lopez, 514 U.S. 
at 601 (Thomas, J., concurring); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 522-27 (1965) 
(Black, J., dissenting). The aversion to "legislating from the bench" is, however 
selective. Compare Justice Thomas' concern with enforcing the original understanding 
of the Commerce Clause in Lopez and Morrison with his concern for enforcing his 
personal beliefs about racial discrimination. See Adarand, 515 U.S. at 240 (Thomas, J., 
concurring) ("I believe that there is a moral and constitutional equivalence between 
laws designed to subjugate a race and those that distribute benefits on the basis of 
race in order to foster some current notion of equality.") (citation omitted); see also 
Chang, Judicial Conservatism, supra note 121, at 800-17; infra note 466. 
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holder to suffer the same loss-the loss of a job-because of a 
(permissibly motivated) last hired, first fired principle? Although it is 
true, as Powell suggests, that "layoffs impose the entire burden of 
achieving racial equality on particular individuals, often resulting in 
serious disruption of their lives,"321 seniority-based layoffs of more 
recently hired black employees must seriously disrupt their lives as 
well.a22 
A legislature that chooses to displace traditional seniority 
policies toward mitigating the effects of past racial discrimination 
has made its own judgment about fairness. What is the judicially-
determined, constitutionally mandated concept of "fairness"? Why 
should that definition of "fairness" supersede the legislature's 
different view? Without clear answers to these questions, and apart 
from issues of legitimacy, a judge seeking to enforce the "excessively 
unfair effects" principle will haphazardly identify issues of 
constitutionally significant fact and, therefore, haphazardly fulfill the 
adjudicative function of judicial review. 
Furthermore, if laws containing racial classifications are to be 
measured against a separate substantive constitutional principle 
prohibiting excessively unfair effects on "innocents," the Court must 
derive and define adjudicative rules tailored to enforcing this new 
norm. Should laws with racial classifications be presumed to violate 
this principle? Do remedial racial classifications probably have 
excessively unfair effects on whites? Is it worse wrongly to uphold a 
classification that is excessively unfair than wrongly to invalidate 
one that is not excessively unfair? Powell posed none of these 
questions. He addressed and answered none of these questions-and 
none could have been answered because the substantive definition of 
unconstitutional unfairness was neither explicitly defined, nor 
derived. 
Thus, with the substantive constitutional principle prohibiting 
"unfair" effects ill-defined, Justice Powell's Wygant opinion risked 
erroneously identifying issues of constitutionally significant fact. 
With the appropriate adjudicative rule unaddressed, his opinion 
risked erroneously resolving issues of constitutionally significant 
fact. The foregoing discussion focused on one of Powell's new 
substantive constitutional principles, but is applicable to any 
circumstance in which a Justice measures the permissibility of 
challenged policies against putative substantive constitutional 
principles that are neither explicitly derived nor defined, nor 
tethered to adjudicative rules explicitly tailored for their 
enforcement. 
321. Wygant, 476 U.S. at 283. 
322. See Chang, Judicial Conservatism, supra note 121, at 794-99. 
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d. Failing Explicitly to Derive and Define New 
Substantive Constitutional Principles Undermines 
the Political Function for Enforcing Those New 
Principles 
The creation of constitutional doctrine that fails explicitly to 
derive and define substantive constitutional principles undermines 
the political function of judicial review by precluding the "due 
instruction" of political representatives as to the norms by which 
they should feel their discretion constrained. All of the previously 
discussed ways in which the political function could be undermined323 
are applicable to Justice Powell's opinions in Bakke and Wygant and 
their newly-established implicit substantive constitutional principle 
prohibiting (permissibly motivated) racial classifications having 
excessively unfair effects on "innocents." First, failing to define the 
elements of "unfairness" fails to instruct political actors about the 
boundaries by which discretion is circumscribed.324 Second, failing to 
derive the excessively unfair effects principle through an identified 
interpretive methodology is a lost opportunity to reveal it as 
interpretive error, and increases the likelihood that conscientious 
legislators will be wrongly inhibited from enacting remedial uses of 
racial classifications.325 Third, and alternatively, failing to derive the 
excessively unfair effects principle through an identified interpretive 
methodology is a lost opportunity to reveal it as proper 
interpretation, and thereby to reduce the likelihood that less than 
conscientious legislators would feel constrained to limit their policy 
pursuits within such boundaries judicial supremacy 
notwithstanding .326 
D. The Nature of Federal Legislative Power: Marshall in 
McCulloch versus Marshall in Gibbons 
Explicitly differentiating the derivation and definition of 
substantive constitutional principles and adjudicative rules can 
323. See supra text accompanying notes 183-84. 
324. Policymakers were left unguided about a range of issues. What 
constitutionally-mandated notion of "fairness" underlies the proposition that it is 
worse to lose a job than never to receive it? What constitutionally-mandated notion of 
"fairness" supports the view that it is worse for a white worker with more seniority to 
lose a job than for a black worker with less seniority (because of the effects of past 
racial discrimination) to lose a job? See Chang, Judicial Conservatism, supra note 121, 
at 794-99. 
325. Cf supra text accompanying note 311 for an example of a politician who 
conscientiously sought to limit policy choices within judicially-declared constitutional 
mandates. 
326. Cf supra text accompanying notes 167-87 for an example of a politician less 
than conscientious about responsibilities in relation to judicial supremacy. 
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enhance the enforcement of constitutional provisions well beyond the 
Equal Protection Clause. Consider the enumerated powers of 
Congress. Consider, in particular, Justice Marshall's foundational 
efforts to interpret the meaning of the Necessary and Proper Clause 
in McCulloch v. Maryland, and the Commerce Clause in Gibbons v. 
Ogden.327 
1. McCulloch and Foundational Ambiguity 
a. Failing Explicitly to Derive and Define Substantive 
Constitutional Principles Undermines the 
Adjudicative Function . 
Definitional Ambiguity and Identifying Issues of Constitutionally 
Significant Fact. In McCulloch v. Maryland,328 Marshall resolved 
arguments concerning the definition of Congress' legislative 
discretion under the Necessary and Proper Clause. Challenging the 
permissibility of legislation creating a national bank, Maryland 
argued, first, that the power to create a bank was not expressly 
enumerated and, second, that any implied powers provided by the 
Necessary and Proper Clause should be interpreted narrowly.329 
Indeed, Maryland argued that "necessary" should be construed to 
mean "absolutely necessary,"330 defined "as limiting the right to pass 
laws for the execution of the granted powers, to such as are 
indispensable, and without which the power would be nugatory."331 
The federal government conceded that the power to create a bank 
was not expressly enumerated, but contended that the implied 
powers delegated through the Necessary and Proper Clause should 
be interpreted broadly enough to include the discretion to create a 
bank,332 
Marshall presented his own, much broader interpretation. In 
Marshall's view, Congress could choose any means of regulation it 
wished, so long as the ends it sought to pursue were authorized 
under some enumerated power other than the Necessary and Proper 








[W]e think the sound construction of the constitution must 
allow to the national legislature that discretion, with respect to 
the means by which the powers it confers are to be carried into 
22 U.S. 1 (1824). 
17 U.S. 316 (1819). 
See id. at 412. 
Id. at 414-15. 
Id. at 413. 
Id. at 413-15. 
Id. at 418-19. 
888 RUTGERS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 58:4 
execution, which will enable that body to perform the high 
duties assigned to it, in the manner most beneficial to the 
people. Let the end be legitimate, let it be within the scope of the 
constitution, and all means which are appropriate, which are 
plainly adapted to that end, which are not prohibited, but 
consist with the letter and spirit of the constitution, are 
constitutional. 334 
Later in his opinion, Marshall articulated much the same idea: 
[W]here the law is not prohibited, and is really calculated to 
effect any of the objects entrusted to the government, to 
undertake here to inquire into the degree of its necessity, would 
be to pass the line which circumscribes the judicial department, 
and to tread on legislative ground. This court disclaims all 
pretensions to such a power.335 
These statements express three essential concepts. First, a law 
might be affirmatively prohibited-unconstitutional not on 
federalism grounds, but for transgressing affirmative prohibitions, 
such as those established in the Bill of Rights. Second, the Necessary 
and Proper Clause itself imposes no limits on Congress' discretion. 
The choice of means-and any determination about the degree of a 
law's necessity-are political questions, not subject to judicial 
oversight. Third, and very significant, these statements imply that 
the boundaries on congressional discretion under the expressly 
enumerated powers (other than the Necessary and Proper Clause) 
are to be defined in terms of "ends" or "objects"-purposes-that 
Congress is constitutionally authorized to pursue. Thus, implicitly, 
Congress' discretion under the Commerce Clause is properly defined 
in terms of the limited purposes Congress may pursue. So with the 
power to tax, to pay the debts, and all of the other enumerated 
powers. "Let the end be legitimate," where a law is "really calculated 
to effect any of the objects entrusted to the government," then 
Congress' choice of means-so long as not affirmatively prohibited-
is a matter of political discretion.336 
There are ambiguities in at least the first iteration of principles 
defining Congress' discretion under the Necessary and Proper Clause 
334. McCulloch, 17 U.S at 421 (emphasis added). 
335. Id. at 423. Elsewhere, Marshall articulated the same idea but in negative 
terms: 
Should congress, in the execution of its powers, adopt measures prohibited 
by the constitution; or should Congress, under the pretext of executing its 
powers, pass laws for the accomplishment of objects not entrusted to the 
government; it would become the painful duty of this tribunal, should a case 
requiring such a decision come before it, to say that such an act was not the 
law of the land. 
Id. (emphasis added). 
336. Id. at 421, 423 (emphasis added). 
2006] STRUCTURING CONSTITUTIONAL DOCTRINE 889 
with potentially significant consequences for identifying issues of 
relevant fact and fulfilling the adjudicative function.337 Yet, 
Marshall's analysis became more fundamentally problematic as he 
moved toward his ultimate conclusion that the statute creating the 
national bank was not unconstitutional. Having declared that an act 
would be impermissible if Congress "under the pretext of executing 
its powers, pass[ed] laws for the accomplishment of objects not 
entrusted to the government,"338 Marshall's ensuing analysis was 
definitionally deficient in two ways. 
First, though he suggested that the bank is helpful "in the 
prosecution of [the government's] fiscal operations," and "the 
administration of our finances," he did not identify the particular 
enumerated power(s) under which, in his view, Congress acted to 
create the national bank.339 Second, he did not define the purposes 
for which Congress may legislate under those particular (unspecified) 
enumerated powers.340 Given these unaddressed issues, it was simply 
337. Marshall suggests that the means chosen must in some way be "appropriate." 
Does he intend this as a judicially-defined element that must be satisfied, apart from 
whether Congress acted for a legitimate end? In other words, must the Court make its 
own determination of whether the means selected are "appropriate," or is the question 
simply whether Congress selected the means in pursuit of a legitimate end? His other 
two statements would seem to eschew an independent judicial determination of 
"appropriateness," but the ambiguity created by his reference to a requirement of 
"appropriate" means in the first statement creates a risk of wrongly identifying issues 
of fact in adjudicating federalism challenges to congressional acts. In that first 
iteration, Marshall also suggests that the means chosen must be "plainly adapted" to a 
legitimate end. See id. at 421. Does he mean to establish judicial standards as to the 
efficacy of a chosen means to achieve a legitimate end-and, therefore, to establish 
requirements in addition to the legislature's good faith? If so, Marshall is 
contemplating a requirement that goes well beyond determining the content and 
legitimacy of Congress' purpose. He may be contemplating the possibility that an act of 
Congress could be deemed impermissible even if adopted for a legitimate end if, in the 
Court's view, the act is not a sufficiently effective means for achieving that end. For 
evaluation of such a substantive proposition, see infra note 429. Alternatively, is 
requiring that the challenged statute be "plainly adapted" to a legitimate end meant to 
establish an adjudicative rule for ascertaining legislative purpose-i.e., a presumption 
that Congress acted for a constitutionally unauthorized purpose? Such a notion, ifthat 
is what Marshall had in mind, would have been very different from Thayer's 
deferential "rule of administration." See supra text accompanying notes 52· 77. If so, as 
discussed below, there was no analysis of any kind deriving an (implicit) adjudicative 
rule presuming that acts of Congress are unconstitutional for not having been adopted 
in pursuit of legitimate ends. 
338. McCulloch, 17 U.S. at 423. 
339. Id. at 422. 
340. In other words, now assuming that Congress claims to have acted under the 
commerce power to create the bank, what ends, objects, or purposes is Congress 
authorized to pursue under the Commerce Clause? Marshall might have defined a 
substantive constitutional principle that Congress' discretion under the Commerce 
Clause is limited to purposes of promoting interstate commerce-i.e., if (and only if) 
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impossible to determine whether Congress acted for permissible 
purposes in having created the national bank. By thus failing to 
define the applicable substantive constitutional principle for 
identifying issues of constitutionally significant fact, Marshall 
hamstringed his analysis of the bank's permissibility, and thereby 
undermined the adjudicative function. 
Deriuational Ambiguity and Adjudicative Legitimacy. Marshall 
spent considerable effort discussing his interpretive goal for defining 
"necessary," and the interpretive methodology to be employed in 
reaching that goal. He said, "[t]his word, then, like others, is used in 
various senses; and, in its construction, the subject, the context, [and] 
the intention of the person using them, are all to be taken into 
view."341 Thus, he endeavored to identify the intent of the 
sovereign-the People who chose the word "necessary." "The 
government proceeds directly from the people; is 'ordained and 
established' in the name of the people."342 
Turning to interpretive methods, Marshall suggested various 
approaches for identifying the intent of the sovereign People. He 
compared the text of the Constitution with that of the Articles of 
Confederation as a basis from which to infer the intent of those who 
framed and ratified the Necessary and Proper Clause.343 He further 
Congress enacted legislation with the purpose of promoting interstate commerce, then 
its means of regulation are permissible. Alternatively, he might have determined that 
the framers and ratifiers had a more limited view of congressional discretion under the 
Commerce Clause, authorizing only legislation adopted for purposes of eliminating 
protectionist trade barriers. These different substantive definitions of congressional 
power under the Commerce Clause identify different issues of relevant fact that would 
have to be resolved in determining the permissibility of the national bank. Judicial 
scrutiny of the circumstances under which the bank was rechartered should look very 
different, depending on which (if either) of these two ways of defining authorized 
purposes under the Commerce Clause Marshall might have adopted. For further 
discussion of these purpose-centered definitions of congressional authority under the 
Commerce Clause, see infra note 433 and accompanying text. 
341. McCulloch, 17 U.S. at 415. 
342. Id. at 403. This interpretive goal also was implicit in Marbury u. Madison, 
where Marshall declared: "That the people have an original right to establish ... such 
principles as, in their opinion, shall most conduce to their own happiness, is the basis, 
on which the whole American fabric has been erected." 5 U.S. at 176. From this 
foundational norm, Marshall's interpretive approach was comprised of a goal-
identifying the intent of the framers and ratifiers-and of methodological propositions 
as to how that goal is to be fulfilled. One should note that Marshall's rationale for 
originalism is not quite applicable for guiding Justices once "the People" who created 
the Constitution have passed from the scene. See infra text accompanying notes 468· 
72. 
343. See McCulloch, 17 U.S. at 406. In particular, Marshall noted that the Articles 
of Confederation declared that the national government possessed only such powers as 
were "expressly" delegated, while the Constitution's Tenth Amendment omitted the 
word "expressly" in declaring that those powers not delegated to the national 
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asserted that the People could not have intended to create a national 
government without providing "ample means" for the execution of its 
enumerated substantive powers. "The power being given, it is the 
interest of the nation to facilitate its execution. It can never be their 
interest, and cannot be presumed to have been their intention, to clog 
and embarrass its execution, by withholding the most appropriate 
means."344 
However supportable these propositions about the People's 
intent might have been, Marshall's analysis thus far was relevant 
only for rejecting Maryland's very narrow interpretation of 
"necessary." Beyond this, however, he gave no attention to deriving-
justifying-the critical proposition that the People intended to define 
Congress' expressly enumerated powers in terms of limited, 
authorized purposes.345 This is significant because there were other 
ways in which the framers and ratifiers might have chosen to define 
the national government's legislative powers. Rather than define 
Congress' powers in terms of authorized purposes, they might have 
preferred to define such powers in terms of requisite effects. 
Alternatively they might have chosen to define such powers in terms 
of permitted subjects of regulation-thus rendering Marshall's 
interpretation of the Necessary and Proper Clause incorrect.346 
Failure to derive-to justify-the proposition that Congress' 
expressly enumerated powers are defined in terms of authorized 
purposes undermined Marshall's conclusion that the national bank 
was not unconstitutional. A substantive constitutional principle 
defining Congress' powers in terms of authorized purposes requires 
finding very different facts relevant to a challenged statute than 
would a principle defining Congress' discretion in terms of requisite 
effects, or authorized subjects. Furthermore, correctly finding facts 
under an identified principle promises incorrect results if the 
principle applied was itself unwarranted. Failing to derive-to 
justify-the conceptualization of congressional power in terms of 
authorized purposes threatened the legitimacy of any conclusions 
reached about the national bank, and about any other congressional 
government are reserved to the states. See id. Of course, omitting the word "expressly" 
in the Constitution merely confirms that the framers and ratifiers of the Constitution 
intended to vest the national government with some measure of implied powers-a 
point that Maryland did not contest. The interpretive disagreement between Maryland 
and the federal government concerned not whether Congress was vested with implied 
powers, but the scope of those implied powers. 
344. Id. at 408. 
345. Id. at 421-23 (emphasis added). Indeed, he gave little attention to deriving his 
own interpretation of the necessary and proper clause as imposing no limits on 
Congress' choice of regulatory means. Id. 
346. See infra text accompanying notes 356-62, 366-72. 
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statute subsequently challenged, and thereby undermined the 
adjudicative function. 
*** 
All of these failings in defining the principles for identifying 
issues of constitutionally significant fact about the national bank-
failing to specify the enumerated power under which Congress acted, 
to define the purposes Congress may pursue under that power, to 
derive the proposition that Congress' powers were created in terms of 
authorized purposes, and to derive the particular purposes Congress 
was authorized to pursue--would have been less likely had Marshall 
endeavored to define constitutional doctrine explicitly in terms of 
substantive constitutional principles and adjudicative rules. 
Substantive constitutional principles are rules stating limits on 
governmental discretion derived from and evoking values deemed to 
underlie constitutional text. Their function is to identify issues of 
constitutionally significant fact. They must, therefore, be defined 
with careful attention to the elements identified, and to the kinds of 
fact addressed by each element. Furthermore, to frame a substantive 
constitutional principle requires its derivation-by identifying the 
values deemed to underlie relevant text, explaining how and why 
those values were so deemed, and explaining how the substantive 
constitutional principle, as particularly defined, is indeed derived 
from and expresses those identified underlying constitutional norms. 
b. Failing Explicitly to Derive and Define Adjudicative 
Rules Undermines the Adjudicative Function 
Beyond the foregoing shortcomings in deriving and defining the 
substantive constitutional principles relevant for adjudicating the 
bank's permissibility, Marshall failed to derive and define 
adjudicative rules with respect to which issues of constitutionally 
significant fact were to be resolved. Now assuming that McCulloch's 
(inadequately derived and defined) implicit substantive 
constitutional principles provide the yardstick for identifying the 
issues of constitutionally significant fact, should congressional acts, 
when challenged, be presumed to have been enacted for 
constitutionally authorized purposes (and, therefore, presumed 
permissible) or be presumed to have been enacted for constitutionally 
unauthorized purposes (and, therefore, presumed impermissible)? 
What evidence should be relevant from which to infer Congress' 
legislative objectives? What inferences from what evidence should be 
permissible? What, if any, inferences from what evidence should be 
mandatory? Because Marshall did not begin to address these issues, 
reliably determining whether the national bank was adopted because 
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of authorized purposes under some enumerated power was gravely 
undermined.347 
c. Failing Explicitly to Derive and Define Substantive 
Constitutional Principles and Adjudicative Rules 
Undermines the Political Function 
It should be evident that McCulloch's ambiguities in defining 
substantive constitutional principles would impede not only the 
Court's performance of the adjudicative function, but also the "due 
instruction" of political actors. The McCulloch opinion informed 
Congress that its statutes were to be judged by the purposes for 
which they were enacted,348 but gave no indication of the purposes for 
which Congress was authorized to act under any enumerated power. 
Further discussion of the political function will be deferred until 
analysis of Gibbons and its progeny,349 for the doctrines developed in 
these cases involved worse than the ambiguity that results from 
doctrine that is unclear. These cases undermined both the 
adjudicative and the political functions with implicit substantive 
constitutional principles that were at war with each other. 
347. Indeed, it was impossible to determine whether the Bank should be presumed 
permissible or impermissible without having first identified the power(s) under which 
Congress acted, and without having defined (and derived) the particular purposes 
(ends or objects) that Congress was authorized to pursue under such power(s). As 
previously suggested, one cannot effectively analyze the burden of persuasion-
whether pursuant to a probabilistic analysis or a normative analysis-without a 
clearly defined substantive constitutional principle. See supra text accompanying notes 
142-57, 237-40, 313-23. If one were to pursue a probabilistic rationale for allocating 
the adjudicative presumption, determining whether a given category of statute 
probably does, or does not, violate the applicable substantive constitutional principle 
requires focusing with particularity on the elements of the substantive constitutional 
principle at issue. Thus, for example, determining whether Congress probably enacted 
the Bank legislation for a constitutionally authorized purpose requires defining those 
purposes that are authorized. If one were to pursue a normative rationale for 
allocating the adjudicative presumption, one also would have to identify the content of 
the constitutional norms limiting (and authorizing) congressional discretion in order to 
determine whether an erroneous invalidation would be worse than an erroneous 
failure to invalidate the challenged Bank legislation. Thus, the failure to derive and 
define substantive constitutional principles undermined the adjudicative function not 
only through the absence of clear rules for effectively identifying issues of relevant 
fact, but also by having precluded the derivation and definition of adjudicative rules 
for effectively resolving issues of relevant fact. 
348. McCulloch, 17 U.S. at 421-24. 
349. See infra text accompanying notes at 350-82. 
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2. Building on McCulloch's Substantive Ambiguity: 
Gibbons' Schizophrenia and its Bipolar Progeny 
Gibbons v. Ogden350 involved a dispute over the operation of 
steam vessels in the Hudson River from the shores of New Jersey to 
those of New York. New York had granted a monopoly to Ogden to 
operate vessels in its waters.351 Congress had granted a license to 
Gibbons to operate vessels between New Jersey and New York, 
including within New York's waters.352 If Gibbons' license was a valid 
exercise of federal power, it would preempt Ogden's monopoly based 
on New York law. Ogden argued that Congress lacked discretion 
under the Commerce Clause to grant a license to operate a vessel 
within New York's territorial waters, because navigation within a 
state's territorial waters does not qualify as "commerce among the 
several states."353 
Referring to the Commerce Clause, Marshall asked, "What is 
this power?" 
This power, like all others vested in Congress, is complete in 
itself, may be exercised to its utmost extent, and acknowledges 
no limitations, other than are prescribed in the constitution. 
These are expressed in plain terms, and do not affect the 
questions which arise in this case, or which have been discussed 
at the bar. If, as has always been understood, the sovereignty of 
Congress, though limited to specified objects, is plenary as to 
those objects, the power over commerce with foreign nations, 
and among the several States, is vested in Congress as 
absolutely as it would be in a single government, having in its 
constitution the same restrictions on the exercise of the power 
as are found in the constitution of the United States. The 
wisdom and the discretion of Congress, their identity with the 
people, and the influence which their constituents possess at 
elections, are, in this, as in many other instances, as that, for 
example, of declaring war, the sole restraints on which they 
have relied, to secure them from its abuse. They are the 
restraints on which the people must often rely solely, in all 
representative governments.354 
Note that these elements defining the extent, and the limits, of 
Congress' delegated powers are much the same as those Marshall 
developed in McCulloch.355 First, he suggests that the Constitution 
350. 22 U.S. 1 (1824). 
351. Id. at 7. 
352. See id. 
353. Id. at 186·87. 
354. Id. at 196-97. 
355. See supra text accompanying notes 334-40. Toward defining Congress' 
discretion under the Commerce Clause in Gibbons, Marshall addressed interpretive 
2006] STRUCTURING CONSTITUTIONAL DOCTRINE 895 
imposes affirmative limits on Congress' discretion, apart from the 
boundaries of delegated powers. As in McCulloch, these affirmative 
limits, such as those imposed by the first eight amendments, did "not 
affect the questions" presented in Gibbons. Second, he suggests that 
Congress' legislative powers are "limited to specified objects"-that 
Congress is authorized to legislate in the pursuit of particular ends, 
objects, or purposes. Third, as he did in McCulloch, he suggests that 
Congress' regulatory discretion is plenary, so long as it acts in 
pursuit of authorized purposes. 
Yet, the ambiguities left in McCulloch were repeated in Gibbons. 
Most significantly, what purpose(s) may Congress pursue under the 
Commerce Clause? Marshall never touched this issue.356 
Compounding these ambiguities, earlier portions of Marshall's 
Gibbons opinion implied an entirely different framework for defining 
the scope of the commerce power. Indeed, Marshall began his 
analysis of Congress' discretion under the Commerce Clause by 
considering whether ship navigation falls within the subject of 
commerce. 
The subject to be regulated is commerce; and our constitution 
being, as was aptly said at the bar, one of enumeration, and not 
of definition, to ascertain the extent of the power, it becomes 
necessary to settle the meaning of the word .... If commerce 
does not include navigation, the government of the Union has no 
direct power over that subject, and can make no law prescribing 
what shall constitute American vessels, or requiring that they 
shall be navigated by American seamen. All America 
understands, and has uniformly understood, the word 
"commerce," to comprehend navigation. The convention must 
have used the word in that sense, because all have understood 
it in that sense; and the attempt to restrict it comes too late.357 
goals and methods as he had with respect to the necessary and proper clause in 
McCulloch. As in McCulloch, Marshall suggests the goal of identifying the intent of 
"the enlightened patriots who framed our constitution, and the people who adopted 
it .... " Gibbons, 22 U.S. at 188. Furthermore, he again suggests a premise with 
respect to which he seeks to infer the intent of these framers and ratifiers-that they 
used words in the Constitution "in their natural sense." Id. 
356. Secondary ambiguities include the following questions: To determine whether 
Congress acted for legitimate ends, does it matter if one member voted for illegitimate 
ends; or if most members did not vote for legitimate ends; or if the act would not have 
been enacted but for the consideration of legitimate ends? These are ambiguities about 
identifying those issues of relevant fact that should be resolved in the adjudicative 
process. For a discussion of willful ambiguity, see supra text accompanying notes 116-
19. 
357. Gibbons, 22 U.S. at 189-90 (emphasis added). 
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Marshall pursues a similar subject-centered inquiry into whether the 
navigation of vessels within a state's waters is encompassed by 
"commerce among the several states." 
The subject to which the power is next applied, is to commerce 
"among the several States" ... It is not intended to say that 
these words comprehend that commerce, which is completely 
internal . . . and which does not extend to or affect other 
States.358 
There is a fundamental inconsistency between this part of 
Marshall's opinion, concerned with defining "commerce" and "among 
the several states" as subjects of regulation,359 and the later part of 
his opinion, discussed above, concerned with defining the power "to 
regulate."360 Each of these two different approaches would require 
identifying very different issues of fact in determining whether 
particular acts of Congress are permissible. The latter approach is 
concerned with facts indicative of legislative purpose; the former is 
concerned with facts indicative of the nature of the things regulated. 
Both approaches cannot be correct. If, indeed, as Marshall had 
suggested in McCulloch, and in the latter part of Gibbons defining 
the power "to regulate," Congress may choose any means of 
regulation in pursuit of an authorized end,361 the inquiry into 
whether "navigation" qualifies as commerce would be irrelevant. 
Marshall's assertion, above, that "[if] commerce does not include 
navigation, the government of the Union has no direct power over 
that subject" would be wrong.362 
This schizophrenia in Marshall's substantive conceptualization 
of federal legislative power in Gibbons-which emanated at least in 
part from his failure to attend to the explicit derivation and 
358. Id. at 194 (emphasis added). 
359. Id. 
360. Id. at 196-97. 
361. See McCulloch, 17 U.S. at 421, 423; Gibbons, 22 U.S. at 196-97. 
362. Gibbons, 22 U.S. at 190 (emphasis added). It is somewhat unclear what 
Marshall means by "direct" power over navigation. One might interpret the statement 
as distinguishing between power derived from the Commerce Clause itself as "direct" 
power, in contrast with power derived from the necessary and proper clause in 
conjunction with the Commerce Clause as other than "direct." Yet, such an 
interpretation of Marshall's meaning is not plausible, because Marshall follows this 
point about "direct" power with the unqualified assertion that if "commerce" does not 
include navigation, Congress could "make no law" regulating vessels or seamen. Id. 
This unqualified proposition that Congress could make no such law had to have 
accounted for whatever discretion Congress has under the necessary and proper 
clause. This confirms that in this portion of Gibbons, Marshall's view of Congress' 
discretion under the Commerce Clause is the product of an approach very different 
from that developed in McCulloch and in the later, purpose-centered portion of 
Gibbons. 
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definition of both substantive constitutional principles and 
adjudicative rules in McCulloch363-had significant consequences in 
the decades to come. Consider Champion v. Ames364 (The Lottery 
Case) and Hammer v. Dagenhart365 (The Child Labor Case). 
Champion involved a challenge to a congressional act that 
criminalized the interstate shipment of lottery tickets.366 Champion 
argued that the act was unconstitutional because "the carrying of 
lottery tickets from one state to another ... does not constitute ... 
commerce among the states."367 The government argued "that the 
carrying of lottery tickets from one state to another is commerce 
which Congress may regulate."368 Note that both parties made 
arguments that eschewed the McCulloch and latter-Gibbons 
concept369 of federal legislative power defined in terms of authorized 
purposes. Instead, both parties made arguments that employed the 
earlier Gibbons conceptualization of congressional power in terms of 
whether Congress regulated an authorized subject. 
Justice Fuller, in dissent, did rely on the McCulloch and the 
latter Gibbons perspective. 
[A]n act prohibiting the carriage of lottery matter would be 
necessary and proper to the execution of a power to suppress 
lotteries; but that power belongs to the states and not to 
Congress. To hold that Congress has general police power 
would be to hold that it may accomplish objects not entrusted to 
the General Government, and to defeat the operation of the 
[Tenth] Amendment .... 370 
Fuller seems concerned about Congress' objects or purposes, and 
seems to suppose that the commerce power does not vest Congress 
with a "general police power" to pursue moralistic purposes. 
In response for the majority, Justice Harlan suggested that so 
long as Congress regulated the subject of interstate commerce, it 
could pursue any purpose. 
We have said that the carrying from State to State of lottery 
tickets constitutes interstate commerce, and that the regulation 
of such commerce is within the power of Congress under the 
Constitution .... If a state, when considering legislation for the 
suppression of lotteries within its own limits, may properly take 
into view the evils that inhere in the raising of money, in that 
363. See supra text accompanying notes 329-47. 
364. 188 U.S. 321 (1903). 
365. 247 U.S. 251 (1918). 
366. See generally Champion, 188 U.S. 321. 
367. Id. at 344. 
368. Id. at 345. 
369. See supra text accompanying notes 350-56. 
370. Champion, 188 U.S. at 365 (Fuller, J., dissenting) (emphasis added). 
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mode, why may not Congress, invested with the power to 
regulate commerce among the several States, provide that such 
commerce shall not be polluted by the carrying of lottery tickets 
from one State to another? In this connection it must not be 
forgotten that the power of Congress to regulate commerce 
among the States is plenary, is complete in itself, and is subject 
to no limitations except such as may be found in the 
Constitution. 371 
Note that in the last sentence above, Harlan paraphrases the portion 
of Marshall's Gibbons opinion that defined Congress' powers in terms 
of unlimited discretion to choose means in pursuit of limited, 
authorized ends. Highly significant, however, was Harlan's omission 
of Gibbons' limiting principle: Congress' discretion, "though limited to 
specified objects, is plenary as to those objects."372 
In Hammer, the Court considered a challenge to a congressional 
act that prohibited the interstate shipment of goods produced by 
children of less than a minimum age who worked for less than a 
minimum wage or for more than maximum hours.373 In a formal 
sense, the subject of regulation in Hammer was just as much 
interstate commerce per se as was the regulated subject in 
Champion-interstate shipment was prohibited by the law 
challenged in each case. In Hammer, however, the subject of 
regulation was not dispositive. 
The thing intended to be accomplished by this statute is the 
denial of the facilities of interstate commerce to those 
manufacturers in the States who employ children within the 
prohibited ages. The act in its effect does not regulate 
transportation among the States, but aims to standardize the 
ages at which children may be employed in mining and 
manufacturing within the States .... There is no power vested 
in Congress to require the States to exercise their police power 
so as to prevent possible unfair competition .... The grant of 
power to Congress over the subject of interstate commerce was 
to enable it to regulate such commerce, and not to give it 
371. Id. at 355-56 (majority opinion). 
372. Gibbons, 22 U.S. at 197 (emphasis added). There is, of course, a certain 
ambiguity in this statement from Gibbons. "Objects," in the sense of the purposes 
Congress is authorized to pursue under its enumerated powers, are not specified in the 
Constitution, but would have to be identified through some interpretive inference. Yet, 
it also is true that the subjects Congress may regulate are not specified in the sense 
suggested in the earlier part of Gibbons-that because, in Marshall's view, "commerce" 
includes the unspecified category of "navigation," Congress may regulate the licensing 
of steam vessels. Furthermore, the subjects Congress may regulate also are not 
specified in the sense suggested by Marshall's definition of Congress' discretion in 
McCulloch and in the latter part of Gibbons. Rather, from that perspective, Congress 
could regulate any subject, so long as it pursued authorized objects. 
373. See Hammer, 247 U.S. at 268 n.1. 
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authority to control the States in their exercise of the police 
power over local trade and manufacture.374 
899 
Though reference to the effect of the act makes Justice Day's 
conceptualization of Commerce Clause discretion ambiguous, the 
broader thrust of these passages suggests a concern with the 
impermissibility of Congress' purpose-that Congress "aim[ed] to 
standardize" the age at which children could be employed; that 
Congress sought "to require the States to exercise their police power 
so as to prevent possible unfair competition;" that Congress sought 
"to control the states in their exercise of the police power .... "375 In 
Hammer, it did not matter that the subject regulated was interstate 
shipment-what mattered was Congress' purpose. In Champion, it 
did not matter that Congress was aiming at the moral evils of selling 
and buying lottery tickets-what mattered was that the subject 
regulated was interstate shipment. Thus, Hammer and Champion 
enforced diametrically opposed (implicit) substantive constitutional 
principles defining congressional discretion under the Commerce 
Clause.376 
374. Id. at 271-74 (emphasis added). 
375. Id. at 272-74. Although the Hammer Court determined that Congress "aim[ed] 
to standardize" child labor policy through the Child Labor Act, it failed to define the 
substantive standard against which that purpose was measured-it failed to define 
the substantive constitutional principles identifying those particular purposes that 
Congress may pursue under the Commerce Clause. More than this, the Hammer Court 
gave no indication of the adjudicative rules with respect to which it made the factual 
determination that the Child Labor Act was enacted for illegitimate purposes. Did the 
government bear the burden to show that Congress acted for constitutionally 
authorized purposes, or did the challenger bear the burden to show the opposite? Why? 
What evidence of legislative intent was relevant? What inferences from what evidence 
were permissible, or mandatory, and why? 
376. Justice Day feebly tried to distinguish the facts of Hammer from those of 
Champion, and thereby denied the fundamental inconsistency of the implicit 
substantive constitutional principles applied in each case. Day suggested, first, that 
unlike lottery tickets, the goods produced by children are intrinsically harmless. 
Hammer, 247 U.S.at 272. Yet, a lottery ticket is simply a piece of paper which, one 
would suppose, is no more intrinsically harmful than is a shirt stitched together by a 
child. It is, of course, the use of a lottery ticket-its sale or purchase-that arguably is 
harmful, as it is the manufacture of the shirt by children that involves social harm. In 
both circumstances, it is human activity in relation to intrinsically harmless products 
that provides the focus of legislative concern. 
Day's second basis for purportedly distinguishing the statute upheld in Champion 
from that invalidated in Hammer somewhat contradicts the first, and is no more 
tenable. Day suggested that for lottery tickets, "the use of interstate transportation 
was necessary to the accomplishment of harmful results . . . . [A]lthough the power 
over interstate transportation was to regulate, that could only be accomplished by 
prohibiting the use of the facilities of interstate commerce to effect the evil intended. 
This element is wanting [in regulating the interstate shipment of goods produced by 
children]." Id. at 271. Of course, if the interstate shipment of lottery tickets was 
necessary to effect the evil posed by lottery tickets, it follows that it is their sale or 
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*** 
Causes of Doctrinal Incoherence. McCulloch's ambiguity begat 
Gibbons' internal inconsistency; Gibbons' internal inconsistency 
begat the contradictory (implicit) substantive constitutional 
principles applied in Champion and Hammer. To have expressly 
derived and defined substantive constitutional principles in 
McCulloch would have required Marshall to designate as substantive 
constitutional principles the propositions that legislation enacted "for 
the accomplishment of objects not entrusted to the government" is 
unconstitutional; and that legislation is permissible if "really 
calculated to effect any of the objects entrusted to the government," 
regardless of the means of regulation.377 
To have justified the purpose-centered approach as a substantive 
constitutional principle would have required addressing a range of 
questions. Why did the sovereign People choose to define the power 
"to regulate Commerce ... among the several states," or "to establish 
an uniform Rule of naturalization,"378 in terms of authorized 
purposes? What values, what competing values, underlay the 
People's creation of these limited powers and their definition of these 
powers in terms of authorized purposes? What other ways for 
defining the boundaries of these expressly enumerated powers might 
they have chosen?379 What values could underlie these alternative 
modes of defining national legislative power, and why are such 
values not plausibly those from which the sovereign People created 
Congress' legislative powers? And if, indeed, the sovereign People did 
choose to define the enumerated powers in terms of authorized 
purposes, what particular purposes did they authorize Congress to 
pursue when using the power under which the Bank was created, 
and why? 
purchase that is harmful, rather than anything intrinsic in the pieces of paper. Beyond 
this, however much this point undermines Day's first basis for distinguishing the 
cases, it fails to establish a second basis for distinguishing lottery tickets from goods 
produced by children. As the use of interstate transportation was necessary to achieve 
harmful results with lottery tickets, so the interstate shipment of goods produced by 
children was necessary to reach an out-of-state demand for the goods, which increased 
the occasion for employing more children. Thus, if the child labor statute could be 
understood as "aiming at" local production, so the lottery statute could be understood 
as "aiming at" local purchase. 
377. McCulloch, 17 U.S. at 423. 
378. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8. 
379. Why not have chosen to define the powers in terms of required regulatory 
effects, rather than legislative purposes? Why not have chosen to define the power in 
terms of authorized subjects, rather than authorized objects? See supra text 
accompanying notes 356-72. 
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To have addressed the normative roots and implications of a 
putative substantive constitutional principle would have required 
acknowledging definitional ambiguity, and either clarifying what was 
ambiguous, or explaining why the ambiguity is retained as a matter 
of judicial choice. Furthermore, to have explicitly derived and defined 
adjudicative rules in McCulloch would have required closer attention 
to defining the substantive conception of federal legislative power 
that Marshall had constructed. Determining whether a challenged 
statute should be presumed permissible or impermissible, from 
either a probabilistic or a normative perspective, requires identifying 
with particularity the elements of the substantive constitutional 
principle with respect to which probabilities or normative hierarchies 
are to be determined.380 
Had there been in Gibbons an explicit focus on the discrete 
functions of substantive constitutional principles and adjudicative 
rules, and the explicit derivation and definition of each, Marshall 
would have been more likely to recognize, and ultimately to avoid 
articulating, the two inconsistent substantive conceptualizations of 
Congress' discretion. He more likely could have considered whether it 
makes more sense to conclude that the sovereign People chose to 
frame congressional discretion in terms of subjects it may regulate, 
or in terms of objects it may pursue, or in some other terms entirely. 
Thus, he would have been more likely to acknowledge (or to avoid 
framing) doctrine suggesting simultaneously that Congress' 
discretion is limited in terms of the subjects it may regulate and that 
Congress has unbounded discretion to choose the means of 
regulation-the subjects of regulation-so long as it has pursued an 
authorized end. How could it be that Congress lacks power to 
regulate a subject that does not qualify as "commerce" (as Marshall 
suggested that navigation could not be regulated unless it qualifies 
as "commerce") if, indeed, Congress has plenary discretion to choose 
the means of regulation when acting in pursuit of authorized ends? 
Had this all occurred in Gibbons, the divergent approaches of 
Champion and Hammer would not each have had a plausible 
precedential pedigree. Justice Harlan less likely could have so 
selectively used Marshall's Gibbons language in Champion, because 
Marshall more likely would have clearly derived and defined doctrine 
in Gibbons that was concerned either with authorized subjects of 
regulation, or authorized objects of regulation, but not both.381 
380. One cannot conduct an effective analysis about how to allocate the burden of 
persuasion-whether with respect to a probabilistic analysis or a normative analysis-
without a clearly defined substantive constitutional principle. See supra text 
accompanying notes 142-57, 237-40, 313-23, 347. 
381. Not only did Harlan fail to acknowledge that his definition of congressional 
power was inconsistent with McCulloch, and with at least that portion of Gibbons 
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Champion might well have been decided very differently, based on 
the principle (on which Fuller relied in dissent) that Congress acts 
impermissibly when it pursues purposes not constitutionally 
authorized. 
Consequences of Doctrinal Incoherence for the Adjudicative and 
Political Functions. A court might happen to reach the same result in 
a case whether by flipping a coin or by the careful derivation, 
definition, and application of legal principle to relevant facts. Though 
the result in Gibbons might not have been different had Marshall 
fully pursued the implications of McCulloch's proposition that 
Congress may regulate any subject so long as it acts for authorized 
objects,3s2 the incoherence of the Gibbons opinion undermined the 
adjudicative function in Champion and Hammer. Champion's 
doctrine applied to Hammer's facts should have upheld the 
challenged regulation, as the dissent argued. Hammer's principle, if 
applied by the majority in Champion, should have invalidated that 
regulation. The availability of contradictory doctrine, both of which 
cannot be correct, must undermine the adjudicative function, much 
in the way that deciding constitutional cases by flipping a coin would. 
Furthermore, just as ambiguous-or worse, contradictory-
constitutional doctrine must undermine the adjudicative function by 
failing to guide courts effectively, such flawed doctrine must 
undermine the political function of judicial review in failing to guide 
legislators effectively. Legislators only could have been confused by 
judicial opinions suggesting in one case (Champion) that Congress 
may pursue any purpose, so long as the subject regulated is 
interstate commerce, and suggesting in another case (Hammer) that 
Congress may not regulate under the Commerce Clause if its purpose 
is not authorized, even if the subject regulated is interstate 
commerce. Such incoherent doctrine cannot "duly instruct')··-
legislators as to the boundaries of their discretion. Embracing the 
proposition that constitutional doctrine must be structured as is legal 
doctrine in other areas-explicitly comprised of substantive rules and 
adjudicative rules, explicitly recognizing the nature and functions of 
each kind of rule, and explicitly deriving and defining each kind of 
rule-can reduce the risks of ambiguous, inconsistent, and 
misleading legal doctrine, unfit to perform the adjudicative and 
political functions that judicial review exists to serve. 
concerned with defining "to regulate" in the Commerce Clause; he also failed even to 
address the range of issues relevant to deriving substantive constitutional principles. 
For discussion of issues relevant for deriving substantive constitutional principles, see 
infra text accompanying notes 466-77. 
382. For discussion of McCulloch's purpose-centered definition of Congress' 
discretion, see supra text accompanying notes 334-46. 
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E. The New Deal Revolution in Commerce Clause Doctrine and 
the Modern Reaction: Explicitly Deriving and Defining 
Substantive Constitutional Principles and Adjudicative 
Rules Could Enhance Doctrinal Clarity and Legitimacy 
Champion and Hammer adjudicated challenges to congressional 
acts that regulated the interstate shipment of goods and, therefore, 
that could be seen as regulating interstate commerce itself. In the 
late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the Court developed 
complex and contradictory doctrines for determining the 
permissibility of federal statutes regulating subjects that did not 
qualify as interstate commerce per se--either because not commerce 
or not interstate. The Court determined that if the subject regulated 
is not itself interstate commerce, then Congress could regulate only if 
the thing regulated "directly" affects interstate commerce.383 By the 
time of challenges to early New Deal legislation, the Court defined 
"direct effects" as those caused "proximately" by the thing regulated, 
without "an efficient intervening agency or condition."384 It 
emphasized that the magnitude of the effect on interstate commerce 
caused by the subject Congress regulates was irrelevant to the issue 
of whether that subject "directly'' affects interstate commerce.385 
So much could be said about this pre-New Deal line of cases, 
informed by the distinction between substantive constitutional 
principles and adjudicative rules. Rather than spend more time with 
these cases, however, it would be equally revealing, and more 
relevant to evaluating contemporary constitutional doctrine, to look 
closely at the case in which the Court departed from the doctrinal 
focus on "direct" versus "indirect" effects, and to examine how the 
Court's failure in that case to distinguish between substantive 
constitutional principles and adjudicative rules undermined the 
adjudicative and political functions of judicial review. 
383. See, e.g., Carter, 298 U.S. at 304. Noting that the regulation of wages and 
hours "primarily falls upon production and not upon commerce," and that "the 
production of every commodity intended for interstate sale and transportation has 
some effect on interstate commerce," the Court turned to "the final and decisive 
inquiry," i.e., "whether here that effect is direct." Id. at 307. 
384. Id. This was an apparent importation into constitutional law from prevailing 
tort notions of proximate cause. See, e.g., In re Polemis, (1921] 3 L.J.K.B. 560 (Eng. 
EWCA (Crim)) (finding defendant in negligence action liable only for those harms 
"directly" caused by his negligence, where "direct" entails the absence of causal events 
intervening between defendant's negligence and plaintiffs injury). 
385. Carter, 298 U.S. at 308 ("[T]he extent of the effect bears no logical relation to 
its character. The distinction between a direct and indirect effect turns, not upon the 
magnitude of either the cause or the effect, but entirely upon the manner in which the 
effect has been brought about."). 
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1. NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel as Counterpoint 
In NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel,386 the Court considered a 
challenge to the National Labor Relations Act of 1935. The Act 
prohibited employers from retaliating against employees for 
engaging in union organizing activities. Pursuant to the Act, the 
National Labor Relations Board found that the Jones & Laughlin 
Steel Corporation had impermissibly fired employees. The Board 
ordered the company to reinstate the employees, and to pay their 
back wages.387 In challenging this order, the company relied on 
arguments that were irrefutable under the most recently decided 
cases38B--that the subject regulated was not interstate commerce per 
se; that firing employees could have only an indirect effect on 
interstate commerce; and that the exercise of federal power was, 
therefore, unconstitutional.389 The government attempted to rely on 
the less recently decided "stream of commerce" line of cases.390 
The Analysis the Court did Pursue. The Court determined that 
neither line of precedent was controlling, and moved-more 
implicitly than explicitly-toward a new definition of congressional 
power under the Commerce Clause. 
We do not find it necessary to determine whether these features 
of defendant's business dispose of the asserted analogy to the 
"stream of commerce" cases ... The congressional authority to 
protect interstate commerce from burdens and obstructions is 
not limited to transactions which can be deemed to be an 
essential part of a "flow" of interstate or foreign commerce .... 
The fundamental principle is that the power to regulate 
commerce is the power to enact "all appropriate legislation" for 
its "protection or advancement;" to adopt measures "to promote 
its growth and insure its safety;" "to foster, protect, control, and 
restrain." That power is plenary and may be exerted to protect 
interstate commerce "no matter what the source of the dangers 
which threaten it." Although activities may be intrastate in 
character when separately considered, if they have such a close 
and substantial relation to interstate commerce that their 
386. 301 U.S. 1 (1937). 
387. Id. at 22. 
388. See A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. u. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935); Carter 
u. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238 (1936). 
389. See Jones, 301 U.S. at 34. Firing employees for union organizing activity could 
affect interstate commerce only through a chain of causation involving several 
intervening agencies-including the decision to strike by fellow employees; the 
resulting cessation of producing goods; the resulting cessation of shipping goods; and 
the resulting reduction of goods purchased in other states. Thus, firing employees for 
engaging in union activities could affect interstate commerce only indirectly under 
Carter. See supra text accompanying notes 383·85. 
390. See Jones, 301 U.S. at 34-36. 
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control is essential or appropriate to protect that commerce 
from burdens and obstructions, Congress cannot be denied the 
power to exercise that control .... The question is necessarily 
one of degree.391 
905 
Here, the Court suggests that under the Commerce Clause, 
Congress has the power "to protect interstate commerce from 
burdens and obstructions."392 Justice Hughes elaborates by declaring 
"the fundamental principle" defining Congress' power, and 
articulates that "fundamental principle" in terms that imply a 
reversion to the purpose-centered definition of congressional power 
born in McCulloch, distracted in Gibbons, and implicitly-if 
temporarily-recaptured in Hammer.393 Congress has the power to 
enact all appropriate legislation regarding interstate commerce "for 
its protection or advancement."394 Thereafter, Hughes describes the 
power in terms of infinitive verbs: Congress may adopt measures "to 
promote its growth and ensure its safety .... "395 Further implying an 
approach consistent with that in McCulloch, the Court declared that 
the power it had just sketched-the power to legislate for the 
protection or advancement of interstate commerce-is plenary, and 
may be exercised regardless of the source of the dangers that 
Congress seeks to address. In other words, but still only implicitly, 
Congress may pursue any means of regulation-may regulate any 
subject-so long as its purpose is to protect or to promote interstate 
commerce. 
Yet, this "fundamental principle" is not the only principle 
implied by Justice Hughes' opinion. In addition, Hughes seems to 
view as significant the effects of the regulated activities on interstate 
commerce, but to examine such effects in a way that departed from 
Carter's focus on causal chains. Hughes declared that "it is the effect 
upon commerce, not the source of the injury, which is the 
criterion."396 Though this statement leaves ambiguities as to what 
aspects of "the effect" the Court deemed significant, the ambiguities 
were mitigated when the Court examined the facts of the case-the 
"effects of the unfair labor practices."397 "In view of respondent's far-
flung activities, it is idle to say that the effect upon interstate 
commerce would be indirect or remote. It is obvious that it would be 
391. Id. at 36-37 (emphasis added) (citations omitted). 
392. Id. at 36. 
393. Id. 
394. Id. at 37 (quoting The Daniel Ball, 10 Wall. 557, 564 (1870)). 
395. Id. (quoting County of Mobil v. Kimball, 102 U.S. 691, 696-97 (1880)). 
396. Jones, 301 U.S. at 37 (quoting Second Employers' Liability Cases, 223 U.S. 1, 
51 (1912)). 
397. Id. at 41. 
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immediate and might be catastrophic."398 Here is implied, at least, a 
concern with the magnitude of effects on interstate commerce-
implying a principle that if the subject regulated could have a 
substantial (or catastrophic) effect on interstate commerce, then 
Congress may regulate that subject under Commerce Clause.399 
It should be obvious that Jones' two principles each make very 
different issues of fact constitutionally dispositive. Under the first-
the "fundamental principle" concerned with the purposes for enacting 
the challenged legislation-the Court would need to make 
determinations as to Congress' beliefs about the facts of the world, 
and Congress' purposes in responding to those beliefs. Under the 
second, concerned with the effects of the subject regulated on 
interstate commerce, the Court would need to make determinations 
as to its beliefs about the facts of the world-the Court's judgments 
about the effects of the regulated activity on interstate commerce. 
Thus, these two different principles in Jones would provide very 
different bases for adjudicating challenges to congressional 
legislation. 
Which is a more plausibly "correct" interpretation of the 
Commerce Clause? Hughes made even less effort to derive as 
"correct" either the purpose-centered fundamental principle, or the 
new magnitude-oriented effects principle, than he did to define either 
principle with precision.400 Thus, the Jones opinion left nearly as 
much ambiguity as to the substantive constitutional principles 
defining Congress' Commerce Clause discretion as did Marshall's 
opinion in Gibbons.401 
Elements of an Analysis the Court Should Have Pursued. A 
substantive constitutional principle states limits on governmental 
discretion derived from and evoking values deemed to underlie 
398. Id. 
399. The foregoing explication of Hughes' two principles glosses over the kinds of 
ambiguity, explored above in other doctrinal contexts, resulting from failing to 
structure constitutional doctrine explicitly in terms of substantive constitutional 
principles and adjudicative rules. Though "the fundamental principle" was framed 
implicitly as concerned with legislative purpose, it might have been understood to be 
concerned with the effect of legislation. These two different meanings would hinge on 
the difference between defining Congress' power as that of enacting legislation to 
promote interstate commerce, versus enacting legislation that promotes interstate 
commerce. So understood, the fundamental principle would have an interesting 
relationship to the second principle-which was concerned with the degree of the effect 
of the regulated activity on interstate commerce. For an examination of how the 
purpose-oriented "fundamental principle" relates to this second principle, see infra 
text accompanying notes 409-11. 
400. Rather, the principles were asserted simply as if they were ordained by past 
decisions. See Jones, 301 U.S. at 36-37. 
401. See supra text accompanying notes 350-62. 
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constitutional text.402 Had he explicitly sought to define Congress' 
discretion in such terms, Hughes would have been more likely to 
consider whether a purpose-centered definition of congressional 
authority is, indeed, rooted in values underlying the Commerce 
Clause.403 When form is explicitly connected to content and context, 
doctrinal meaning must be more carefully defined. Further 
development of an analysis the Court might have pursued toward 
deriving-legitimizing-the substantive constitutional principles 
from which twentieth century Commerce Clause doctrine is 
comprised will be deferred until the discussion of United States v. 
Darby, 404 in the next section. 405 
Beyond this, Hughes neglected entirely the derivation and 
definition of the foundational adjudicative rule allocating the burden 
of persuasion. Should laws like the NLRA have been presumed 
impermissible, or presumed permissible? Why? Let us briefly 
consider how the analysis ought to have proceeded. 
As previously suggested, one might allocate the burden of 
persuasion from a probabilistic perspective or a normative 
perspective.406 Whichever perspective one chooses, deriving and 
defining the adjudicative presumption requires clearly identifying 
the applicable substantive constitutional principle with respect to 
which probabilities or normative hierarchies are to be determined.401 
Assume, for the sake of discussion, a substantive constitutional 
principle declaring that if (and only if) Congress pursues a purpose of 
protecting or promoting interstate commerce, then it has plenary 
discretion to choose the means of regulation, and has acted 
402. See supra text accompanying notes 34-35. 
403. Does the specific proposition that Congress may pursue any regulatory means 
(not otherwise prohibited) so long as its purpose is to promote or protect interstate 
commerce emanate from and evoke values underlying the Commerce Clause? How and 
why? If Congress does regulate a subject that qualifies as interstate commerce per se, 
is its discretion still restricted to pursue only the authorized purpose of promoting 
interstate commerce? Why? Alternatively, does defining Congress' discretion in terms 
of the effects of the regulated activity on interstate commerce emanate from and evoke 
values underlying the Commerce Clause? If so, should a court second-guess a 
legislative determination that disparate bargaining power between employers and 
employees depresses the price of labor, which undermines demand, which undermines 
production, which undermines interstate commerce? Should Congress have the right 
to pursue its view of social and economic facts relevant to the creation of economic 
policy, or should courts have priority to substitute their views of the facts of the world? 
Does judicial review only of Congress' bona fides, or of the correctness of Congress' 
judgment as well, better reflect the constitutional allocation of institutional 
responsibilities between Court and Congress? 
404. 312 U.S. 100 (1941). 
405. See infra text accompanying notes 426-35. 
406. See supra text accompanying notes 142-57. 
407. See supra text accompanying notes 142-57, 237-40, 313-23, 347. 
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permissibly. How could Justice Hughes have framed an analysis of 
whether Congress should be presumed to have enacted the National 
Labor Relations Act for such permissible purposes? 
From a probabilistic perspective, deriving and defining the 
adjudicative presumption depends on identifying categorical 
circumstances about the statute in question that suggest a 
probability of constitutionality, or unconstitutionality. For example, 
if one can identify a category of statute that includes the National 
Labor Relations Act, within which a majority would seem to have 
been enacted to protect or promote interstate commerce, then there is 
a basis to presume that the Act is permissible, and to place the 
burden on the challenger to prove that it is among the impermissible 
minority within that category.4os 
From a normative perspective, deriving and defining an 
appropriate adjudicative presumption would depend first, on 
identifying what (of constitutional magnitude) would be lost if the 
Court were to uphold an unconstitutional act, or invalidate a 
permissible act; and second, on determining which constitutional loss 
is more significant, and more to be avoided.409 In Jones, the 
erroneous invalidation of the NLRA would undermine the 
constitutional norm that the national electorate's representatives 
have the right to make policy within the boundaries of their 
constitutionally delegated authority-in particular, the right to make 
policy to protect and promote interstate commerce. The erroneous 
failure to invalidate the NLRA would intrude on the constitutional 
norm that the national government is a limited government of 
enumerated powers, and is limited toward protecting the states' 
discretion to govern themselves without unauthorized federal 
interference. 
Finally, constructing doctrine that explicitly differentiates the 
derivation and definition of substantive constitutional principles and 
adjudicative rules could have facilitated additional clarifying 
refinements in Jones. Recognizing the two kinds of rule would have 
supported exploring whether there was some relationship between 
the "fundamental principle,'' apparently concerned with whether 
Congress acted with a purpose "to protect or to promote" interstate 
commerce, and that other principle, apparently concerned with the 
408. Conversely, if one can identify a category of statute that includes the National 
Labor Relations Act, within which most would seem not to have been enacted to 
protect or promote interstate commerce, then there is a basis to presume that the Act 
is impermissible and to place the burden on the government to prove that it is among 
the permissible minority within that category. For foundational discussion on the 
probabilistic approach for allocating the burden of persuasion in constitutional 
adjudication, see supra text accompanying notes 152-57. 
409. See supra text accompanying notes 142-51. 
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magnitude of the effect of the regulated activity on interstate 
commerce. Is the effect principle inconsistent with the purpose 
principle? If so, which is the "correct" substantive constitutional 
principle, and which should be abandoned? 
Alternatively, the two principles might have been understood as 
synergistically related. The effects principle could have been 
understood as an adjudicative rule developed to help enforce the 
substantive constitutional principle authorizing Congress to act with 
a purpose of protecting or promoting interstate commerce. The 
stronger the basis from which Congress could have concluded that 
the regulated activity-that is, the discriminatory firing of employees 
for engaging in union activities-substantially (and negatively) 
affects interstate commerce, the stronger the basis from which a 
court could infer that Congress' purpose for enacting the NLRA was 
indeed to protect or to promote interstate commerce. Depending on 
whether the foundational adjudicative rule were to establish that 
laws like the NLRA are presumptively permissible, or presumptively 
unconstitutional, the supplementary adjudicative rule establishing 
the relevance of plausible effects could provide the basis for a 
permissible inference, or perhaps a mandatory inference, that 
Congress acted for a constitutionally authorized purpose. 
Framing issues for deriving and defining adjudicative rules is 
necessary, but obviously not sufficient, for framing the rules 
themselves. Complex questions, difficult to resolve, are presented 
whether one pursues a probabilistic or normative framework for 
deriving and defining an adjudicative presumption. There will be 
much more to say about allocating adjudicative presumptions for 
legislation challenged under the Commerce Clause, when discussion 
turns to United States u. Lopez.410 For now, it is sufficient to reiterate 
the basic proposition: Structuring constitutional doctrine by explicitly 
differentiating substantive constitutional principles (and the 
considerations relevant to their derivation and definition) and 
adjudicative rules (and the considerations relevant to their 
derivation and definition) can enhance doctrinal clarity. Though 
Justices might seek to create doctrinal ambiguity for a range of 
reasons, candor and clarity may well be chosen objectives, and for 
good reasons-for example, better fulfilling both the adjudicative and 
political functions.411 
Of course, the Jones Court did not explicitly differentiate 
substantive constitutional principles and adjudicative rules. Perhaps 
it sought ambiguity by design. Perhaps it created ambiguity through 
410. 514 U.S. 549 (1995). See infra text accompanying notes 446-53. 
411. See supra text accompanying notes 39-115. On reasons for doctrinal ambiguity, 
see supra Part III.A. 
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inadvertence. Whatever the case, ambiguity there was, and the ink 
on the pages was barely dry when in Darby, the Court moved, 
implicitly but unmistakably, to a new substantive conception of 
congressional discretion under the Commerce Clause. 
2. United States v. Darby as Counterpoint 
United States v. Darby involved a challenge to two provisions of 
the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 412-§l5(a)(l), which prohibited 
the interstate shipment of goods, if those goods had been produced by 
workers employed for more than maximum hours or for less than a 
minimum wage; and §15(a)(2), which prohibited the employment of 
workers for more than maximum hours or for less than a minimum 
wage, if those workers produced goods to be shipped in interstate 
commerce.413 Note that §15(a)(l) was structurally identical to the 
child labor provisions invalidated in Hammer.414 
The Analysis Justice Stone Did Pursue. Recall the implicit 
substantive constitutional principle from Jones: Congress' discretion 
under the Commerce Clause is defined in terms of authorized 
purposes, and that if Congress acted for the purpose of promoting 
interstate commerce, then the means of regulation are 
constitutionally irrelevant.415 In Darby's consideration of §15(a)(l), 
this principle was turned on its head, when Justice Stone declared: 
The motive and purpose of a regulation of interstate commerce 
are matters for the legislative judgment upon the exercise of 
which the Constitution places no restriction and over which the 
courts are given no control. "The judicial cannot prescribe to the 
legislative departments of the government limitations upon the 
exercise of its acknowledged power." Whatever their motive and 
purpose, regulations of commerce which do not infringe some 
constitutional prohibition are within the plenary power 
conferred on Congress by the Commerce Clause. Subject only to 
that limitation, presently to be considered, we conclude that the 
prohibition of the shipment interstate of goods produced under 
the forbidden substandard labor conditions is within the 
constitutional authority of Congress.416 
In this passage, Justice Stone and the Court reverted to the principle 
embraced in Champion: Congress may act for any purpose, so long as 
the subject regulated is interstate commerce per se.417 
412. Act of June 25, 1938, ch. 676, 52 Stat. 1060 (codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 201 et. seq. 
(2004)). 
413. See Darby, 312 U.S. at 108-10. 
414. See supra text accompanying notes 373-76. 
415. See Jones, 301 U.S. at 33-34. 
416. Darby, 312 U.S. at 115 (citations omitted). 
417. See Champion, 188 U.S. at 355-56. 
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Indeed, rather than positing a congressional purpose to promote 
interstate commerce through § 15(a)(l), the Court supposed Congress 
to have been concerned with the "fairness" of labor conditions and the 
"fairness" of competition between producers in states that mandated 
"fair" employment conditions, and producers in states that did not.418 
Given these concerns, Congress might well have believed that its 
enactment actually would harm the efficiency of production, lessen 
the availability of inexpensive goods, hinder the growth of the 
national economy, and limit the flow of interstate commerce-yet 
despite such beliefs, might well have chosen to sacrifice economic 
productivity toward enhanciiig social "fairness." If so, §15(a)(l) would 
not have been permissible under Jones' implicit substantive 
constitutional principle limiting Congress' Commerce Clause 
discretion to the pursuit of authorized purposes-in particular, the 
purpose of promoting the flow of interstate commerce. 
In upholding §15(a)(2), Justice Stone said: 
The power of Congress over interstate commerce is not confined 
to the regulation of commerce among the states. It extends to 
those activities intrastate which so affect interstate commerce 
or the exercise of the power of Congress over it as to make 
regulation of them appropriate means to the attainment of a 
legitimate end, the exercise of the granted power of Congress to 
regulate interstate commerce.419 
This statement implies two principles with respect to which 
regulations of subjects other than interstate commerce per se may be 
validated: First, Congress may regulate those intrastate activities 
that so affect interstate commerce as to validate their regulation in 
pursuit of "a legitimate end;" second, Congress may regulate those 
intrastate activities that so affect Congress' regulation of interstate 
commerce as to validate their regulation in pursuit of "a legitimate 
end." 
At first glance, these rules seem to connect one principle 
concerned with the legitimacy of legislative purpose and another 
principle concerned with the effects of the regulated activity-a 
connection that begged to be identified in Jones. Upon closer 
examination, however, one concludes that Justice Stone's approach, 
unlike the approach implicit in McCulloch, Hammer, and Jones, does 
not contemplate a limited set of permissible purposes rooted in the 
Commerce Clause itself. 
418. Justice Stone posited that "the evils aimed at by the Act are the spread of 
substandard labor conditions through the . . . facilities of interstate commerce .... 
The Act is thus directed at the suppression of ... competition in interstate commerce 
which it has in effect condemned as 'unfair' . .. . "Darby, 312 U.S. at 122 (emphasis 
added). 
419. Id. at l18. 
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Recall that under Stone's analysis of §15(a)(l), Congress may 
regulate interstate commerce per se for any motive or purpose.420 In 
analyzing §15(a)(2), Stone declares that Congress may regulate 
intrastate activities "which so affect ... the exercise of the power of 
Congress over [interstate commerce] as to make regulation of them 
appropriate means to the attainment of a legitimate end .... "421 The 
ongoing production of goods under substandard labor conditions 
affects Congress' prohibition of shipping such goods in interstate 
commerce-that is, such production affects the exercise of Congress' 
power over interstate commerce.422 Furthermore, when Congress 
prohibits the interstate shipment of goods produced under 
substandard labor conditions, Congress may act for any purpose 
(including for non-economic moral purposes)--any end is legitimate. 
Thus, ancillary to prohibiting the interstate shipment of goods 
produced under substandard labor conditions (the exercise of 
Congress' power over interstate commerce), Congress is 
constitutionally unconstrained in the purposes for which it may 
regulate the intrastate conditions of production themselves. This is 
quite unlike the fair implications of Jones, which seemed to define 
Congress' discretion as restricted with respect to the purposes it may 
pursue, but unrestricted as to the means it may choose for pursuing 
those constitutionally authorized purposes. 
The proposition that under the Commerce Clause, Congress may 
pursue any purpose in regulating activity that is not itself interstate 
commerce was confirmed by Stone's analysis of why §15(a)(2) was 
permissible even unconnected to §15(a)(l). Stone said: 
We think also that §15(a)(2), now under consideration, is 
sustainable independently of § 15(a)(l), which prohibits 
shipment or transportation of the proscribed goods. As we have 
said the evils aimed at by the Act are the spread of substandard 
labor conditions through the use of the facilities of interstate 
commerce for competition by the goods so produced with those 
produced under the prescribed or better labor conditions; and 
the consequent dislocation of the commerce itself caused by the 
impairment or destruction of local businesses by competition 
made effective through interstate commerce. The Act is thus 
directed at the suppression of a method or kind of competition 
in interstate commerce which it has in effect condemned as 
"unfair" . . . . 423 
420. Id. at 115. 
421. Id. at 118. 
422. Such goods cannot be shipped interstate if they are not produced in the first 
place. 
423. Darby, 312 U.S. at 122. 
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According to Stone, the effect on interstate commerce contemplated 
by Congress involved the spread of "substandard" labor conditions.424 
As discussed above, this effect was conceptualized in moral terms, 
not in the economic terms of reduced productivity, reduced demand, 
or a reduced flow of interstate commerce.425 Stone does not posit a 
congressional concern that the regulated activities would cause 
harmful economic effects on interstate commerce; rather, he posits a 
congressional concern that interstate commerce would cause harmful 
effects on local morality-that the dynamics of interstate competition 
would pressure local businesses to employ workers under 
"substandard" conditions. Thus, in upholding §15(a)(2) on a basis 
independent of § 15(a)(l), Stone implies that Congress may regulate 
activity that is not itself interstate commerce if that activity has a 
substantial effect "on" interstate commerce, even when Congress has 
conceptualized, evaluated, and targeted that effect in terms not of 
interstate economic curtailment, but of local moral debasement 
through the mechanisms of interstate commerce. 
Elements of an Analysis Justice Stone Should Have Pursued. A 
substantive constitutional principle states limits on governmental 
discretion derived from and evoking values deemed to underlie 
constitutional text.426 If Justice Stone had framed Darby's analysis 
explicitly in terms of substantive constitutional principles, he would 
have had to confront the following questions: What values could 
explain the particular benefits to be gained by empowering Congress 
to legislate for any purpose, so long as the subject regulated is 
interstate commerce, or in some way substantially affects interstate 
commerce? How do such benefits justify the concomitant sacrifice of 
otherwise retained state legislative autonomy? More fundamentally, 
whose values count-those of the framers and ratifiers, or those of 
some sovereign People otherwise defined? Recognizing, now, that the 
Darby (Champion) approach is very different from that of Jones 
(McCulloch), which better expresses values underlying the commerce 
power for defining the extent-and the limits-of Congress' 
discretion ?427 
Consider the relative merits of the substantive constitutional 
principle implicit in Jones and that implicit in Darby. Jones implied 
424. Id. at 123. 
425. See supra note 418 and accompanying text. 
426. See supra text accompanying notes 34-35. 
427. Without delving too far into what it might entail, Professor Berman refers to 
considerations for evaluating a putative substantive constitutional (operative) 
principle as the "test of fidelity." See Berman, Guillen and Gullibility, supra note 12, 
at 1528-29. For a summary of my views about the criteria with respect to which 
substantive constitutional principles ought to be derived and defined, see infra text 
accompanying notes 467-78. 
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that under the Commerce Clause, Congress may regulate any subject 
for the purpose of promoting interstate commerce. Empowering 
Congress in this way promises certain unambiguous benefits to the 
people of all the states, at least over the long term. We live in a 
material world42B--money and possessions are good; more money and 
possessions are better. If Congress enacts legislation-e.g., 
mandating minimum wages, or prohibiting the discriminatory firing 
of employees-with a purpose of promoting interstate commerce, 
promoting productivity, and creating wealth, the anticipated 
material benefits could compensate for any intrusions on state 
discretion to pursue competing policies.429 
All of this helps to explain why people-the sovereign People of 
the states in 1787-might have chosen to define congressional power 
in terms of authorized purposes, and in particular to define the 
commerce power in terms of the authorized purpose to promote 
interstate commerce. All of this could have been said, and should 
have been, in Jones-indeed, in Gibbons-toward explicitly deriving, 
defining, and legitimizing their implicit substantive constitutional 
principles. What could be said, however, to explain why the sovereign 
People of the states might have chosen to define the commerce power 
in Darby's terms, authorizing Congress to pursue any purpose, so 
long as the subject regulated is interstate commerce, or has some 
kind of substantial effect on interstate commerce? 
Justice Stone's view of the purposes underlying the Fair Labor 
Standards Act, discussed above, imply perhaps the strongest 
rationale for Darby's Commerce Clause doctrines. 
[T]he evils aimed at by the Act are the spread of substandard 
labor conditions through the use of the facilities of interstate 
428. See MADONNA, MATERIAL GIRL (Sire/Warner Bros. 1984). 
429. Of course, Congress might not be correct in predicting the economic 
consequences of its policies. This possibility of predictive error raises the question of 
whether the substantive constitutional principles defining Congress' discretion under 
the Commerce Clause might better be defined in terms of required effects-for 
example, under the Commerce Clause, Congress might be deemed permitted to 
regulate only if its enactment actually will have the effect of promoting interstate 
commerce. But such an approach for defining the substantive boundaries of 
congressional discretion would require a judicial determination as to the effects to be 
anticipated from the regulation in question. It contemplates the priority of a court's 
prediction, superseding the legislature's, about the way the world works-about 
matters of societal fact relevant to policymaking. This seems deeply at odds with 
conventional notions about legislative prerogatives in a democracy. In part because a 
court might err as well, it is ordinarily a matter for legislative judgment to predict and 
to evaluate the effects of laws contemplated or enacted-for example, whether a policy 
of mutually assured destruction would deter a Soviet first strike; or whether lowering 
marginal tax rates would increase tax revenues; or whether reforming welfare would 
encourage its beneficiaries to seek employment; or even whether imposing the death 
penalty deters crime. 
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commerce for competition by the goods so produced with those 
produced under the prescribed or better conditions; and the 
consequent dislocation of the commerce itself caused by the 
impairment or destruction of local businesses by competition 
made effective through interstate commerce. The Act is thus 
directed at the suppression of a method or kind of competition 
which it has in effect condemned as "unfair" .... 430 
915 
Thus, according to Justice Stone, Congress determined that without 
national standards governing minimum wages and maximum hours, 
interstate market forces would spread pressures to pay "unfair" 
wages. Indeed, without national mandates governing decent 
employment conditions, firms in states that favored such standards 
would face "unfair competition" from firms in states that rejected 
such standards.431 Stone anticipates two possible effects of leaving 
low-paying firms and states unconstrained by national standards: 
Either states otherwise inclined to impose mm1mum wage 
requirements would forgo such policies toward enabling their firms 
to remain competitive in the relevant market; or such states will 
persist in imposing minimum wage policies, rendering their firms 
less competitive and vulnerable to being forced out of business. Thus, 
as he apparently viewed Congress' intent in enacting Darby's 
minimum wage requirements, Stone contemplates that national 
standards enacted under the Commerce Clause can be designed to 
prevent "higher morality" states from facing "unfair" economic 
pressure from "lower morality" states to lower their moral standards 
and forgo their preferred policies. 
Might the sovereign People have sought to empower Congress to 
prevent what it views as creeping interstate moral debasement 
through such effects of "unfair" interstate economic competition? 
Perhaps. Yet, the consequences of this "unfair" economic 
competition-the "dislocation" of less efficient firms by more 
productive firms-was among those economic benefits that the 
framers and ratifiers apparently anticipated from freely flowing 
commerce among the states, as fostered by laws enacted by 
Congress.432 If a product could be produced better and cheaper by a 
firm in Georgia than one in Mississippi, the Georgia firm should have 
430. Darby, 312 U.S. at 122 (emphasis added). 
431. Id. 
432. One should emphasize that Congress could, of course, favor wage and hour 
legislation because of a belief that such a policy would stimulate demand, and thereby 
promote interstate commerce, as was the view of congressional policy in Carter and 
Schechter. Where minimum wage legislation is justified on "fairness" grounds, 
however, one might seek minimally decent standards of employment even while 
believing that such standards could retard interstate commerce, or without 
considering the effects of such standards on the volume and vigor of interstate 
commerce. 
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free access to the Mississippi market. The Mississippi firm might fail, 
but its economic energies could be channeled toward the production 
of goods for which it is better suited.433 
Indeed, as suggested by the rationale for Jones' "fundamental 
principle," one can understand why people would sacrifice state 
discretion to pursue their own moral objectives if they anticipate 
gaining wealth, at least in the long-run. Far less plausible is the view 
implicit in Darby-that the people of the states chose to sacrifice 
state discretion to pursue local moral judgments for the sake of 
establishing national moral judgments with no anticipated 
corresponding gain in wealth. What the Darby principle promises, at 
best, would be the opportunity for states to trade occasions when, as 
part of a congressional majority, they can impose their morality (say, 
about minimum wage laws) on states that disagree, for occasions 
when, as part of a congressional minority, they have moral precepts 
imposed on them (say, about child labor). Voters might view trading 
opportunities for national governance on moral questions as 
desirable, but they hardly would anticipate an unambiguous 
benefit-such as the long term wealth production promised by 
conceptualizing the commerce power as does the McCulloch-Jones 
approach. 
Yet, even if it were more plausible that Jones, rather than 
Darby, expresses the original intent for the Commerce Clause, it 
would not necessarily follow that Jones, rather than Darby, is 
"correct." Should substantive constitutional principles defining 
Congress' discretion under the Commerce Clause be defined in terms 
of the original understanding? If so, why? If not, why not? And if not, 
then through what alternative interpretive methodology? How does 
433. In the Federalist No. 11, Alexander Hamilton declared: "Under a vigorous 
national government, the natural strength and resources of the country, directed to a 
common interest, would baffle all the combinations of European jealousy to restrain 
our growth." THE FEDERALIST No. 11, at 87. Although he was discussing the benefits of 
union in relation to Europe-both competition among states for European markets, 
and competition between domestic and European industry-Hamilton here 
contemplates a Commerce Clause authorizing vigorous national policy directed toward 
economic growth. See id. Elsewhere in this Federalist Paper, Hamilton extols the 
virtues of union in relation to establishing a navy, as different ingredients in building 
a navy are best provided by different states and regions. Id. at 89. The point is related 
to the benefits to be derived from a national market of producers and consumers, 
where production proceeds by those firms and in those areas where the highest quality 
can be achieved with least cost. This is a perspective that hardly supports the Darby 
notion that Congress was to be empowered to impose national moral standards on 
conditions of production, even at the cost of economic productivity. Again, of course, 
Congress could well choose to enact the kinds of policy challenged in Darby for 
purposes of promoting economic development and the flow of interstate commerce. See 
supra note 432. 
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that alternative interpretive methodology lead to Darby's 
principles?434 
To have framed constitutional doctrine explicitly in terms of 
deriving and defining substantive constitutional principles and 
adjudicative rules could have made addressing these questions far 
more likely. Explicitly framing constitutional doctrine in terms of 
substantive constitutional principles and adjudicative rules 
inherently requires not only defining each kind of rule for 
adjudicating a constitutional controversy, but also deriuing-
justifying-a rule as a substantive constitutional principle or as an 
adjudicative rule. To have done so might have inhibited Justice 
Stone's reversion to, and expansion of, Champion's license for 
Congress to pursue any purpose under the Commerce Clause.435 And 
even apart from whether Justice Stone still would have moved from 
Jones' purpose-centered definition of congressional power, he could 
have enhanced the definitional clarity and interpretive legitimacy of 
whatever rules he ultimately chose to apply in Darby, had he 
endeavored explicitly to derive and define them as substantive 
constitutional principles for identifying issues of significant fact, and 
concomitant adjudicative rules for resolving those issues of fact. 
3. United States u. Lopez as Counterpoint 
In United States u. Lopez, defendant was convicted of violating 
the Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990, which defined as a crime 
"knowingly to possess a firearm at a place that the individual knows, 
or has reasonable cause to believe, is a school zone."436 Lopez argued 
that Congress had acted beyond its discretion under the Commerce 
Clause in having criminalized such gun possession. This is regarded 
as a case in which a majority of the Court sought to reinvigorate 
federalism-based limits on national legislative power.437 Lopez 
reveals the limitations of a judicial effort to "fix" inherited doctrine, 
without structuring the fix explicitly in terms of substantive 
constitutional principles and adjudicative rules. 
The Analysis Rehnquist Did Pursue. Justice Rehnquist, for the 
majority, began by canvassing established Commerce Clause 
doctrine, stating that Congress may regulate, first, use of the 
channels of interstate commerce; second, the instrumentalities of 
interstate commerce, or persons or things in interstate commerce; 
434. See infra text accompanying notes 467-78. 
435. See Darby, 312 U.S. at 113-17. 
436. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 551. 
437. See, e.g., NORMAN REDLICH, JOHN ATTANASIO, & JOEL K. GOLDSTEIN, 
UNDERSTANDING CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 143 (2005) (characterizing Lopez as "another 
turning point" in the Court's Commerce Clause doctrine). 
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and third, activities that substantially affect interstate commerce.438 
Analyzing the Act under the third doctrinal category, Rehnquist 
implicitly addressed issues relevant to the foundational adjudicative 
rule-that is, whether Congress or the challenger bore the burden of 
persuasion with respect to the "affecting commerce" principle.439 He 
noted the undisputed fact that Congress had failed to make formal 
findings identifying the effects on interstate commerce caused by gun 
possession in a school zone. Rehnquist said: 
Congress normally is not required to make formal findings as to 
the substantial burdens that an activity has on interstate 
commerce. But to the extent that congressional findings would 
enable us to evaluate the legislative judgment that the activity 
in question substantially affected interstate commerce, even 
though no such substantial effect was visible to the naked eye, 
they are lacking here. 440 
This passage suggests that the Court was subjecting this Act to a 
burden of validation that was not applicable to other putative 
exercises of the commerce power. Unlike for other challenged 
legislation, Congress' failure to make such formal findings in the 
Guns-Free School Zones Act counted against its permissibility. 
Indeed, in dissent, Justice Breyer charged that this facet of 
Rehnquist's opinion departed from precedent. 
Courts must give Congress a degree of leeway in determining 
the existence of a significant factual connection between the 
regulated activity and interstate commerce-both because the 
Constitution delegates the commerce power directly to Congress 
and because the determination requires an empirical judgment 
of a kind that a legislature is more likely than a court to make 
with accuracy. The traditional words "rational basis" capture 
this leeway .... Thus, the specific question before us, as the 
Court recognizes, is not whether the "regulated activity 
438. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 558-59. Rehnquist cited Darby for the "use of channels" 
principle, though he referred to the situation addressed by Darby in the second 
category's concern with "things in interstate commerce." Id. He recognized that under 
established doctrine, Congress may regulate use of the channels of interstate 
commerce even to address perceived moral problems, as Darby made clear. Id. It is 
notable that Rehnquist did not mention Jones' "fundamental principle," which seemed 
to harken back to the McCulloch framework for defining Congress' Commerce Clause 
power as involving unlimited discretion to choose the means of regulation, so long as 
the ends are constitutionally authorized. See supra text accompanying notes 329-47. 
Rehnquist thus implicitly confirmed that Darby and its progeny superseded Jones, 
even as his Lopez opinion might be interpreted as an implicit and tentative effort to 
reinvigorate the notion that Congress may act only for economic purposes, at least 
when regulating matter that is not itself interstate commerce. See infra text 
accompanying notes 447-54. 
439. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 562-65. 
440. Id. at 562-63 (citations omitted). 
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sufficiently affected interstate commerce," but, rather, whether 
Congress could have had "a rational basis" for so concluding.441 
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Rehnquist gave two reasons for rejecting this "rational basis" 
deference in enforcing the "substantial effects" principle against the 
Lopez statute-reasons that putatively distinguished that statute 
from all those to which the Court had accorded deference since Jones. 
First, the regulated activity-gun possession in a school zone-is not 
"economic activity."442 Second, deferring to Congress' assertions of 
"inference after inference" about the effects on interstate commerce of 
this "non-economic activity"<>would "convert congressional authority 
under the Commerce Clause to a general police power of the sort 
retained by the States."443 How do these two propositions support 
adjudicative rules less deferential to congressional discretion in 
Lopez than in Jones or Darby? 
As Rehnquist presented his analysis, this retreat from deference 
seems little more than the late twentieth century equivalent to 
earlier crudely articulated fears of congressional aggrandizement-
whether Maryland's position in McCulloch, Calhoun's path to 
nullification, or the Knight-Schechter-Carter era refrain that if 
Congress can do "this," then little would be left for state regulation.444 
Such outcome-reactive paths to nondeferential adjudicative rules 
hardly provide the focused analysis that can enhance the 
adjudicative and political functions of judicial review. 
441. Id. at 616-17. 
442. Id. at 567. 
443. Id. Rehnquist also noted that the Lopez statute "contains no jurisdictional 
element which would ensure, through case-by-case inquiry, that the firearm 
possession in question affects interstate commerce." Id. at 561. However, the absence 
of a statutory requirement that a particular litigant's regulated activity must be 
determined to have a substantial effect on (or some other connection with) interstate 
commerce does not distinguish the Lopez statute from, say, the quota on a farmer's 
winter wheat production upheld in Wickard u. Filburn, and, therefore, does not 
explain why the Court applied a presumption of impermissibility in Lopez and a 
presumption of permissibility in Wickard. Wickard, 317 U.S. at 128-29 (upholding 
regulation because "Congress may properly have considered that wheat consumed on 
the farm where grown, if wholly outside the scheme of regulation, would have a 
substantial effect in defeating and obstructing its purpose to stimulate trade therein at 
increased prices"). 
444. In 1895, the Court said: "[I]f the national power extends to all contracts and 
combinations in manufacture, agriculture, mining, and other productive industries, 
whose ultimate result may affect external commerce, comparatively little of business 
operations and affairs would be left for the state control." United States v. E.C. Knight 
Co., 156 U.S. 1, 16 (1895). In 1935, the Court said: "If the commerce clause were 
construed to reach all enterprises and transactions which ... have an indirect effect 
upon interstate commerce, the federal authority would embrace practically all the 
activities of the people and the authority of the State over its domestic concerns would 
exist only by sufferance of the federal government." Schechter, 295 U.S. at 546. 
920 RUTGERS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 58:4 
Why should it matter whether Congress regulates economic 
activity or non-economic activity? How would lesser deference to 
regulations of non-economic activity prevent transforming the 
commerce power into a general police power? If the subject regulated 
should matter, why not draw a distinction, as the Court once did, 
between regulating interstate commerce itself, and regulating 
intrastate economic activities-whether commerce, manufacturing, 
or mining?445 Why, and how, is the nature of the regulated subject 
significant for deference, or not, in determining whether that 
regulated subject substantially affects i~terstate commerce? 
An Analysis Rehnquist Should Have Pursued. To develop a 
rationale for such lesser deference to regulations of non-economic 
activity in enforcing the "substantial effects" rule, one must consider 
the rationale for the "substantial effects" rule itself. As suggested in 
the discussion of Jones, one might understand a requirement that a 
regulated activity must substantially affect interstate commerce as 
an adjudicative rule for enforcing a substantive constitutional 
principle authorizing congressional action under the Commerce 
Clause if (and only if) Congress' purpose was to promote the flow of 
interstate commerce.446 The adjudicative rule would permit an 
inference of such a permissible purpose if there was a basis for 
Congress to believe that the regulated activity had a substantial, 
adverse effect on the flow of interstate commerce. Assuming such 
functions for the purpose principle (substantive), and the effects 
principle (adjudicative), how might one frame the basic adjudicative 
rule-that is, the adjudicative presumption? Should the government 
bear the burden of proving a permissible purpose-and of proving a 
basis on which Congress could have concluded that the regulated 
activity adversely affected the volume or flow of interstate 
commerce--or should the challenger have the burden of persuasion 
on these issues? 
445. Such is a question posed by Justice Thomas. See 'Lopez, 514 U.S. at 587 
(Thomas, J., concurring). 
446. Recall our earlier consideration of the "effects" principle in Jones. See supra 
text accompanying notes 409-11. We questioned whether this rule was, and should be, 
viewed (implicitly) as a substantive definition of Congress' Commerce Clause 
discretion, or as an adjudicative rule defining permissible inferences about dispositive 
congressional intent from ancillary facts. Under the former view, the Court would be 
called upon to make its own independent judgment as to whether the regulated 
activity substantially affects interstate commerce. Under the latter view, the Court 
would be called upon to determine whether there was a basis for Congress to believe 
that the regulated activity substantially affected interstate commerce, thereby 
providing a plausible basis for concluding that Congress' purpose was to promote or 
protect interstate commerce. See supra note 429. 
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As previously suggested, one might pursue a normative or a 
probabilistic analysis for allocating the burden of persuasion.447 Yet, 
we have seen little promise from the normative approach.448 Would it 
be worse wrongly to determine that Congress did pursue the 
legitimate purpose of protecting or promoting the flow of interstate 
commerce, or wrongly to determine that Congress did not pursue 
such a constitutionally permissible purpose? Does the constitutional 
significance of either error depend on whether Congress regulated 
economic activity or non-economic activity? It is difficult to posit 
how.449 
In determining whether Congress pursued a purpose of 
promoting interstate commerce, might one develop a probabilistic 
rationale for according less deference to regulations of non-economic 
activity than to regulations of economic activity? Is there a basis for 
distinguishing the likelihood that Congress enacted legislation in 
pursuit of such an authorized purpose? Does the distinction between 
regulating economic activity and regulating non-economic activity 
provide such a categorical basis. for allocating different 
probabilistically-rooted adjudicative presumptions? 
Perhaps. Economic activities-such as gathering raw materials, 
manufacturing products for marketing, transporting products for 
marketing, advertising products in pursuit of sales, buying and 
selling products in the market, hiring or firing employees, paying 
wages to employees-may be more likely to have potential effects on 
the volume and flow of interstate commerce than would non-
economic activities such as static possession. If this is so, then it 
seems more likely that Congress could be concerned about a 
substantial effect on interstate commerce if such economic activities 
447. See supra text accompanying notes 142-57. 
448. See supra text accompanying notes 145-51. 
449. Either error would intrude on a fundamental constitutional value. Erroneously 
invalidating a congressional act would intrude on the constitutional value of politically 
accountable lawmaking-that Congress is vested with discretion to legislate within 
constitutional bounds. Erroneously upholding a congressional act would intrude upon 
the constitutional value of federalism-that states retain discretion to legislate 
according to the preferences of their people in those areas where Congress has not 
permissibly enacted preemptive uniform national policy. Determining which value is of 
greater constitutional significance-essential for determining which mistake is more 
to be avoided from the normative perspective-is more demanding than "merely" 
deriving and defining those substantive constitutional principles. See supra text 
accompanying notes 142-51. Identifying substantive constitutional principles and 
determining their relative weight require choosing the interpretive methodology a 
Justice will employ (whether originalism or something else); justifying that 
methodology as the appropriate basis with respect to which to define substantive 
constitutional principles; and applying that interpretive methodology toward 
identifying the content and comparative weight of relevant competing substantive 
constitutional principles. See infra text accompanying notes 467-78. 
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were left unregulated than if non-economic activities were left 
unregulated and, therefore, more likely that Congress would choose 
to regulate economic activities for the purpose of promoting 
interstate commerce than to pursue such a purpose in regulating 
non-economic activities.450 In other words, congressional regulation of 
economic activity suggests a probability that Congress acted for 
purposes of promoting interstate commerce451 that is not suggested 
by the regulation of non-economic activity. Thus, regulations of non-
economic activities may indeed warrant less judicial deference on the 
issue of whether they were enacted for the permissible purpose of 
promoting interstate commerce-and less deference on the issue of 
whether Congress believed that such activities have a substantial 
economic effect on interstate commerce.452 Whether or not these 
propositions are correct, one could not have begun to analyze the 
matter at issue-i.e., whether, and why, regulations of non-economic 
activity should be accorded less judicial deference than regulations of 
economic activity-without having explicitly distinguished between 
substantive constitutional principles and adjudicative rules, their 
respective functions, and the different considerations relevant for 
their respective derivation and definition.453 
450. In Carter, Schechter, Jones, Wickard, Darby, and Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. 
United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964), Congress had regulated economic activities. 
Though Congress might not have enacted each of those regulations for purposes of 
promoting interstate commerce, one reasonably might suppose that it acted for such 
purposes in enacting most of those regulations. 
451. Even if the "substantial effects" principle is viewed not as an adjudicative rule 
for enforcing a substantive principle defined in terms of authorized purposes, but as a 
substantive principle itself, a similar probabilistic rationale also could justify drawing 
a categorical distinction between regulating economic activity versus non-economic 
activity. If one posited that economic activity more likely has a (relevant) substantial 
effect on interstate commerce than does non-economic activity, there would be a 
probabilistically-rooted basis for according more deference to a statute regulating the 
former than to one regulating the latter. 
452. Justice Rehnquist has indicated not that findings of fact are required for 
upholding a regulation of non-economic activity under the Commerce Clause, but that 
such findings would be helpful to support a judicial determination of permissibility. 
See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 562-63 (citations omitted). If the Court were to make the 
factfinding requirement a condition of permissibility, it would present the kinds of 
issue regarding conclusive presumptions addressed above in relation to Justice 
Powell's opinion in Bakke, and Professor Berman's analysis of Miranda's exclusionary 
rule. See supra note 262. 
453. For a similar analysis of Lopez in relation to a putative substantive 
constitutional principle defining Congress' Commerce Clause discretion as limited to 
the pursuit of commercial purposes, see Berman, Guillen and Gullibility, supra note 
12, at 1523-27. It bears repeating that even when analysts do explicitly differentiate 
substantive constitutional principles and adjudicative rules, they may well disagree 
about the content and definition of each kind of rule in particular constitutional 
contexts. Professor Roosevelt, for example, characterizes the substantive constitutional 
principle established in McCulloch as authorizing Congress to regulate "if the 
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4. Enhancing Doctrinal Clarity and Legitimacy Can 
Promote the Adjudicative Function 
923 
From McCulloch and Gibbons, to Champion and Hammer, to 
Jones and Darby, to Lopez today, the Court has struggled to craft a 
paradigm with respect to which Congress' discretion under its 
enumerated powers is to be defined, and has consistently failed to 
derive-to justify-one paradigm or another as a proper 
interpretation of our constitutional law. Through this struggle, it 
created incompatible conceptions. If the part of Gibbons defining "to 
regulate" was correct, than the part defining "commerce among the 
several states" was wrong. If Hammer was correctly decided, then 
Champion was wrong. If Jones' doctrine was correct, then Darby's 
was wrong. 
It matters whether Congress' discretion is defined as limited to 
the pursuit of constitutionally authorized purposes, or as unlimited 
with respect to purposes so long as the subject regulated either is 
itself interstate commerce, or has some substantial effect on 
interstate commerce. Whatever substantive definition is chosen, it 
matters whether that principle is applied with deference, or with an 
intrusive adjudicative rule. Reliably framing constitutional rules 
tailored to fulfilling the two essential and discrete adjudicative 
functions of identifying issues of relevant fact, and resolving those 
factual issues, requires structuring constitutional doctrine explicitly 
in terms of substantive constitutional principles and adjudicative 
rules. 
legislative intent is in fact to regulate interstate commerce." Roosevelt, supra note 20, 
at 1674. Though apparently viewing McCulloch as concerned with legislative purpose, 
this characterization of congressional power begs the question of whether Congress 
must intend to regulate interstate commerce only for particular purposes-e.g., only to 
promote trade and economic productivity. See supra text accompanying notes 419-35. 
The statutes challenged in Champion and Hammer each involved a congressional 
intent to regulate interstate commerce, but as a means of achieving ends other than 
promoting interstate commerce-and the Court had a very different view in each case 
of whether such motives were constitutionally significant. See supra text 
accompanying notes 364-76. Better specifying the content of substantive constitutional 
principles (or operative propositions) must depend on better exploring the implications 
of how such substantive principles ought to be derived and defined-in my view, as a 
function of explicitly identified values deemed to underlie constitutional text. Whether 
one embraces my characterization of the applicable substantive constitutional 
principle, or Roosevelt's, or something else altogether, the basic point remains as to 
the analytical virtues of explicitly differentiating the derivation and definition of 
substantive constitutional principles and adjudicative rules. As Professor Roosevelt 
stated in critiquing the Lopez Court's posture of nondeference as not adequately 
justified: "The failure to distinguish between decision rules and operative propositions 
has . . . led the Court to reject its Commerce Clause decision rules for patently 
inadequate reasons." Roosevelt, supra note 20, at 1699. 
924 RUTGERS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 58:4 
5. Enhancing Doctrinal Clarity and Legitimacy Can 
Promote the Political Function 
The Civil Rights Act of 1964454 prohibits racial discrimination in 
places such as restaurants, theaters, hotels, and amusement parks. 
Two Supreme Court decisions influenced congressional deliberations 
about whether the legislation should be enacted under Section 5 of 
the Fourteenth Amendment or the Commerce Clause. In the 
consolidated case United States v. Stanley455 (Civil Rights Cases), the 
Court invalidated the Civil Rights Act of 1875, which criminalized 
racial discrimination by private individuals in providing "the 
accommodations, advantages, facilities, and privileges of inns, public 
conveyances on land or water, theatres, and other places of public 
amusement .... "456 Congress enacted this landmark legislation 
under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. Justice Bradley, for 
the Court, determined that Section 5 does not empower Congress to 
regulate private conduct, but only to constrain state action that 
subverts "the fundamental rights specified in the amendment."457 
Proponents of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 were concerned that if 
Congress proceeded under the Fourteenth Amendment, their bill 
would suffer the same fate as did the 1875 Act. Yet, because Darby 
had determined that Congress may legislate for moral ends so long 
as the subject regulated had some substantial effect on interstate 
commerce, the bill's proponents had reason to expect that it would be 
deemed permissible if enacted under the Commerce Clause. Some 
still favored relying on Section 5, however, arguing that combating 
racial discrimination is a moral matter, that connecting the issue to 
commerce obfuscates those moral issues, and that Congress' 
objectives far better fit the values underlying the Fourteenth 
Amendment than those underlying the commerce power. Typical 
were the positions of Senator Pastore of Rhode Island, and Senator 
Cooper of Kentucky. Pastore said: 
I believe in this bill, because I believe in the dignity of man, not 
because it impedes our commerce. I don't think any man has 
the right to say to another man, ''You can't eat in my restaurant 
because you have a dark skin." ... And that is the reason I 
want to vote for this law.458 
454. 42 U.S.C. § 2000(a) (2000). 
455. 109 U.S. 3 (1883). 
456. Id. at 9 (quoting Civil Rights Act of 1875, 18 Stat. 335, § 2). 
457. Id. at 11. 
458. See GERALD GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-CASES AND MATERIALS 202 
(10th ed. 1980). 
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Cooper went a bit further, suggesting that relying on the Commerce 
Clause requires limiting the reach of the bill's prohibitions in ways 
that are unwarranted and that otherwise might not be necessary. 
I do not suppose that anyone would seriously contend that ... 
Congress . . . suddenly determined, after all these years, that 
segregation is a burden on interstate commerce. We are 
considering the legislation because we believe . . . that all 
citizens have an equal right to . . . the equal use of 
accommodations held out to the public . . . . [I]t is a right of 
citizenship and a constitutional right under the 14th 
amendment. It has nothing to do with whether ... 
discrimination against individuals places a burden on 
commerce. It does not depend upon the commerce clause, and 
cannot be limited by that clause .... 459 
Those who favored relying on the commerce power argued that 
Darby provided a safe foundation for the bill, while the Civil Rights 
Cases rendered Section 5 shaky at best. Robert Kennedy, the 
Attorney General, pressed the point in his congressional testimony: 
We base this on the commerce clause which I think makes it 
clearly constitutional .... I think there is argument about the 
14th amendment basis-going back to the 1883 Supreme Court 
decision, and the fact that this is not state action-therefore 
Congress would not have the right under the 14th amendment 
to pass any legislation dealing with it .... [W]e are not going 
beyond any principle of the use of the commerce clause that has 
not already been clearly ... ruled on by the courts. We are not 
stretching the commerce clause. 460 
These statements illustrate the political function of judicial 
review. Political actors accounted for not only the Court's decisions, 
but also its reasoning. Yet, while congressional debate was 
influenced by Darby and the Civil Rights Cases, the doctrine of 
neither case had been effectively legitimized as "correct." The Civil 
Rights Cases did derive interpretation of Section 5 power on textual 
and originalist grounds, but so much had changed since 1883 that 
the Court's interpretive rationale warranted at least reexamination, 
if not rejection. In Darby, as suggested above, the Court had made no 
effort toward justifying its implicit substantive constitutional 
principles as "originalist," or as a correct expression of any other 
459. Id. at 201. 
460. Id. at 199. Burke Marshall, Assistant Attorney General of the Civil Rights 
Division, echoed Kennedy. "I think it would be a mistake to rely solely on the 14th 
amendment. This bill ... relies on the 14th amendment, and also on the Commerce 
Clause. I think it is plainly constitutional. I think if it relied solely on the 14th 
amendment, it might not be held constitutional. I think it would be a disservice to pass 
a bill that was later thrown out by the Supreme Court." Id. at 202. 
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identified and justified interpretive methodology.461 But Darby's 
then-recent vintage offered a path of less resistance, even for 
members of Congress who sensed a discontinuity in pursuing 
primarily moral objectives through a power that seemed concerned 
primarily with economic development. 
Consider how different congressional deliberation about the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964 might have been had the Court clarified Jones' 
"fundamental principle" through explicitly differentiating 
substantive constitutional principles and adjudicative rules, rather 
than abandoning that "fundamental principle" in Darby.462 Suppose, 
for example, the Court had defined a substantive constitutional 
principle declaring that Congress may act under the Commerce 
Clause whenever (but only if) its purpose is to promote or protect the 
development of interstate commerce. Suppose, as well, that the Court 
had defined adjudicative rules declaring that when Congre(:ls 
regulates economic activities, it will be presumed to have acted for 
those authorized purposes; and, further, that when there is a basis 
from which Congress plausibly could have determined that the 
regulated activity substantially affects interstate commerce, there is 
a basis for concluding that Congress acted to promote interstate 
commerce. 
In a context of such judicial declarations, it would not have been 
plausible to argue that pursuing moral purposes under the 
Commerce Clause is permissible. 463 The positions of Senators Cooper 
and Monroney would have had constitutional force beyond 
persuasiveness on grounds of mere policy. Despite that, proponents 
such as the Attorney General could have emphasized the deferential 
adjudicative rules (implicit in Jones but which we have 
hypothetically posited were made explicit). They could have 
pretextually emphasized economic objectives, while deemphasizing 
moral motives. Members of Congress would have more understood 
that they could choose to respect a clearly derived and defined 
substantive constitutional principle limiting Congress to purposes of 
promoting interstate commerce; or choose to violate that principle by 
acting pretextually, anticipating that the bill could have been upheld 
pursuant to deferential adjudicative rules. "Duly instructed," 
members of Congress could have chosen policy more responsibly. 
461. See supra text accompanying notes 426-27. 
462. See supra text accompanying notes 428-35. 
463. Even with Darby's departure from Jones' "fundamental principle" that 
implicitly defined Congress' Commerce Clause power in terms of limited permitted 
purposes-purposes of promoting or protecting interstate commerce-members of 
Congress were uncomfortable about using the commerce power for moral purposes. See 
supra text accompanying notes 459-60. 
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Furthermore, had the Court clarified and legitimized Jones, 
rather than departing from it in Darby, the Civil Rights Cases, eight 
decades old by 1964, might have seemed the less daunting obstacle. 
Legislative creativity could have been devoted to developing new 
arguments about the nature and definition of state action. For 
example, private discrimination in the provision of services could 
have been connected to state action by recognizing that such private 
discrimination depended significantly on state enforcement of 
trespass laws. Building on McCulloch's definition of congressional 
power in terms of unlimited discretion to choose the means of 
regulation toward achieving a constitutionally authorized end, 
prohibiting private discrimination could have been viewed as a 
chosen means toward the constitutionally authorized end of 
preventing state law enforcement from discriminating because of the 
racism of the private service providers.464 Alternatively, as suggested 
by Akhil Amar, prohibiting private racial discrimination could have 
been viewed as a means of securing equal citizenship to blacks, 
mandated pursuant to Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment.465 
Or, building on Bolling, Brown, and Loving, proponents could have 
developed arguments that the definition of congressional power 
464. Cf. Shelley, 334 U.S. 1. In Palmore v. Sidoti, a father challenged his former 
wife's custody of their daughter because the mother, a white woman, had married a 
black man. The state court determined that "the best interests of the child" would be 
threatened by the taunts the child would face about her black step-father. 466 U.S. at 
431. Justice Burger, for the Court, invalidated the custody decision because the 
custody decree accommodated the anticipated racist response of private actors. Id. at 
433-34. 
There is a risk that a child living with a stepparent of a different race may be 
subject to a variety of ... stresses not present if the child were living with 
parents of the same racial ... origin. The question, however, is whether the 
reality of private biases ... are permissible considerations for removal of an 
infant child from the custody of its natural mother .... The Constitution 
cannot control such prejudices but neither can it tolerate them. Private 
biases may be outside the reach of the law, but the law cannot, directly or 
indirectly, give them effect. 
Id. (emphasis added). Burger's opinion is significant in suggesting that even if the 
purpose of a government official is not itself rooted in racist values or stereotypes-as 
the family court judge seemed to be concerned with sparing the child from taunts she 
would bear from one custody arrangement but not from the other-a governmental 
purpose to accommodate private racism is impermissible. This notion would be readily 
applicable to a state's even-handed enforcement of trespass laws, where the owner of 
private commercial property discriminated because of race in determining which 
customers to permit where. If state action accommodating anticipated private racism 
can be viewed as a violation of equal protection in Palmore, then state action 
accommodating actual private racism (a race-motivated call to enforce trespass laws) 
could be so understood as well. See supra note 92. 
465. See Amar, supra note 17, at 105-07. 
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under Section 5 should be derived by interpretive methodologies 
other than originalism. 
Even had the Court decided Darby as it did, but in a way that 
explicitly sought to derive its substantive constitutional principle as 
"correct" interpretation, the political function of judicial review also 
could have been enhanced. Members of Congress might have felt less 
concerned about enacting the Civil Rights Act of 1964 for moral 
purposes had the Court persuasively explained the permissibility of 
pursuing such purposes as derived from and expressing values 
deemed to underlie the Commerce Clause. Alternatively, if the 
Court's explicit derivation of Darby's substantive principles had been 
unpersuasive, conscientious members of Congress could have better 
understood why using the Commerce Clause for moral purposes 
should indeed be viewed as constitutionally problematic-and should 
be avoided-despite having been deemed permissible by the Court. 
In short, the better instructed political actors are about the 
derivation and definition of the substantive constitutional principles 
by which they should view their discretion constrained, the better 
able they will be to make informed decisions about what policies 
should be understood as constitutionally problematic and why, what 
precedents should be viewed as binding and how, and what areas of 
substantive constitutional doctrine appropriately might be 
questioned. Judicial opinions that frame substantive constitutional 
principles by explicitly identifying the values deemed to underlie 
constitutional text,· and the interpretive methodology with respect to 
which such values were identified, would better enable legislators 
and other political actors to account for such values when deciding 
which policies to pursue, and which to eschew. 
IV. TOWARD FULFILLING THE ADJUDICATIVE AND POLITICAL 
FUNCTIONS: A TEMPLATE FOR STRUCTURING CONSTITUTIONAL 
DOCTRINE 
The foregoing has suggested that constitutional doctrine should 
be structured in a way that explicitly differentiates substantive 
constitutional principles and adjudicative rules. This section suggests 
a template of issues that judges should address in deriving and 
defining each kind of rule. 
Explicitly Deriving and Defining Substantive Constitutional 
Principles. First, a judge must identify the interpretive methodology 
with respect to which she will endeavor to derive and define relevant 
values and to frame applicable substantive constitutional principles. 
Second, whether the judge identifies originalism, conventional 
morality, Dworkian principle, representation-reinforcement, 
republican aspiration, or something else, she must justify her choice 
of methodology. Justification is all the more important when the 
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judge employs one interpretive method for resolving some issues of 
constitutional meaning, and another interpretive method for 
resolving other issues of constitutional meaning. Identifying 
interpretive method, and justifying such a choice, is essential for 
addressing every question of substantive constitutional meaning, to 
prevent Justices from claiming to pursue a consistent approach, even 
as they cherry-pick contexts in which to abide by their protestations, 
and those in which freely to depart.466 
Though well beyond the scope of this Article, it might be helpful 
briefly to address some ways in which a judge might endeavor to 
justify her choice of interpretive methodology. Justice Marshall's 
opinion in Marbury v. Madison467 is foundationally instructive. In 
interpreting and enforcing the Constitution's mandates, Marshall 
recognized the need to identify the sovereign-the authority whose 
values ought to have been enforced. Marshall identified "the people" 
who created the Constitution as the sovereign. He declared: 
That the people have an original right to establish, for their 
future government, such principles as, in their opinion, shall 
most conduce to their own happiness, is the basis on which the 
whole American fabric has been erected.468 
466. Justice Thomas insists on originalism for interpreting the Commerce Clause. 
See, e.g., Morrison, 529 U.S. at 627 ("Until this Court replaces its existing Commerce 
Clause jurisprudence with a standard more consistent with the original 
understanding, we will continue to see Congress appropriating state police powers 
under the guise of regulating commerce."). Yet, he also insists on a decidedly 
nonoriginalist interpretation of the Equal Protection Clause-that all laws containing 
racial classifications are prohibited. See supra note 320. Consider, as well, Justice 
Blackmun's different methodologies for interpreting the words "liberty'' and "person" 
in the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause. See Roe, 410 U.S. at 129-68. 
Blackmun employed a methodology akin to a Dworkinian pursuit of coherent principle 
for interpreting the word "liberty'' as including the right to choose to terminate 
pregnancy. See id. at 153 ("This right of privacy ... founded in the Fourteenth 
Amendment's concept of personal liberty ... is broad enough to encompass a woman's 
decision whether ... to terminate her pregnancy."). Blackmun employed originalism 
for interpreting the word "person" in that very same clause as not including a human 
fetus. Id. at 157-58 ("The Constitution does not define 'person' in so many words .... 
'Person' is used in other places in the Constitution .... [I]n nearly all these instances, 
the use of the word is such that it has application only post-natally .... All this, 
together with our observation ... that throughout the major portion of the 19th 
century prevailing legal abortion practices were far freer than they are today, 
persuades us that the word 'person,' as used in the Fourteenth Amendment, does not 
include the unborn."). 
467. 5 U.S. 137 (1803). What follows in the text above anticipates analysis to be 
presented in my work-in-progress, tentatively entitled "Reconceptualizing 
Originalism." 
468. Id. at 176. As previously discussed, Marshall predicated his opinion in 
McCulloch on this foundational norm of sovereignty as well. See supra note 342 and 
accompanying text. 
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Having identified the governing sovereign, everything else fell 
into place for evaluating and choosing interpretive methodologies. If, 
indeed, the People who created the Constitution in 1787 are the 
sovereign, if they have the right to their preferred constitutional 
values, then Marshall is their servant, and his interpretive goal 
should be to identify the constitutional choices they made.469 For 
Marshall, fulfilling this interpretive goal warranted an interpretive 
methodology known today as "originalism," and involved analyzing 
all reliably relevant evidence indicating the intent of the framers and 
ratifiers-from constitutional language, to records of debates, to 
other aspects of the political context in which the text was framed 
and ratified.470 
Of course, for judges deciding cases a century or two after the 
ratification of constitutional text, the justification of interpretive 
method could not be as direct as was Marshall's. In 2006, who is the 
sovereign whose values ought to be vindicated? Is it the People, long 
since dead, who created the text in question, or the People today, who 
not only are governed by the Court's interpretations, but who have 
the uncontested right to create their own constitutional provisions 
and to select Supreme Court Justices? How one answers these 
foundational questions must have far reaching implications for 
articulating an interpretive goal, and justifying an interpretive 
methodology for achieving that goal.m 
Third, having identified and justified an interpretive 
methodology, the judge should, through applying that methodology, 
identify values that underlie the relevant constitutional text. Toward 
this end, it is critical to recognize that there are inevitably competing 
values underlying the meaning of all constitutional provisions-as 
the original understanding of unconstitutional racial discrimination 
accommodated an aspiration for racial equality with continuing 
racist notions;472 and the original understanding of liberties specially 
protected against state intrusion by the Due Process Clause 
accommodated an aspiration for individual liberty with ordinary 
469. This, or some variation on the idea, would be the implicit interpretive goal. 
One variation would seek to identify not only the constitutional choices actually made 
by the sovereign People, but also the choices they would have made, had they thought 
about an issue not actually contemplated. Justice Jackson suggested such a notion 
when he said, "Just what our forefathers did envision, or would have envisioned had 
they foreseen modern conditions, must be divined from materials almost as enigmatic 
as the dreams Joseph was called upon to interpret for Pharaoh." Youngstown Sheet & 
Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 634 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring). 
470. See BORK, supra note 78, at 165 (discussing "abundant sources" for inferring 
the original understanding of particular constitutional provisions). 
4 71. For more on possible interpretive methodologies, see supra text accompanying 
notes 136-38. 
472. See Chang, Constitutional Intent, supra note 41, at 833-38. 
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concerns for social order through law;473 and the original 
understanding of Congress' limited enumerated powers 
accommodated the pursuit of benefits anticipated through 
authorizing the creation of national policy with a continuing desire 
for state autonomy.474 
Identifying such competing values underlying constitutional text 
is necessary for providing a foundation from which applicable 
substantive constitutional principles can be meticulously derived and 
defined, and for identifying the normative framework within which 
judges and political actors should understand the meaning of such 
principles. Identifying the normative framework within which 
substantive constitutional principles ought to be understood is 
essential for transforming otherwise abstract and formulaic doctrine 
into normatively evocative declarations. Framing substantive 
constitutional principles as normatively evocative declarations is 
critical toward fulfilling Madison's and Hamilton's vision of a value-
based constitutionalism capable of securing "the permanent and 
aggregate interests of the community'' against the short-sighted 
impulses of majority faction.475 
Fourth, having identified the competing values underlying 
constitutional text, the judge should carefully frame the elements of 
a substantive constitutional principle in a way that is derived from, 
expresses, and serves the implications of those values. Of course, the 
crystallization of mature doctrine will take time.476 But once doctrine 
has matured, the Court should explain the connection between each 
element of the substantive constitutional principle and the identified 
competing underlying values. The Court should endeavor to address 
473. Id. at 811-14. 
474. Unless a policy is constructed from competing public values, there is no need 
for a constitutional mandate to force a greater commitment to one side of those 
competing values than Congress can be trusted to respect. It is the competition of 
values, and an anticipated congressional inclination to favor one side of that 
competition, that provides a rationale for constitutional mandates forcing a greater 
commitment (than Congress can be trusted to respect) to the other side of that 
competition. See Chang, Critique, supra note 37, at 293-95; see also supra text 
accompanying notes 39-51. 
475. Having defined "faction" as "a number of citizens, whether amounting to a 
majority or minority of the whole, who are united by some common impulse of passion, 
or of interest, adverse to the rights of other citizens, or to the permanent and 
aggregate interests of the community," THE FEDERALIST No. 10, at 78, Madison defines 
"the great object to which our inquiries are directed" as "secur[ing] the public good and 
private rights against the danger of ... a [majority] faction." Id. at 80. 
4 76. See supra text accompanying notes 117-18. 
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any ambiguities in each element's meaning, and either resolve those 
ambiguities, or explain why they remain.477 
Explicitly Deriving and Defining Adjudicative Rules. As 
suggested throughout this Article, different considerations must 
underlie the derivation and definition of substantive constitutional 
principles and adjudicative rules. Framing adjudicative rules must 
be guided by the goal of best avoiding error in resolving those issues 
of fact made relevant by the elements of the applicable substantive 
constitutional principle, and in applying those elements to the facts 
found. 
First, toward deriving and defining an adjudicative rule for 
enforcing the applicable substantive constitutional principle, that 
substantive principle must be clearly identified.478 This, of course, 
will have been achieved if the foregoing parts of this "template" have 
been followed. 
Second, the judge must identify (and justify) the analytical 
method through which she will derive and define the foundational 
adjudicative rule--the presumption of permissibility or 
impermissibility. Is the adjudicative presumption to be determined 
through a normative analysis, identifying the constitutional costs 
that would be incurred through an erroneous invalidation of the 
challenged act (and the erroneous intrusion on the foundational norm 
477. Close attention to substantive constitutional principles as derived from and 
evoking values deemed to underlie relevant text is necessary not only for framing new 
doctrine, but also for an effective critical taxonomy of existing doctrine. One might 
quibble, for example, which Professor Roosevelt's analysis of the Court's doctrine for 
adjudicating equal protection challenges to laws that discriminate because of gender. 
Roosevelt focuses on the shift from Bradwell v. State, 83 U.S. 130 (1872) (in which the 
Court upholds a state bar against the practice of law by women), to Frontiero v. 
Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973) (in which the Court's plurality applies "strict 
scrutiny'' to gender classifications), as a shift in "decision rules" that had "lost their fit 
with the underlying operative proposition-discrimination against women had shifted 
from natural to invidious." See Roosevelt, supra note 20, at 1688. Roosevelt is correct, 
in my view, in suggesting that there had been a shift in the implicit substantive 
constitutional principle. But what warrants emphasis in this context is less that 
Frontiero was part of a reform of adjudicative (decision) rules to fit changed 
substantive constitutional (operative) principles but, rather, the change in substantive 
constitutional principle itself. What was the new substantive definition of 
unconstitutional gender discrimination? I would suggest that the Court was moving 
toward a substantive constitutional principle prohibiting purposes rooted in gender 
role-typing or stereotyping-a destination rather clearly reached in Mississippi 
University for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718 (1982). If this is, indeed, the definition of 
the applicable substantive constitutional principle, through what interpretive 
methodology is it derived? These questions concerning the derivation and definition of 
substantive constitutional principles must be raised and addressed as prior to, and 
more fundamental than, the derivation, definition, and "fit" of adjudicative (decision) 
rules for their enforcement. 
478. See supra text accompanying notes 234-40. 
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of electorally accountable discretion within constitutional 
boundaries), or an erroneous failure to invalidate (and the erroneous 
intrusion on the particular substantive constitutional values at 
issue)?479 Or is the adjudicative presumption to be determined 
through a probabilistic analysis, identifying a category of 
governmental act, including the one in question, suggesting a 
probability of permissibility, or impermissibility, with respect to the 
substantive constitutional principle at issue?480 Or, is the 
presumption to be determined through some combination of the 
normative and probabilistic approaches? 
Third, whatever analytical method is identified (and justified) 
for deriving and defining the adjudicative presumption, the judge 
must apply that method to the particular doctrinal context presented 
and, of course, actually frame the adjudicative presumption. 
Fourth, the judge might frame supplemental adjudicative rules 
tailored to resolving the issues of fact made relevant by the 
applicable substantive constitutional principle. Such supplemental 
adjudicative rules could be derived from the relationships among the 
substantive constitutional principle, the foundational adjudicative 
presumption, and the rationale for that adjudicative presumption. 
They could include rules identifying categories of evidence relevant 
to establishing essential elements of the substantive constitutional 
principle,481 or rules identifying ancillary facts from which 
permissible or mandatory inferences of dispositive fact ought to be 
drawn.482 
479. See supra text accompanying notes 142-51. 
480. See supra text accompanying notes 152-57, 198-207, 446-53. 
481. In Arlington Heights, for example, Justice Powell identified several categories 
of evidence that a challenger could employ to meet its burden to show that a facially 
neutral law was motivated at least in part by an impermissible racially discriminatory 
purpose. Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 266-67. 
482. One might understand the substantial (economic) effects principle from Jones, 
for example, as an adjudicative rule establishing a basis from which a court may, or 
must, draw an inference of congressional purpose to promote the volume or flow of 
interstate commerce. See supra text accompanying notes 409-11. One might 
understand the requirement of factfinding in Powell's Bakke opinion as an 
adjudicative rule establishing a basis from which a court must draw an inference of 
purposes rooted in racial stereotypes. See supra text accompanying notes 258-62. One 
. might understand Justice Rehnquist's preference for congressional findings of fact in 
Lopez as an adjudicative rule establishing a basis from which a court must draw an 
inference of purposes other than one to promote the volume or flow of interstate 
commerce. See supra text accompanying notes 447-54. 
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V. CONCLUSION: TOWARD CONSTITUTIONAL DOCTRINE CLEARLY 
ROOTED IN, AND EXPRESSNE OF, LEGITIMIZED PUBLIC VALUES 
Like doctrine in other areas of law, constitutional doctrine 
should be comprised of two explicitly differentiated kinds of legal 
rule. Substantive constitutional principles should be framed for 
determining which facts have what legal significance-for identifying 
issues of legally relevant fact. Adjudicative rules, most 
fundamentally rules allocating the burden of persuasion, should be 
framed for resolving those issues of fact, and for applying the 
substantive law to the facts found. Substantive constitutional 
principles should be derived from and evoke values deemed to 
underlie particular provisions of constitutional text. Adjudicative 
rules should be derived from concerns for minimizing the costs of 
making erroneous findings of fact, and of reaching erroneous 
conclusions about a challenged policy's constitutionality, under 
applicable substantive standards. 
Unlike doctrine in other areas of law, constitutional doctrine has 
not been framed in a structure that explicitly differentiates the 
derivation and definition of substantive principles and adjudicative 
rules. Rather, the Supreme Court has created formulaic doctrine,483 
in context after constitutional context, that fails to serve relevant 
underlying values, fails to identify and define necessary elements, 
and conflates considerations relevant to defining what must be 
proved and those relevant to defining how that proof is to be made. 
Failing explicitly to differentiate the derivation and definition of 
substantive constitutional principles and adjudicative rules results in 
ambiguities that undermine the adjudicative function of judicial 
review. Ambiguity in defining substantive constitutional principles 
risks adjudicating issues of fact that ought to be irrelevant, and 
neglecting issues of fact that ought to be dispositive. Failing 
explicitly to derive and define adjudicative rules risks erroneously 
allocating the burden of persuasion. Ill-framed substantive rules for 
identifying issues of significant fact, and ill-framed adjudicative rules 
for resolving those issues of fact, can only increase the risks of both 
upholding government action that "in fact" is unconstitutional and 
striking down government action that "in fact" is not 
unconstitutional. 
483. See, e.g., Robert F. Nagel, The Formulaic Constitution, 84 MICH. L. REV. 165, 
202-03 (1985); Amar, supra note 17, at 27 (suggesting that to focus on synthesizing 
constitutional doctrine rather than on ascertaining the Constitution's meaning is "to 
miss the point of many constitutional rights and structures-to spend too much time 
pondering arid formulas and not enough time recalling the world the Constitution 
rejected and imagining the world it promised"). 
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Furthermore, failing explicitly to differentiate the derivation and 
definition of substantive constitutional principles and adjudicative 
rules results in ambiguities that undermine the political function of 
judicial review. When political actors are not effectively informed 
about the elements of their conduct that render government action 
unconstitutional, they could be both undeterred from enacting an 
impermissible law and deterred from enacting a permissible law. 
Either way, an essential objective of constitutionalism-the exercise 
of political will within constitutional boundaries-is thwarted. 
In our democracy, legal rules are created and enforced to serve 
public values-values that ought to be publicly identified, contested, 
and selected. No less than for contract law, or tort law, or criminal 
law-and perhaps more so-constitutional law foundationally ought 
to be about preferred public values. There is no other reason for a 
body of superior law that governs inferior law, or for a practice in 
which judges appointed "during good behavior" exercise a power that 
is designed to supersede the decisions of officials accountable to the 
People. 
Our processes of constitutional democracy establish the 
framework within which disagreements about governing public 
values are to be resolved. The familiar counter-majoritarian difficulty 
of judicial review underscores the importance of ensuring, to the 
extent possible, that constitutional cases are properly decided, and 
that public officials are duly instructed about the boundaries of 
political discretion, according to rightly framed substantive 
constitutional commandments. Hamilton's rationale for judicial 
review was predicated on the faith that federal judges have the 
capacity and inclination to exercise judgment, not will, and thereby 
effectively to identify the Constitution's meaning and enforce its 
mandates.484 
Eternal debates about whether Dred Scott was "correctly" 
decided--or Plessy, Brown, Loving, or Roe-are premised on the 
notion that there is such a thing as deciding a constitutional 
controversy "correctly;" that there is such a thing as Hamiltonian 
interpretive "judgment;" and-a critical point-that criteria for 
decisional correctness are different from questions of political 
desirability. The political function of judicial review contemplates 
that political actors will abide by the fair implications of decided 
cases-e.g., feeling constitutionally free, if so inclined, to create 
separate but equal facilities for blacks and whites after Plessy, and 
feeling constitutionally constrained from maintaining racially 
segregated public schools after Brown; feeling constitutionally free, if 
so inclined, to criminalize sexual conduct between people of the same 
484. See supra text accompanying notes 42-44. 
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gender after Bowers u. Hardwick,485 and feeling constrained from 
doing so after Lawrence u. Texas.486 
Thus, it matters greatly that the Court's voice, as oracle of 
constitutional meaning, explicitly defines substantive principles, 
explicitly predicated on identified values, explicitly derived through 
an identified and plausibly legitimate interpretive methodology. If 
not, the justification for a judicial opinion intervening in politically 
accountable decisionmaking, or refraining from intervening, is no 
more compelling than would be intervention decided through the flip 
of a coin. Doctrine that does not explicitly differentiate the derivation 
and definition of substantive constitutional principles and 
adjudicative rules intertwines discrete functions, risks the unreliable 
adjudication of constitutional controversies, and leaves unfulfilled 
the promise of a judicial participation in our democratic 
constitutionalism that legitimately clarifies foundational values and 
appropriately enriches public debate. 
Through constitutionalism, the American people pursue a better 
version of our laws and our politics--one that seeks "the permanent 
and aggregate interests of the community" more than we otherwise 
would.487 Through constitutionalism, the American people attend to 
certain values---constitutionally selected values-more than we 
otherwise would.488 If judicial review is to serve its adjudicative and 
political functions, if judicial review is to help the People and our 
representatives toward better self-governance, then judges must 
pursue a better version of constitutional doctrine.489 Practical or 
merely ideal, embraced or debated, the proposition that 
constitutional doctrine-like doctrine in other areas of law--ought to 
be framed in terms that explicitly differentiate the derivation and 
definition of substantive principles and adjudicative rules, could 
reform the ways in which the legally-trained and lay alike think 
about constitutional law. Less formalistic, less formulaic, less 
technically foreign, and more derived from and expressive of clear 
and legitimized public values, doctrine comprised of explicitly derived 
and defined substantive constitutional principles and adjudicative 
485. 478 U.S. 186 (1986). 
486. 539 U.S. 558 (2003). 
487. THE FEDERALIST No. 10, at 83. 
488. See Chang, Constitutional Intent, supra note 37, at 774-84; Chang, Critique, 
supra note 37, at 293-95. 
489. Richard Fallon, who Amar views as more concerned with the doctrine than 
with the document, Amar, supra note 17, at 27, and who urges a "theory of the second-
best" when Justices cannot agree as to what constitutes "fidelity" to the Constitution, 
Fallon, supra note 17, at 117, nevertheless recognizes that the foundational reason for 
judicial review is the "successful specification and implementation of constitutional 
values ... . "Id. at 142. 
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rules could be the basis for better judicial decisions in adjudicating 
cases, and better political debate about the constitutional 
implications of legislative options. If this does not describe the best 
that judicial review can do, it at least may describe a step in the right 
direction. 
*** 
